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Preface
The 1992 Annual Conference of the Norwegian Association for
Development Research (NFU) was hosted by the Chr. Michelsen Institute
(CMI) in cooperation with the Centre for Development Studies at the
University of Bergen. It took place at the Institute 21-23 May, and attracted
more than 100 participants. The main theme was Development theory. The
Conference inc1uded three sessions with invited speakers, two parallei
sessions for presentation of papers, and the NFU Annual Meeting. Arve
Ofstad, Ame Wiig and Marianne Serck-Hanssen (secretary) were
responsible for the programme and organisation.
These Proceedings are arranged in three parts along the lines of topics
discussed in the sessions at the Conference. It inc1udes all contributions at
the Conference, also the few that were not yet availab1e at the time. Most
of the papers have been revised and edited. The technical editing has been
undertaken by Inger A. Nygaard.
We wish to thank the Norwegian Research Council for Science and the
Humanities (NAVF) for financial support for the Conference, as well as for
preparation and publication of these Proceedings.
The editors
v
Introduction
Arve Ofstad and Arne Wiig, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen
Eight years ago, in 1985, the main topic of the Second NFU Conference
was Development theory and lessons from re cent development. Since then,
momentous changes have taken place on the world scene, particularly in
Europe, but also in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The debates over
development models, the role of the state, state planning and the market,
private versus public ownership, as well on systems of government,
democracy, public participation and human rights, have all come back to
the forefront in practically all comers of the globe. In the developing world
questions are again being raised whether economic and political
liberalisation wil promote economic growth and development in the longer
run, and whether these changes wil improve the conditions and
opportunities for the poor.
Parallel to this, we also observe other major trends at the global scene,
which we today may not be able to fully comprehend. One element is the
global environmental awareness, which already is makng its impact on
policies. Another is the growing fundamentalism in several places, as well
as other cultural reactions to general deve10pment and modemisation. Both
of these trends may be elements of a major turn in development goals and
objectives, of which we today only see a beginning.
It was therefore fitting that NFU again wanted to return to the topic of
Development theory, to ask whether these global changes had impacted on
the theories of development, and what analytical contributions are made
from the various corners of development theories. At the same time, we
know that within many of the disciplines on which development theories
are based, new theoretical mode1s and theories are being generated, that
may well represent new contributions when applied to the arena of
development. The purpose of some of the invited interventions at this
Conference, was therefore to bring out some of these more recent
contributions.
We believe that the Conference succeeded at least to some extent, in its
objectives, as documented in the 14 contributions inc1uded in these
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"radical" conservative rhetoric of monetarist and free-market policy
prescriptions. Toye refuted many of the basic foundations of this
development "counter-revolution" as untenable from a theoretical as well
as an empirical point of view, and defended what he terme d basically
Keynesian policies of intellgent state intervention. The purpose of his
keynote speech at the NFU Conference entitled Dilemmas of development:
New challenges, new theories? was to review this position in the light of
the quite dramatic changes that have taken place on the international scene
since 1987, and to consider whether the theoretical debates on development
wou1d necessitate any new paradigms.
The collapse of the post-war regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastem
Europe, the dismantlng of the aparheid regime in South Africa, the retum
to democracy in many Latin American countries, and possibly also in
Africa, have all been elements of a momentous change. This has induced
some ana1ysts to c1aim that there are now longer any altematives to
economic liberalism and liberal democracy, and that these forms therefore
constitute the end-state of human development, towards which all societies
wil eventually gravitate. Francis Fukuyama (1992) has even coined this
phase the End of history.
Toye disagrees, and c1aims that Fukuyama has mainly added neo-
Regelianism to well-known economic modernisation theory. Re reminds us
that previous arguments showing the flaws of a universal homogenous,
linear modernisation theory, are stil valid. Global modernisation is
inherently a conflctual process, and technical progress does not "guarantee"
a homogenisation of all human societies. It does not help to invoke a neo-
Hegelian interpretation of history as the progressive self-realisation of the
human spirit, culminating in the achievement of freedom, so that once this
freedom is achieved, no greater achievement is possible.
On this basis, Toye argues that Keynesian ideas of a "managed
capitalism" are not only conspicuous by their absence in the new discourse
on The end of history, but may well be reinforced by experiences in
countries of rapid economic growth in East Asia. Also at the international
level, the case is being made again for global Keynesian policies. Toye' s
arguments for "intellgent and selective government interventions" are
similar to those developed by Bardhan in his paper in this vo1ume.
In his final section, Toye takes issue with the proponents of the "new
political economy" (NPE) of development. The NPE theories are based on
the assumption that ru1ers only act in their own rational se1f-interest.
However, intellgent government interventions for the purpose of managing
capitalism as described above, require a government which is not on1y
intellgent, but also reflects some degree of benevolence of the state. The
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problem areas, but we would have liked to see more of Hveem's efforts at
operationalisation, as attempted in the contributions by SØrensen, Bardhan,
Skålnes, and Nordhaug.
With respect to the two former of these issues, Hveem argues in favour
of a "midd1e road" between the underdevelopment school which is
underlining the structural constraints and believing in a mechanistic role of
the state, and the neo-liberals with their disregard for structural aspects and
strong belief in the self-regulatory ability of the market. The need for a
stronger focus on the interaction between various social actors and
processes, is exemplified by a presentation of the interplay between the
state and national interest groups in South East Asian countries. Mauritius
is presented as another case showing the limited validity of strict
structuralist approaches. These examples should be instructive for those that
stil believe in only one of the "old schools".
Hveem does not go much further into the debate on the ultimate goal of
development, but refers to whether democracy and environmental
considerations are to be treated as additiona1 goals or integral parts of the
development concept. In his opinion, democratisation should be regarded
as much as part of the goal, as it is a means to reach the goal of
development. We have some problems in accepting that his overloading of
the concept of development to encompass all desired goals of mankind is
helpful in our analysis of social change and development processes. Hveem
himself also refers to inconc1usive studies as to whether democratisation
promotes or delays economic development, and it is in our opinion more
important to sharen the various concepts of democratisation and
development, rather than confusing them. These issues were treated in more
depth in session Il.
The environmental issue brings up a similar conflct. H ve em refers to
viewpoints in "the South" which basically regard environmental
considerations as an obstac1e to deve10pment. if so, there is conflct
between environmental goals and the goa1s of (economic) development. The
concept of sustainable development represents an attempt to merge the two.
Hveem shows us how this debate may result in "the South" obtaining a
new and stronger leverage on "the North" for the first time since the wave
of independence in Asia and Africa. But he a1so argues that this dimension
underlines further that deve10pment is a complex, multi-leveL, multi-actor
system where political, socio-cultural and economic motives meet and
sometimes c1ash, sometimes collude.
While both Toye and Hveem discussed broad development issues, Karl
Ove Moene who is professor of economics at the University of Oslo,
concentrated his lecture on the more recent contributions to economic
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Session Il: Democratisation, human rights, and development
In this session we wanted to focus on theories conceming the role of the
state in relation to civil society in developing societies. In paricular, we
were interested in the renewed debate on the connection between political
regimes and economic development, and whether more recent political
development theory could contribute to a better understanding of the
comp1exities of this relationship. Three lectures and three papers discussed
these and related issues.
In his presentation entitled Democracy and authoritarianism:
Consequences for economic development, professor Georg SØrensen from
Århus University attacked these issues head on. He starts off with a review
of the main arguments insisting that authoritarian rule is more suitable for
promoting economic development, as well as of the critics of this trade-off
thesis. The empirical analyses that have been undertaken seem to indicate
that countries with authoritarian regimes more often experience faster
economic growth than democratic ones, but the results are ambiguous, and
the data and definitions are far from universally accepted. SØrensen
therefore argues for a more sophisticated analysis, which accepts that the
type of regime may have an influence on economic performance, but finds
it necessary to differentiate between the very dissimilar entities covered by
the terms "authoritarian" and "democratic". This is well ilustrated in his
comparison between democratic India and authoritarian China's
development expetiences over almost 40 years.
Sørensen's contribution is to propose three main types of authoritarian
systems; the authoritarian developmentalist regime (China, Taiwan), the
authoritarian growth regime (Brazil), and the authoritarian state elite
enrichment regime (Zaire). In a similar way, he postulates two main types
of democratic regimes; the elite-dominated democracy (India, Costa Rica),
and mass-dominated democracy (Chile 1970-73, West Bengal 1977-). By
employing these categories, it might be more easy to explain why an
authoritarian developmentalist regime might succeed better both in terms
of economic growth and in providing economic welfare that an elite-
dominated democracy, while an authoritarian regime based on an elite out
to enrich itself, wil not perform in those terms. It a1so reflects that the
economic development prospects of democratic regimes, especially as
regards the underprivileged, wil depend on the nature of the ruling
coalitions behind the regime.
We find this differentiation very useful, and probably an important
stepping stone for further research into the development/democracy
re1ationship. Sørensen does not, however, discuss how these various types
of regimes may emerge, remain stable, or change over time, except for
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wil nurture a democratie culture, by culturing democratic practices as well
as culture a general consensus on the basic rule of the democratic game.
Sharif Harir in his presentation on democracy in multi-ethnic societies;
the African case ends up in a similar belief in the new multiparty
movement in Africa, which is more deeply rooted in the African realities
of ethnic diversity and cultural pluralism than previous democratic
experiments. But before expressing this optimism, he paints a very grim
picture of the present state of affairs for the African state.
Sharif Harir is a Sudanese national and a visiting research fellow at the
Centre for Development Studies at the University of Bergen. His starting
point is that the present-day states in Africa are not nation-states, but
cultural pluralities. The states were artificially created by the co10nial
powers, and both the institutions that were formed in order to rule the new
states at independence, as well as the theories on which they were founded,
were Western blueprints in shar contrast to the complex realities of ethnic
and tribal diversity, cultural pluralism and the resultant multiplicity of
interpretative frames of reference. There is therefore a need for an almost
complete reinterpretation of recent political history in Africa.
In his presentation, Harir provides a critique of the ruling elites and their
dominant ideology which is putting almost all blame for the present
political and economic decay on the "original sin" of colonialism, and
present external (neo-colonial) forces. He then ventures into his own
interpretation of this history: The nationalist coalitions of the anti-colonial
struggles soon disintegrated, partly because they were based on a theory
that did not coincide with realities. The road was short to politics of
c1ientalism based on ethnic loyalties, but without the mutual respect and
consensus-building of the pre-colonial past. The new African elite which
assumed the reins of power at independence consisted of a small, urban-
based and educated c1ass, themselves a product of the colonial education
system. Based on some of the notions of the imported democracy, segments
of this elite established a hegemonic and dominant position which was used
to suppress other segments, and turn the state into a vehic1e for forwarding
their own interest; the "privatisation" of the state. In this process, the
common socia1 basis between the state and society disappeared, and most
of what can be termed the civil society has been in a process of
disengagement from the ruling elite.
Harir argues that the concept of nation-building in Africa cannot be
constructed on the European epistemology which presupposes an ethnic
core, or a central fund of culturally-determined shared historical
experiences, on which to base a nation-state. Most African states lack this
basis, and attempts by the new elite to construct it artificially, have failed.
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societies is not completely new, Bayart relates changes and developments
par le bas with an analysis of the African state. He views this state as
basically dominated by an elite of political and bureaucratic "entre-
preneurs", utilising the state capabilities in their own private interests.
On this basis, Amundsen makes an attempt to analyze whether and what
kinds of popular action might benefit the process towards democracy in
Africa, and to draw some conc1usions whether these social movements
might eventually represent a countervailng power to the existing state .
apparatus. While we find the approach utilised by Amundsen interesting,
we also find that this analysis is stil very incomplete. Amundsen makes
use of very broad generalisations, with little or no attempt to differentiate
between various forms of reactions and organisations, and with no reference
to empirical cases except by mention in the passing.
Unfortunately, also in his introductory pages on the afropessimistic
setting, Amundsen (as Sharif Harir) tends to over-generalise without
specification and differentiation. As underlined by the author himself, the
(re- )discovery of informal popular intermediate and intermediary
organisations and authorities implies that "society cannot be properly
understood in terms of two fundamental and antagonistic core groups, the
elite and the masses" . Stil it is all toa easy to forget this, and 1apse into
these more populist concepts. We hope that Amundsen in his future works
wil further develop these theories and his analysis of responses "from
below" .
The paper by Anne Hellum also deals with the parallei existence of
several cultures in many African societies and the present trends towards
(formal) democratisation, but with a much more specific focus. In her paper
on gender, law and democratisation she shows how the state and its laws
mediate the gender and c1ass conflcts inside society. Her starting point is
that in Zimbabwe (as in several other African countries) there exists at the
same time a "generaliaw" based on the notion of individual rights and
freedoms, and a "customary law" as well as traditional beliefs and moral
codes based on group and extended family obligations. The two systems of
laws and traditions have different implications for women' s rights to
mariage and divorce, and for controlover her sexual, reproductive and
productive capacities. Hellum shows, however, that even under customary
arangements, male control cannot be complete, and many women are
capable of manipulating the rules and moral codes. It is generally assumed
that women are given greater individual freedoms and more equality under
the new 1aws introduced since independence. According to Hellum, the
concept of individual consent is more complex, and provides a focus on
direct and indirect gender struggles.
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To a large extent therefore Taiwan seems to fit the Gerschenkron theses,
particularly for the first period. In the sec ond period of liberalisation,
however, the pressure came neither from the new capitalist c1ass, nor from
the growing working c1ass as it had in most European countries. Nordhaug
suggests that the Gerschenkron thesis may be modified to say that it is the
civil society created by capitalist development rather than the capitalists
themselves, that press for democracy. He also makes a point of the role of
an outside hegemonic power, the USA, on the Taiwanese economic and
political transformation. Nordhaug's paper thus provides an interesting
application of an existing analytical model in a new context, and in this
process modifying it.
Session ILL: The state and the market
After a period with opposing groups on either side of the barricades
fighting for more market or more state planning, some - inc1uding the
World Bank - now argue for a more balanced relationship in the
development process. This implies greater weight on the institutional
framework for the functional area of the market, and on the character and
quality of state activities. At the same time this creates a new role for the
state, and represents new challenges conceming such issues as:
* Does a balanced relation between the state and the market require that
both are "strong" and effective? What is the essence in the concept of a
strong state?
* In many instances we are confronted by atomised and ineffective states
as well as ineffective markets. In such a situation the question must again
be raised what role the state can realistically play in a development
process, and what reforms are necessary for the state to be able to initiate
a deve10pment-oriented policy. One aspect of an ineffective state may be
the degree of rent-seeking activities. Externalities, imperfect information
as well as informal markets may generate imperfect markets.
* Does a ba1anced relation between the state and the market require
institutions and interest groups which interact with the state sector? How
do different interest groups (inc1uding interest groups in the public
sector) develop, and under what conditions can they hinder or create
opportunities for the state to implement a policy that promotes
development? The question must also be raised of the conditions under
which the state can promote institutional arrangements which increase the
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a region and between regions. The question remains however, whether this
force of intervention necessarily has to be the state.
We agree with Bardhan that it is impossible to give general statements
of which development strategy is more likely to provide the desired results
(state regulation, market economy or decentralisation). Such statements are
usually made rhetorically at the political scene, without reference to the
specific empirical context. In most of the Eastem Europe, we stil have not
seen the success of the privatisation campaign, even though there has been
an almost full agreement on the need for such a reconstruction of their
economy. Also in Norwegian foreign aid policy, the concept of market
solution and decentralisation has been given more attention. In our view,
more attention should rather be devoted to creating incentives in the
economy, that imitate the good incentives both by the market and by the
local communities (conceming monitoring) particularly when also the
market structures are weak and imperfect. The principal-agent theory in
economics is a tool which possibly can be more integrated and developed
in this process.
The question whether state autonomy is necessary for development and
the circumstances in which negotiation games may end up in a prisoner' s
dilemma situation, as mentioned by Bardhan, is further elaborated in the
paper by Tor Skålnes. By contrasting theories of state autonomy with a
contractarian theory focusing upon negotiations between different interest
groups and the state, Skålnes, in the specific con text of Zimbabwe, asks
why the country is currently undergoing structural adjustment? Despite 25
years of protection, the manufacturing sec tor has lobbied for reform.
Agriculture is divided between commercial farmers, who favour
liberalisation, and small-scale farmers, who do not. According to Skålnes,
the pressure exerted by key interest groups for policy change contrasts with
a large body of theory that emphasises the need for state autonomy if
liberalisation is to take place. Skålnes also ilustrates that key urban
interests might under certain circumstances favour such policies, and that
key rural interests might opposeit in contrast to what theories'of urban bias
would predict.
The stringent analytic approach pursued by Skålnes together with his
empirical knowledge of the current political situation in Zimbabwe, makes
this paper an original contribution. We want to emphasise three points.
First, relative autonomy is usually related to authoritarianism. Second, the
Zimbabwean case shows that autonomy is not a necessary condition for
development. Third, the case of Zimbabwe ilustrates that broad-based,
centralised interest groups sometimes favour policies which may increase
efficiency. In the context of Zimbabwe, his inductive methodology have
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From a theoretical and empirical perspective, the rent-seeking literature
stil lack general conc1usions concerning welfare aspects of rent-seeking
activities and we agree with Andvig that we have to "reI y on the judgement
of the specific acts and institutions" in a specific country. On the other
hand, placing this issue on the research agenda, may contribute to a
reversion of traditional economic analysis in many fields eg. corruption
may reduce the efficiency of state regulation and als o the beneficiary
effects of foreign aid.
While Andvig emphasises ilegal activities within a hierarchy of
bureaucrats, thepaper by Morten Heide and Odd Einar Olsen focuses on
activities in the marketplace which usually are not regulated by the state.
In the first section, this paper describes previous research on the informal
sec tor in developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. It also
examines the various definitions of the term and the disparate views of the
informal sector that have characterised research and policy in the last two
decades. The main section of the paper is an evaluation of the informal
sector' s significance for sustainable industrial development in third world
countries. It is conc1uded that such a segmented informal sector is of great
importance in the short run in generating employment, but is not
sustainable in the lon g run.
However, we find their definitions very unc1ear. We are not sure if the
degree of regulation is the critical distinction between formal and informal
sectors. Furthermore, when economic sustainability is defined by the
authors as "economic profitability generated in the unit of the firm...", it
naturally follows that there are "two opposite views on the relationship
between economy and ecology" (incompatibility versus growth as a
precondition for sustainability). As a consequence, the policy options
analyzed become too narrow. By introducing the welfare function of the
society (not the firm), it is possible to discuss how to internalise external
factors through the market mechanism (through taxes and subsidies).
Simply postulating a conflict or a complementary between economy and
eco10gy easi1y ends up with imprecise statements like "the logical
conc1usion is that the economic system does not have the potential to
incorporate environmental considerations".
W e also miss a more thorough reference to the relationship between the
informal sector and the overall economy. The structure of the informal
sector reflects the overall structure of the economy, such as capital
intens it y, unemployment, regulations, etc. in formal sector. In our view,
more theoretical and empirical work should be done to examine whether or
not the informal sector may enhance the efficiency of the overall economy,
and this paper reflects one partial approach to this study. For those that
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Opening address
Desmond MeNeill, Chairman of NFU
Introduction
Ladies and gentlemen,
To those of you who come from abroad: Welcome to Norway.
And to all of you, on behalf of the NFU, the Norwegian Association for
Development Research: Welcome to our 1992 conference, on Development
Theory.
Bergen is a very beautiful and historic city. And the conference has been
carefully timed to coincide with the music festivaL. I hope you wil enjoy
both the conference and the city to the full.
The host for this year's conference is the Chr. Michelsen Institute, in
association with the Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen.
And I want to begin by thanking especially the Chr. Michelsen Institute,
and more particularly the three from CMI who have carried the greatest
part of the burden - Arve Ofstad, Arne Wiig and Marianne Serck-
Hanssen. As any of you who have had to organise a conference well know,
there is a great deal of work involved. And it is due to the efforts of Arve,
Ame and Marianne that we are here today, and that we have such an
interesting and full programme. All credit and thanks to them.
In addition to the Annual Conference we wil on Saturday have the
Annual Meeting of the NFU. Most of you are members, and are encouraged
to attend. To those few who are not members I strong1y urge you to join.
y ou wil find brochures giving more information about NFU, as well as
copies of NFU-NYTT, Forum for Utviklingsstudier, the NORDREC
catalogue, and the Bibliography of Norwegian Development Research.
The theme for discussion at the Annual Meeting on Saturday is the
financing of Development Research in Norway. This is always an issue of
interest for NFU, but it is particularly relevant now that the whole system
of research councils in Norway is being reorganised. Indeed,
Stortingsmelding 43 of 1991/92 "Et godt Råd for Forskning" was issued
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This is a subject I could go on about at some length, having worked on
both sides of the fence. But today my concern is with the implications for
development research, and more particularly for its quality.
The researcher is, by training if not by nature, out to disagree - to fin d
the exception to the rule, the subtle failing of logic, the anomaly. And
many researchers are also concemed with an in-depth study of the
particular. Researchers thrive on variety, on complexity, even, perhaps, on
intellectual conflct. But this is no basis on which to build consensus, or to
agree global prescriptions.
I suggest that researchers, as researchers, should be wary of policy
makng. They should analyse the world as they perceive it to be, untainted
by how they would like it to be. They may of course take ona role as
advisers, consultants, but they should recognise that they are then crossing
a line - between analysis and action - and that this is likely to draw
them into unwarranted generalisation, unjustified simplification. In short,
being toa c10se to policy-making constitutes a threat to good research.
Policy-makers ne ed high quality analysis carried out by good researchers,
but both would do well to recognise that there is an inevitable tension,
sometimes amounting even to conflct of interest, between them.
And what of my second threat to quality: the mix of different disciplines
which is another notable feature of development research?
I think it is useful here to distinguish between multi-disciplinarity, by
which I mean disciplines working together in parallei, and what I shall here
refer to as cross-disciplinarity, which implies working in concert. The
former is what is required in planning and policy-making (for example, a
team planning a district development programme ). The latter - cross-
disciplinarity - is what I believe is necessary for research. This requires
ameeting, perhaps even a collding, of minds at a much more basic level;
and it is, in my view - much more difficult. It is a1so, however,
potentially very fruitfu1, for a confrontation between two disciplines which
focuses attention on basic methodological issues can be of benefit to both.
In certain circumstances it may even lead to the development of a new
discipline in its own right.
But true cross-disciplinary research is noteasy, and those who work
between disciplines often lead an uncomfortable life.
Because they mix toa c10sely with other disciplines, development
researchers are of ten marginalised within their own disciplines. There is a
view, whether explicitly stated or not, which is held by many - that the
development economist, anthropologist, geographer, or whatever, is doing
work that is certainly peripheral, and possibly of low standard - as judged
by those in the mainstream of their respective disciplines. Painful as it may
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body of research concemed with sustainable development, and I sincerely
hope that these lessons wil not be forgotten.
Development research in Norway
So far I have be en speaking of development research in general, but what
I have been saying here applies equally, I believe, in Norway, where
development research has, to a very large extent, been both cross-
disciplinary and policy-related.
I should perhaps preface my remarks by saying that I am a relative
newcomer to Norway, having arrived only in January 1987. I am also an
economist by training, and one thing that I think is unusual about Norway
is that economics has, relative to other countries, been a min or contributor
in the field of development research.
Maybe this is changing. There is evidence of increased interest in
development economics as a field of study. In this context, it is relevant to
point out that this conference is unusual in having a large proportion of
economists among the speakers. And if we turn to policy, it is also notable
that economics is beginning to exert a rather greater influence on
Norwegian assistance.
Although I myself am an economist, I have some reservations about this
new turn of events. When I first came here five years ago, I was struck by
how few development economists there were in Norway, and how limited
was their influence on Norwegian aid. This contrasts with many other
countries, and may in part perhaps, be attributable to the very different
basis for Norway's interest in the Third World - which springs not from
strategic or economic self-interest, but from a combination of missionary
activity, solidarity with countries seeking independence, and support for the
United Nations, especially those UN agencies directed towards peace and
humanitarian ends.
There are some signs, however, that economics may exert rather more
influence on aid policy in the future. To the extent that this can reduce
wastage and expensive error this is to be wholeheartedly welcomed. But
there can also be a danger of going from one extreme to the other. Arecent
editorial in Aftenposten, after making some comments on the uncritical
"idealistic" nature of Norwegian aid, conc1uded: "Profitt må bli et
hedersord i stedet for et skjellsord ...." ("Profit must become an honourable
word, instead of a term of abuse"). Now, Aftenposten is a conservative
newspaper, but I think it both fair and important to remark that even
conservative development specialists have a considerably more nuanced
view of the issue than this.
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countries which could obtain material support from the Eastem bloc, or
play off one against another in the Cold War, no longer have that option.
De-linking from the world economy is not feasible either. But that need not
and should not imply an uncritical acceptance either of the market system
or of those economic theories which seek to justify it.
Indeed, the searchlight should now be focused more shar ly on both the
theory and the practice of the market system in the West. The fact that the
life expectancy of an adult male is lower in Harlem, New York than it is
in Bangladesh, or that half of all children in US cities never complete their
schooling, should now become even more difficult to ignore. And the
philosophical underpinning of the market system, and of neo-c1assical
economics, should become an even more important issue for discussion.
The danger is not only that the market system becomes the dominant
world force, but also economics - and more specifically neo-c1assical
economics of a crude and simplistic kind - may become the dominant
discourse. And, in part as a result, the policy prescriptions laid down for
developing countries, whether in the Third World or the former Eastem
bloc, may be crude and simplistic.
This is not a plea for the retention of the planned economy, the
parastatal, the state farm. It is a plea to economists too see in the new
events that have shaken the world the opportunity and the responsibility for
analysis which is more - not less - specific; analysis which takes more
account of variations between countries, between households, between the
sexes; rejecting over-simplification and generalisation, if the empirical
evidence does not justify them - even if this does make the work of the
policy-maker more difficult.
"Getting the prices right" and "rollng back the state" are slogans. And
the development researcher should be wary and critical of them - not
because the state, per se, is a good thing, but because broad generalisations
of this kind can be so misleading. It may well makesense, in a given
country at a given time, to devalue; or to liberalise the market for
agricultural products. But this need not imply that all activities - health
and education inc1uded - are best left to the market. Even though the
World Bank as an institution can be accused of simplistic analysis and
global prescriptions, many of those who work there, inc1uding economists,
do recognise that the world is not so simple. And researchers should
support them in this view.
In intellectual, as in political terms, as long as your position is contrasted
with, and defined in relation to, another, life is simple. To exaggerate is no
risk, to simplify is no danger. But being the only player gives one a very
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SESSION I: GENERAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY
1. Dilemmas of development:
New challenges, new theories?
John Toye, Institute ofDevelopment Studies, University of Sussex
The challenge of a new world order
A gale of radical conservative rhetoric blew through the early 1980s. It took
the frustrated and demoralised nations of the West by surprise and had
consequences, both good and il, that went far beyond the realm of rhetoric.
An important part of this upheaval in the political world was concerned
with economics and economic policy. Post-Keynesian economics, which
had become almost a consensual foundation for Western macroeconomic
policy, had its ascendency overturned by the advocates of monetarist
policies. The developing countries of the world were then hit by the
backwash of these doctrinal disputes. The economics of development, as it
has evolved up to that time, suffered its own counter-revolution. It was
aggressively disparaged as intellectually worthless and politically motivated.
It was als o convicted of guilt by association with the Keynesian economics
which had "failed". In place of the old development economics, welfare
economics was set up as the proper guide to development policy.
The first edition of Dilemmas of Development (Toye, 1987) had two
aims. One was simply to draw attention to the development counter-
revolution and to provide a brief sketch of the views of some of its leading
proponents. The other was to try and assess a selection of its key
propositions, separating what seemed important and valuable in its critique
of the old development economics from the tendentious and over-blown
c1aims which it also made. The development counter-revolution contained
enough of the latter for the critical assessment to become - in the
euphemism of the day - quite robust at times. The original book was
essentially a response to a phenomenon of the early 1980s, rapidly written,
quite selective in its choice of themes and exhibiting an air of unfinished
business. It was a livre de circonstance, and showed both some of the
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development process. Have the pressures of these events brought not only
fresher but also better responses from the intellectual world? Are more
valid and valuable theories of development emerging? Just putting this last
question forcefully reminds us that a truly original idea is a great rarity.
Intellectual change comes much more from re-appraising the significance
of familiar ideas than from discovering ones without precedent or pedigree.
Indeed, as this paper shows, the "newest" ideas of all skip right back over
the whole of the twentieth century. The freshly embroidered banners of the
New World Order bear the strange devices "Back to the Future" and
"Forward with G W F Hegel, 1770-1823".
The rise to power of MikhaIl Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union in
1985 marked the real watershed of the L 980s, although the full extent of the
changes which he was to usher in did not appear at first. Political
liberalisation at home was combined with renewed, but largely unsuccessful
attempts to re-start economic reforms. The autumn of 1989, however,
revealed Gorbachev' s unwilingness to underwrite militarily those regimes
in Eastem Europe which opposed this kind of reform programme. Without
his support, they proceeded to collapse like dominoes in a veritable liberal
revolution (Toye, 1990). One immediate result was the rushed re-unification
of Germany. Even more dramatic was the result that Gorbachev had fought
vainly to avoid - the break-up of the Soviet Union, as member republics
began to seek the same degree of national, liberal independence as the
states of Eastem Europe had achieved. A similar but much more violent
process of disintegration has destroyed the former Yugoslavia. Political
change has continued, in all the successor states, to be much easier to bring
about than economic reform. China, North Korea and Cuba alone have
managed to stay relatively aloof from the wave of political liberalisation
which Gorbachev initiated (Pérez-López, 1992).
The collapse of the post-war regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastem
Europe has been accompanied by a dramatic realignment in geopolitics.
The Cold War competition of two large blocs headed by super-powers (the
United States and the Soviet Union) first eased and then was formally
ended, and the consequences are stil being untangled. In turn, the ending
of the Cold War led to the defusing of a whole range of conflcts around
the world in which the US and the former Soviet Union had participated,
directly or indirectly.i This has produced the most radical changes in the
A parial list would inc1ude the Iran-Iraq war, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,
the Ethiopian and Angolan civil wars, theconflct in El Salvador, the insurgency in
Mozambique and the independence of Namibia. The hostages held in Lebanon since
L 985 have all been released and the preliminaries of peace talks on the Israel-Palestinian
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fighting under the flag and resolutions of the United Nations. This was the
first time the UN had played such a major role in world affairs since the
Korean War (1950-3). The new dangers were met with a new response, or
rather with a reversion to more consensual st yle of international conflct
management for which the mechanism had been established in the initial
euphoria of the post-World War Il era.
This very brief glance at world events since 1987 makes it patently
obvious that many of the assumptions about the world on which Dilemmas
of Development was based have changed beyond all recognition in a mere
six years. The original book did not predict the end of US-USSR super-
power confrontation; the outbreak of relative peace in many regional
conflcts in LDCs; the strengthening of democratic politics in Latin
America, Asia and Africa; the rapid moves towards a South Africa without
apartheid; or the revival of the United Nations. On the economic reform
front, it did not envis age the eager embrace of liberal market economics by
Eastem Europe and Russia, or the rapidity of the spread of structural
adjustment programmes in developing countries, including from 1991
onwards, in India, which was, however, extensively discussed. Like the dog
which failed to bark in the night in The Hound of the Baskerviles, these
silences raise questions. Was there enough of value in the original text to
give it a continuing relevance to such altered circumstances?
The intellectual respons e
Of all the so-called "new theories" which have responded to the
geopolitical upheavals of the last five years, Francis Fukuyama' s The End
of History and the Last Man, (1992) is the best known. Fukuyama is a
former policy planner at the US State Department and a researcher at the
Rand Corporation. He is very much at the heart of the Washington
establishment. The thesis of Fukuyama's book is not the literal and absurd
one that time has stopped, or historical events have ceased. Rather it is that
recent events show that certain historical alternativ es - socialist central
planning and authoritarian government - have become irretrievably
discredited. Liberal democracy (alled with free-market economics) is said
to be left without any competition, as the only remaining ideology of
potentially universal validity. The future can consist only of the continued
spread ofliberal democracy, albeit with the occasional temporary regression
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provide a reverse image of modemisation, or, in another metaphor, stand
modernisation theory on its head. This attempt to steer a middle course stil
seems, despite the upheavals of the last few years, both necessary and
worthwhile. Leaving the flaws in the under-development account as ide
because of its current low profile, the modemisation storyas re-told by
Fukuyama also glosses over most of the basic intellectual issues which
animate development studies. Let us merely indicate a few of these issues.
Development studies takes it as axiomatic that modernisation cannot be
evolutionary and gradual, because it is human-directed historical process.
It starts somewhere at some time because someone has so decided. Initial
success confers not only increased prosperity, but also increased power on
those who succeeded. It created the capability to colonize others. All
subsequent modernisation efforts are, on the one hand, defensive in
character for the society attempting them, and, on the other hand,
threatening to the societies which have previously succeeded. Global
modernisation is an inherently conflctual process. The circumstances in
which the conflct is worked out is not the same in every case. But
modernising countries which do not enjoy the protection of a more
powerful state during the process (as Korea and Taiwan have done) often
adopt a strategy of militaristic modernisation. Why, after all, has the USSR
collapsed, if not because of the huge distortion of its economy to sustain
a military-industrial complex? Did not a similar distortion also at one
period afflct other, earlier modemisers, Germany and Japan? The logical
point is that modemisation can only become gradual, evolutionary and
economically rational once a universal order of liberal democracies has
already been established - but never before this has happened.4
Development studies has persistently questioned the proposition that
technical progress "guarantees" the increasing homogenisation of all human
societies. The implication of this must presumably be that homogeneity wil
occur at levels of consumption per head at 1east as high as those currently
enjoyed by the most developed countries. (It is an unduly conservative
assumption that the current living standards of the OECD countries wil
stand stil while those in the rest of the world catch up. But ignore that, for
the sake of simplicity.) How much extra production would be needed for
all of the 5.2 bilion in the world to be in a position to enjoy the same level
of living as the 773 millon who live inside the OECD? In 1989, the GNP
4 The history of the United States shows that, even when a liberal democratie order
already exists, economic modernisation can lead to acute military conflict - between
the industrialising northern states and the traditional agrarian southern states in the
American Civil War (1861-65).
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The COITect interpretation of the East Asian experience is, therefore, crucial
for understanding the real prospects for economic modemisation. The
analysis of the actual development process of the last ten years suggests,
in addition to the likelihood of future constraints on growth, the partial
presence of a whole range of other short-term constraints - the debt
squeeze, deteriorating terms of trade, the shortage of administrative
capacity, and so on. These are the real and pressing daily problems of
development policy. Whatever may be true of some unspecified "longer
run", without a solution to all of these and other urgent policy problems,
the vision of universal modemisation wil be no more than a cruelly
deceptive mirage.
The end of the Third World?
In its new version, the story of economic modemisation is supplemented by
the Hegelian interpretation of history as the progressive self-realisation of
the human spirit, culminating in the achievement of freedom. For Hegel,
history was not merely the endless fluctuation, the rise and fall, of different
political and social institutions. It had a pattem, a series of stages, each a
more complete embodiment of freedom than the one before. The transition
from stage to stage was driven by the psychological dissatisfaction
experienced under each set of social arangements with the recognition
which people could achieve for their own sense of essential humanity. The
end of history was the transcending of all the contradictions between social
and political institutions and the striving for personal fulfilment.
Within this new Hegelian perspective, the collapse of central planning
and authoritarian governments in East Europe and the former Soviet Union
has been given a crucial significance as the final transcending of these
contradictions. After slavery, feudalism and dynastic monarchy, the last
plausible set of alternative institutions - state socialism or communism -
has been consigned iITetrievably to the past. Such a view certainly appeals
to our sense of the suddenness and decisiveness of the events themselves.
It also points up that they were not triggered exclusively by the failures and
iITationalities of the chosen method of economic modernisation. As many
commentators noted, psychological alienation was just as potent a fuel for
these liberal revolutions as the (often exaggerated) deprivations of
consumption.
An obvious implication of the disappearance, once and for all, of
authoritarian central planning as an historically viable system of political
economy is that the "Third World" has ceased to exist. If the Second World
of state socialism has indeed vanished into an historical limbo, what
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practices. How far this belief is cOITect, and how far it is ilusory is
something that stil remains to be seen.
Foreign aid, however, is but one of the instruments which wil be used
to shape "the new world order" of the 1990s and beyond. World aITange-
ments for trade are even more important. The outcome of the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations is still awaited, keeping the issue of global
free trade versus global protectionism hang ing in the balance. The trade
aITangements that wil apply between the former Second and Third Worlds
remain to be settled, and their consequences for the world' s poorest remain
in doubt (Stevens, 1992: 38-56). Apart from trade, the degree and nature
of controls over labour migration from East to West and from South to
North are c1imbing ever higher on the political agendas of the OECD
countries. In this issue lurks at least one very pessimistic scenario, in which
the old colonialist attitudes of racial superiority revive in potency to the
point where they can enforce a much more ethnically divided world than
has yet been seriously contemplated. Recent election results in France,
Germany and Italy do not, unfortunately, allow this scenario to be rejected
out of hand.
The end of Keynesianism in development economIcs?
The End of History regards "capitalism" and "economic liberalism" as the
economic arangement which, along with liberal democracy, constitutes the
end-state for human development. The aspirations of political leaders in
developing countries to work towards alternative ends by alternative means
are regarded as ilusory and misguided. The options for economic growth
and social justice through mercantilism, socialism or a nationalist
industrialisation are dismissed after relatively brief discussion (Fukuyama,
1992: 98-108). Such a brusque approach is inadequate. It glosses over too
many critical distinctions. The disappearance of centrally-planned socialism
for all time (if that is indeed what recent events portend) leaves many
possible policy choices. Capitalism and economic liberalism are terms
which can be given a wide range of different definitions. Which one is
adopted in practice is a matter of the greatest importance.
The central thrust of the first edition of Dilemmas of Development was
to counter some of the more simplistic and eccentric c1aims made on behalf
of free-market economics in the 1980s. It pointed out how poorly anchored
such c1aims were to economic theory, particularly the theory of welfare
economics to which some, at least, of their makers seemed to think that
they were tightly linked. It counter-posed to such claims the essentially
Keynesian ide a that economic performance can be improved by intellgent
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himself directly to the analytical treatment of the problems of economic
development. Nor did he c1aim that his short-run analysis of money, interest
and employment in developed economies was relevant to developing
economies. Nevertheless, scattered through his writings are many insights
which are relevant to development policy today. The original edition of
Dilemmas highlighted the objections that had been raised in the L 970s and
1980s against Keynes' influence on development policy, and rejected them
as il-considered. It is now possible to go further and to show how carefully
Keynes himself distinguished between the policies of limited protection and
moderate state planning which he advocated in the British context, and
strategies of wholesale forced industrialisation at the expense of the rural
sector which he vehemently rejected in his comments on Russian
development. This part of Keynes' work has been largely neglected in the
development debate. But Keynes did have clear views about Soviet
economic policies in the L 920s and L 930s. It is manifest that he never
believed that they provided a rational, or even tolerable, path to
development (Toye, 1993). Thus the recent collapse of the Soviet system
in no way undermines the Keynesian approach to managing capitalism.
Rather, ittestifies to Keynes' insight into the defects of the Soviet strategy.
To a Keynesian, it was always the ability of the Soviet economy to survive
for as long as it did that created the puzzle.
The new discourse of The End of History makes the alternative of
managed capitalism conspicuous by its absence. It thus simply by-passes
the problem of what capitalism or the liberal economy is to be like, in
detail and in practice. This rather extraordinary vagueness assists the
general message of teleological thinking - that only one end is possible,
and that only one real choice exists whether we reach that end directly or
indirectly, now or a little later.
The supposition that "capitalism" and "economic liberalism" are unitary
(and indeed interchangeable) concepts is bolstered by reliance on a
particular misinterpretation of economic history that Dilemmas of
Development was at pains to refute. It lumps together the Chicago an free-
market experiment in Pinochet s Chile with the economic strategies of the
newly-industrialising economies of East Asia as indistinguishable examples
of liberal economics. It pays no heed to the accumulating evidence of
extensive intervention by the govemments of South Korea and Taiwan in
their economies in order to increase rapidly their exports of non-traditional
manufactures. While noticing the extremely high growth rates of South
Korea and Taiwan (much higher, incidentally, than for the genuinely free-
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go on to deny that it affected the way in which the economy performed.
Having been forced to abandon an empirically incoITect description of
Korean economic policy, free market theorists have fallen back on the
claim that interventions have been self-cancellng, and so neutral in overall
net effect, or that, being prescriptive only, have allowed the private sector
to flourish outside the areas where the state has a directive policy. Chang
finds both of these suggestions to be defective, the first because counter
examples (such as the heavy and chemical industries started in the 1970s)
were c1early a non-neutral intervention, and the sec ond because it ignores
the problem of opportunity cost of resources.
Both Taiwan and Korea remain, in the light of recent research, examples
of countries where govemments have improved economic performance by
strong, but intelligent and selective, interventions in market behaviour. They
show that managed capitalism remains not only a viable, but a potentially
spectacular path of development. This is not to say that it is the on ly one,
even in East Asia. The successes of the city-states of Singapore and Hong
Kong have been much more the res ult of c1assic free market policies. The
critical issues of the replicability of Taiwan and Korean successes outside
East Asia, and their dependence for effective implementation on
authoritarian rather than democratic regimes, are large ones which remain
unresolved. To cite East Asian strategies under the label of Keynesianism
is also liable to be confusing, given that they have resulted from long-term
industrial policies, rather than the short-term demand management policies
which are the hallmark of Keynesianism in its narow (too naITow) sense.
Nevertheless, Keynes was an advocate of reformed capitalism, in which the
state plays a supplementary and coordinating role in a basically market
economy. In this broader sense, Keynesianism is a national strategy which
not only lives on in the developing world of the 1990s, but has some of the
most dramatic development performances of recent times to its credit.
Global Keynesianism is also being revived in the light of recent events.
The ending of the Cold War has had economic consequences, in addition
to the political ones already refeITed to. Heavy expenditures on armaments
of ever-increasing sophistication and cost have been a major driving force
of economic growth over the last fort y years. This particular engine of
growth has now lost most of its steam. Apart from militar spending
growth has depended on a cycle of monetary expansion and squeeze, boom
and bust, which only at the top of the cyc1e has been able to maintain ne ar-
full employment in the developed countries. In the 1990s, the European
Community wil be struggling, via its exchange-rate mechanism, to pursue
a steadier and more disciplined monetary regime, at a time when the long
boom in Japan is flagging, as Japanese stock market values and property
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economic and political aITangements and the fundamentals of human nature
- just, indeed, as Marxism-Leninism taught about the Soviet state and
socialist man.
How does one take this kind of cosmic comfort? Is it really reassuring?
One alternative reaction is to exc1aim: the fulfiment of human freedom-
us? Do we really represent the apotheosis of human nature so much better
than did the Prussian citizenry of Hegel' s day? Are we self-satisfied enough
to believe that no more can be done to solve the problems of our
environment, our economic antagonisms, our ethnic and nationalistic
egotism, the deep poverty of our global neighbours than what our present-
day liberal capitalism has already achieved? Surely any conception of
human nature must leave room for the spirit of unsatisfied striving for self-
improvement, for self-transformation without knowing in advance how, or
even whether, it can be achieved? Is the Promethean element in human
nature also now extinct?
Another reaction of a less Romantic kind is to raise the question of
morality. Kant's teleology looked forward to the emergence of a universal
moral order. The lessons of history led humanity to understand a moral
imperative which could ultimately be universally agreed to be such. Kant's
vision was of a set of moral values in which all humanity - irrespective
of culture, colour or creed - not only could participate, but would
voluntarily participate. This moral code would doubtless contain important
implications for social aITangements. But it did not necessarily imply social
homogenisation, and certainly did not look forward to it regardless of a
moral convergence. That, however, is what the modem teleologists do.
A third reaction is to question the prospect of social homogenisation
outright. Even if one grants that human societies undergo evolutionary
processes, it does not follow that homogeneity rather than variety wil be
the inevitable consequence. if the theory of biological evolution is relevant
for understanding the long vista of history, it is important to remind
ourselves the biological evolution does not appear to have any pre-
determned end-state. It explicitly allows 'niching', the preservation of
earlier products of the evolutionary process undisturbed in an appropriate
environment (Runciman, 1989: 25-37). Although the nineteenth century
social Darwinists may have thought otherwise, biological evolution is a
theory whose validity is independent of the worth of particular social and
political ideals, and which does not indeed underwrite any of them.
Finally, do we really believe in the law of diminishing marginal
surprises? Five years ago, the first edition of Dilemmas failed to predict so
much. Of course it did. Who had predicted the campus rebellions of the
L 960s, the economic shocks of the 1970s, the plunge into populist
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charities, churches and what today would be called non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). These all provided fora for the development of
ethical social li fe to counter the alienation that inevitably arises from
isolated self-seeking activity. They would also serve as interest groups
which could be a source of group representation in political life. Hegel
believed that universal suffrage would generate political apathy rather than
political paricipation - so great was his distance from modem theorists
of liberal democracy.
As for the state, it has to be based on the rule of law, embodied in a
constitution that was generally accepted as 1egitimate. State officials were
recruited by education and merit, who constituted a "universal c1ass"
capable of acting imparially in the public interest. Hegel was, therefore, at
dramatic variance with modem critiques of the state which deny the very
possibilty of benevolent government and demand its confinement to an
absolute minimum of functions. These doctrines have much more in
common with the views of Hegel' slater opponents, most evidently Karl
Marx.
But Hegel also recognised a problem, which he was unable to resolve,
which stood in the way of a national society with a capitalist economy
attaining an ethical social life - the problem of poverty. This arose
through crises of over-production and the social alienation which they
induce in their victims. Neither charity nor public works could, he argued,
provide an adequate solution. The former failed for psychological reasons,
while he could not envisage Keynesian-type interventions which did not
aggravate the over-production that had caused the original problem. This
difficulty was left hanging in The Philosophy of Right. Some modem
commentators on Hegel see it as a major flaw in this philosophical project,
which in time stimulated the contras ting resolutions offered by first Marx,
and then Keynes (Plan t, 1977: 103-113). In summary, Hegel thought that
modem govemments could in general act benevolently in general interest,
but even so that they could not eliminate poverty. On both grounds, the
modem neo-Hegelians seem to have misunderstood him.
A new political economy of development?
The first version of Dilemmas of Development commented critically on the
work of analysts of India who based themselves on "the new political
economy" of development (NPE). The NPE grew out of work by Krueger
on "rent-seeking", which showed how foreign trade controls (but not only
such controIs) created windfall gains, and thereby stimulated both
corrption and directly unproductive activities in developing countries. The
45
scale not experienced for fort y years. This phenomenon defies analysis by
means of methodological individualism. But equally c1early it is not just an
historical given, which individuals' choices are powerless to intensify or
abate. A fruitful analysis of nationalism has to integrate both dimensions
and explain how they act and re-act on each other. Understanding
nationalism is just one example of the many intellectual tasks that remain
undone in the political economy of development, and on which a more
sophisticated methodology than either individualism or strcturalism needs
to be employed.
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2. Development theory in transition.
Political and social adjustment to
economic and ecological change
Helge Hveem, Centre for Development and the Environment and
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo
The role originally assigned to me was that of a discussant. For that
purpose I re-read Dilemmas of Development. I should like to start by saying
that I found the book as stimulating the second time as I found it when it
was virgin teITitory for me. And I do believe that John Toye could c1aim
some credit for stemmng the "gale of radical conservative rhetoric" (his
own words) that dominated a large part of the 1980s. Recallng what I
wrote myself in a special issue on Norwegian development research which
appeared in 1986, l I also agree with him that the way ahead for theory-
builders lies in the middle course.
Since I have now been assigned a role with greater autonomy, I wil not
resist the temptation to make a personal account on the state of the art
before offering my own preferences. In doing that, I believe that I shall
supply a perspective which is at least partly different from that offered by
Toye and my other panellst colleagues.
No ruling paradigm
Development theory has for some time been, and stil is in a "paradigmatic
vacuum" - if us ing such a label can be permitted. As Toye concludes, the
underdevelopment school is out, but strongly market-oriented economic
modernisation theory is, on the other hand, not in. Some of the broad and
general problems in the debate over theory remain unanswered. I would like
Helge Hveem and Ingrid Schulerud, red. Hvor går utviklingsforskningen? Særnummer
av Internasjonal Politikk, nr. 4-5, 1986.
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your problems at the nationalleveL. Reality has proven the mechanistic and
deterministic theses in the underdevelopment school to be largely wrong.2
Toye has shown why and how the neo-liberals at the other end of the
theoretical spectrm also are wrong. It should perhaps be added though that
some neo-liberals themselves have openly admitted this. As an example,
Lucas points out that the growth-performance of the most economically
liberal cases is less than that of cases with a dirigiste state following
"market-compatible" or "mixed economy" strategies. This conc1usion is
made by one of those economists "most responsible for the downfall of
interventionist Keynesian economics". 3
W e are therefore for practical purpose left with a variety of positions
along the "middle course". They are among others the dependent
development school, a statist approach emphasizing the role of the state in
dialogue with market-compatible or mixed economy variants, and variations
on Another development theme that emphasize small scale management of
the development process and sustainable development.
Dependent development
The "dependent development" school advocated first of all by Cardoso and
Faletto,4 rejects the mechanistic approach and the simplistic generalisations
of the underdevelopment school by saying that integration with the
international market can produce development. The preconditions are, inter
alia, that a progressive national c1ass allance, a social bloc in the
Gramscian sen se, is created between the national bourgeoisie and the
working c1ass, and that the alliance is able and wiling to pursue a strategy
of national industrial development over the long term. In the political
scientist sextension of Cardoso and Faletto, the "dependent development"
2 Reference is made to the now classical texts of Baran and in particular Gunder Frank,
and apologies are made for any slight misrepresentation caused by the need to be brief.
For a good summary of theirs and other works, see Keith Griffin and John GurIey,
"Radical analysis of imperialism, the Third W orId, and the transition to socIalism: A
survey article", Journal of Economic Literature, voL. 23 (September 1985), pp. 1089-
1143.
3 Wing Thye Woo, "The art of economic development: markets, politics and externalities",
International Organization voL. 44, no. 3, Summer 1990. See also Robert E. Lueas, jr.,
"On the mechanics of economic development", Journal of Monetary Economics, 22, July
1988.
4 F. H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependency and Development. Monthly Review Books.
1979.
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they belong. The question, in other words, is not so much what level of
social organisation is the more important one for development to occur -
the inter-national system, the nation-state, or the level of social c1asses,
groups or households. The main concern is rather to what extent and how
processes that are takng place at different levels interplay to shape and
deterrne the development outcome. The focus of the analysis is not so
much the single factor as the interaction among factors.
Let me support this simple, but important theoretical-methodological
proposition with some concrete ilustrations.
In his recent book, Democracy, Dictatorship and Development, George
Sørensen offers some interesting and to my mind convincing empirical
observations on the interaction between type of national political system
and (economic) development. He observes 1) that there is no c1earcut causal
relationship between type of national political regime and economic
development, and 2) that we have to look for a more complete explanation
by analysing "the complex ways in which the form of regime interacts with
other factors".5
Let me therefore delve in to my proposed three-level analysis of those
interactions. For South Korea some recent contributions point to the relative
autonomy of the state vis a vis strong domestic interest groups as an
important explanatory factor in that country's successful economic
development.6 Korea's strategy during the first rapid industrialisation phase
was very much built on regulation of imports inc1uding an import-
substitution policy. Compared to the typical Latin American country's
import-substituting industrialisation strategy, however, Korea's relative state
autonomy, the strict conditions attache d to subsidies granted to firms and
the state's conscious.use of market mechanisms along with state regulation
to increase effciency and competitiveness prevented its trade policy from
becoming conquered by domestic interest groups.
Compare the extreme opposite, the case of Uruguay. At the beginning of
this century Uruguay was in many ways an egalitarian welfare state - the
"Nordic model" in Latin-America as some has coined it (preceding in fact
in some respects the model itself). Over several decades it built and
skilfully maintained a consensual democratic political system based on
c10se linkages between the state and society. It met, in other words, one of
the most important conditions for a successful dependent development
process to take place. Its main problem appears to have been that consensus
5 Sørensen, George, Democracy, Dictatorship and Development. Macmillan, 1991, p. 187.
6 See for example Frederic Deyo, ed. The Political Economy of New East Asian
lndustrialism. Cornell University Press, 1988.
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Africans - contributed positively to putting an efficient (Weberian) state
bureaucracy into place.9 The relative skills displayed by the SEA state
bureaucracies have been pointed to as an important factor by several
authors.
Second, foreign economic policy and the institutions implementing it was
both more flexible and consistent in the East Asian case: flexible because
the market mechanism was being used to promote competitiveness,
consistent because the state enjoyed relative autonomy from business
lobbies. Foreign economic policy in East Asia was also flexible in another
sense: import substitution measures and an export-oriented industrialisation
ran almost paralleI throughout the 1960s and L 970s, with a gradual phasing
in of less import protection. In the Latin American case and in some of the
relevant African cases, there was first rather general import substitution and
then, in the late 1970s and the 1980s a rather radical shift toexport-oriented
industrial strategy.
Third, economic growth was redistributed in order to create and maintain
a relatively egalitarian social structure. We know that land reform was very
much instrumental in making this relative equality possible, alesson which
further contrasts with Latin American experience which has privileged
industrial and urban interests. The importance attached to rural interests in
South East Asia is further ilustrated by the fact that South Korea, as has
Japan, has strongly opposed liberalisation of rice trade demanded by the
United States and its allies in the GATT.
It is possible that in addition a fourth set of factors, socio-cultural factors,
play a role in explaining the egalitarian SEA development experience, but
I do not believe that we know to what extent this is true.
In making these three (four) general points, I overlook disparities that
trly exist among the SEA cases even among the "first-tier" NICs. There
are, for instance, important variances between South Korea and Taiwan in
the way and degree by which the state intervenes in the economy. 10 This
applies even for the state-civIl society relationship during the most
authoritarian phases of their political systems.
International systemic and extemal factors including geopolitics and the
role of transnational capital are integrated into several of these three (four)
factors. I shall return to a few more observations in a moment. Many
9 Bruce Curnngs, "World System and Authoritarian Regimes in Korea, 1948-1984", in E.
A. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, eds., Contending Approaches to the Political Economy
of Taiwan. London, M.E. Sharpe, 1988.
io Yun-han Chu, "State structure and economic adjustment of the East Asian newly
industrialising countries", International Organization, voL. 43, no. 4, Autumn 1989.
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North-South relations reverted?
During the 1980s international relations in the North-South context have
assumed new dependency dimensions: that of heavy foreign debt and
requests for structural adjustment, and at the same time mounting trade
protectionism in the North. This has put the South in what is apparently a
p aradoxic al situation. On the one hand the "End of history" inspired
rhetoric of economistic liberalism in the North holds up more - and more
liberal - integration with the North as the safest road to development. A
great many development theorists and govemments in the South have
moved in the direction of that position. Despite its proven limited validity,
thus, neo-liberal economics theory probably have more support among
Southem academics today than in the 1970s.
On the other hand the North in its own economic interest has taken steps
to marginalize the South by erecting more bariers to trade than before.
This has among other things led to more, not less political bargaining over
market shares and therefore increased emphasis on bilateral arangements
as opposed to non-discriminatory multilateralism.1 i And itcertainly raises
questions about the viabilty of export-led development strategies in the
present and future. If access to Northem markets are blocked, then several
of thosecountries following an export-oriented industrialisation strategy
wil obviously be thwarted.
But again warnings should be sent to those who feel tempted to fall back
into the underdevelopment position. Take tiny Mauritius to prove that
strctural approaches have limited validity: When the North-South
relationship started to assume crisis symptoms at the end of the 1970s, this
island country had 99 percent of its exports in one commodity, sugar, and
some 20 percent of the labour force unemployed. It had a political system
characterised by ethnic differentiation, shifting governments and it lacked
economies of scale and a viable resource base. Stil, in the course of the
1980s, Mauritius managed to turn around. It diversified into textile and
clothing industry with the help of local capital, a relatively skilled labour
force and transnational corporate technology operating in large part through
export free zones. And it made it: exports of textile products have taken off
despite international bariers, and unemployment is down to some 4
percent.
What Mauritius did not manage well in its rapid turn-around was the
environment.
i i See Helge Hveem, The Bargaining Economy. Oslo, Center on Development and the
Environment, 1993 (manuscript, to be published in 1994) for detailed analysis.
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if markets are freed and govemments adopt domestic environmental
regulation, more trade-generated growth wil also improve the environment.
The logic behind this conc1usion appears fairly straightforward:
Increased income from increased trade wil provide financial means which
wil be used for investment in c1eaner technology. The more trade and thus
income grows, the more wil the process of technological transformation be
speeded up. A new and c1eaner international product cyc1e wil replace the
old and dirty one faster with trade-generated growth than without.
What is a proper scholarly reaction to the text? Is it simply a neo-liberal
trickle-down credo which long ago has been proven at best naive, or wrong
at worst? It is tempting to answer with a yes. The credo does not become
more true by being repeated over and over again. There is no unidirectional
relationship between trade and growth, nor is there between growth and
development. 13 But if we reject the credo as we should, we shall probably
have to realize that a great part of the South may well ally itself with the
GATT secretariat. Several OECD countries wil lead on in setting up
stricter standards on production and products that wil affect third countries.
There appears to be a growing concern in the South that this is
protectionism disguised as environmental protection. The anti-environment
reaction is strongest among some of the up-coming industrial nations, such
as Malaysia whose prime minister recently branded environment-motivated
regulation of international trade as "imperialism" . Mauritius on the other
hand has stared to take remedies to cope with the environmental
degradation that followed its successful industrial diversification in the
L 980s.
This brief visit to the most recent development debate shows two things.
First the introduction of environment into the development debate may have
recast North-South politics. Secondly the environment issue makes the
necessity to look at interactions between factors and actors at different
levels of social organisation even more obvious, cf. the agent-structure
dilemma. Malaysia' s strong environmental movement is certainly not going
to accept that its government rides a neo-liberal bandwagon which this
13 One of the most comprehensive studies of the relationship is the World Bank's major
project, see Michaely, Michael, Demetris Papageorgiou and Armeane M. Choksi, eds.
Liberalizing Foreign Trade. Cambridge, Basil Blackwell, 1991, 7 volumes the last of
which is entitled Lessons of Experience in the Developing World. David Evans among
others, offered an in-depth critique of the study at a seminar on trade policies organised
by UNCTAD in Antalya, Turkey in May, 1991. See also Dani Rodrik, "Conceptual
issues in the design of trade policies for industrialization", World Development, VoL. 20,
no. 3, March 1992 for another economists approach to the issue.
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3. Notes on equality, poverty and
development
Karl Ove Moene, Department of Economics, University of Oslo
This is an extended abstract of the lecture given at the NFU Conference. i
Introduction
A popular conservative view c1aims that the failure of Soviet type
communism demonstrates the impossibility of implementing egalitarianism.
Therefore egalitarianism is no feasible option for development in poor
countries. Logically there is of course no basis for such a sweeping
inference. First of all it may be a grave mistake to associate the former
command economies of Eastem Europe with egalitarian principles.
Secondly, if one insisted on such an association, the collapse of the Soviet
system proves the incapabilty of certain tools and means to achieve a
sustainable development with distributional equality rather than the
infeasibility of egalitarian principles as such. Thirdly, more recent evidence
suggests that the vie w that egalitarianism is harmful to development may
be a mistaken or at least incomplete description of realities. In the
following I wil give some reasons for an opposite view, that a high degree
of inequality is not only unjust but may also be harmful to poverty
alleviation and long run economic development.
The issue of justiee in poor countries
One conceptualisation of justice for structuring society refers to a
hypotheticalcontract that is fair in the sense that, when the initial
agreement is made, no one knows what place in the society they wil
occupy. Before "the birth lottery" takes place, most people would "vote
for" more egalitarian allocations than those they may accept after they
I wish to thank Steinar Holden and Tone Ognedal for useful comments to the first draft.
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The inequality/development relationship
Crude estimates by Datt and Ravallion (1992) may be used to illustrate the
scope of redistributions to fight poverty. India has a lower per capita
income than Brazil, but less inequality. The degree of poverty (measured
by the head count), however, is highest in India: 44 percent as compared
to 32 percent in Brazil. If one took the Brazilian mean incbme and
implemented the Indian income distribution around that mean, the head
count measure of poverty would be reduced to L percent. if one instead
took the Indian mean income and implemented the Brazilian income
distribution around that mean, the head count measure of poverty would
rise to 80 percent.
The relevance of this play with numbers depends of course on whether
the distribution can be improved without affecting the mean. The traditional
economists' answer is that it cannot. Inequality of income is necessary to
obtain work incentives and sufficient savings to generate a high enough
capital accumulation to sustain the higher growth and income leveis, the
argument goes. In addition, the traditional view would c1aim that increasing
inequality is an inherent part of staring off a process of modernisation.
To ilustrate the latter point let us consider an economy that consists of
two sectors: backward agriculture and modem industries. Modernisation
implies a rising employment share in modem industries that yields higher
labour incomes than backward agriculture. Accordingly, the first phase of
modernisation generates an increasing inequality, while the second phase
reduces inequality. This is an example of what Kuznets (1955) called the
inverted U shape of the inequality-development relationship.
Kuznets openly admitted that his initial assertation (in his presidential
address to the American Economic Association) was only to a small ex tent
based on empirical evidence. The inverted U has, however, been confirmed
by series of empirical cross section studies in the 60s and 70s (Kravis 1960,
Kuznets 1963, Paukert 1973, Ahluwalia 1976, Chenery and Syrquin 1975
and others). More recently, however, doubt has been casted on the
robustness of these results. Anand and Kanbur (1986) found that the typical
pattern is that inequality first falls and then rises. Fields and Jakubsen
(1990) who also give a comprehensive overview of the empirical works on
this topic, inc1ude new data that in contrast to most other studies, contain
more than one observation per country. They find that inequality decreases
when countries move from less developed to more developed (at least til
they reach per capita income levels of Singapore and Hong Kong).
All these studies have concentrated on the relationship between income
levels and inequality, while the more adequate relationship may be between
changes in income levels (or simply economic growth) and inequality.
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With share cropping the peasant is partially insured since the rental price
varies with the harvest at the same time as he is partially remunerated for
his work efforts. However, even though share cropping can be viewed as
an optimal arrangement (Stiglitz 1974) it is important to note the second-
best nature of this optimality. With a more egalitarian ownership of the
land, there would not be the same need for rental arangements. Peasants
who own their own land, would face improved work incentives and would
in part be self-insured by their property rights. Moreover, with share
cropping neither the landlord nor the peasants face the right incentives for
land improvements and environmental protection unless they can find ways
to share these costs in the same proportion as they share the harvest. (For
further discussions and alternative approaches, see Reiersen 1992)
Growth performanee and inequality
(i) Resource availability and poverty
Can economic growth hurt the interests of the poor? To answer this
question, let us, for the sake of argument, con sider a situation with a given
growth rate. Economic growth increases the pie to be divided. Yet it is
possible that poverty increases during the growth process. One reason why
there may be no monotone relationship between resource availability and
reduction in poverty has been studied by Balan and Ray (1991) and can be
visualised as follows.
In inegalitarian societies economic growth may easily affect rich and
poor population groups differently . According to Engel' s law in consumer
theory, the consumption of high quality goods, luxuries for simplicity,
increases its share of the household budgets of the rich, while the poor
according to the same "law" only consume basic staple food if they are
poor enough. "Luxuries" may be produced by the input of staple food in for
instance meat production. In this way luxuries and basic food to the poor
compete for the use of the same scarce resources and the prices of basic
food easily go up as the demand for luxuries increases.
To be productive, however, the wage leve! of poor workers has to cover
a certain minimum of basic foods. Nominal wages therefore have to go up
when food prices rise. As a consequence employers face higher labour costs
and may in turn lower their demand for labour such that the unemployment
rate goes up. Increasing unemployment means a rising number of poor
families and a higher degree of poverty in the economy. In fact, it is the
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(iii) Endogenous politics
Persson and Tabellni (1991) and Alesina and Rodrik (1991) provide
models of how distributional considerations may affect the choice of growth
in a political equilbrium with rational voters. The main ide a is that
inequality may lead voters to vote for more redistributive policies via the
tax system. Redistributive policies of this sort may require distortive taxes
that again may be harmful to human and physical capital formation. The
mechanisms studied in their formal models may, however, be too stylised
to capture all relevant aspects of democracy and growth. Yet they remind
us of the problems that the emerging democracies in poor countries may
face in the form of short-sighted populist policies unless resources and
incornes are more equally distributed.
(iv) Endogenous conflicts
There are, however, more than one way to tax the rich and privileged,
including banditry and other forms of extra-legal appropriation of wealth.
Since the poor have little to loose and much to win by social convulsion in
inegalitarian societies, they may be rationally motivated to fight harder.
Conflcts of this sort which are rooted in perceived injustice in the
distribution of resources, are detrimental to economic growth and welfare.
Banditry means that human resources are moved from productive to
appropriative activities. Banditry gives rise to defensive actions which again
means that more resources are us ed unproductively. When property rights
are not taken as given, investors cannot be sure to collect the rents of their
investments. For that reason they may prefer short term projects to more
profitable long term projects.
Conflcts of this kind in poor countries and throughout the world include
more activities than individual banditry. Class struggle, tribal conflcts and
rent seeking towards other groups, the state and other nations in the form
of imperialism and war can all be understood within the same conflct
approach. Most of these conflcts are at least fuelled by inequality of
resources and all of them are harmful to economic growth and develop-
ment. (An early formal analysis of such grabbing strategies between
countries, can be found in Haavelmo 1954. See also Hirsleifer 1991.)
The traditional economic approach focusing on interaction within stable
environments where agents respect the established rules and property rights,
may be misplaced when one con siders developing countries with weak legal
institutions. A high degree of inequality in poor countries may easily giv e
rise to harmful strggles that eliminate the potentials for development.
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rises. Accordingly, there may be no conflct between equity and efficiency
in the distribution of land.
Several factors may explain the variable impact of land reforms on
income distribution, poverty and labour migration.
(i) To whom?
The nature of the reform in itself is important. Is the land given to
smallholders or landless peasants? As compared to landless peasants
smallholders are doubled blessed. They have higher incomes and a better
nourishment and have therefore a higher labour productivity than landless
peasants. This privileged position gives them, in addition, a competitive
advantage over landless workers in the rental market for land since
smallholders can afford to pay higher rental prices and stil obtain a high
enough income to remain productive. In this way the market widens income
differentials that are due to unequal distribution of assets.
If land is transferred from large landholders to smallholders only, which
is often the case, poverty and malnutrition may increase among landless
workers who are replaced from their earlier employment by the more
productive smallholders. To give land to landless peasants, however, may
have a better impact on poverty and malnutrition.
(ii) The quantity of arable land per capita
When land is scarce the rental price of land may be so high that landless
workers are unable to rent quality land. A land reform that transfers land
from large landholders to landless workers may then enable them to
compete on equal terms with smallholders. The consequence would be a
reduction in poverty and malnutrition. When land is more abundant,
landless workers may be able to rent land also before the land reform. if
then some land is given to some agricultural workers, those who remain
landless may loose their employment because rental prices are bid up by
the increasing number of more productive smallholders.
(iii) Partial versus comprehensive reforms
Partial reforms are more likely to induce replacement of landless workers
in agricultural production which may increase the number and reduce the
incomes of families below the poverty line. Comprehensive reforms, which
divide the land more or less equally among all agricultural workers,
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compression as a way of equalising basic needs fulfilment may raise labour
productivity and induce structural change towards higher growth.
An important side effect of these egalitarian policies is that distributional
conflcts and wasteful struggles may be reduced. Though equity and
efficiency may be improved simultaneously, there is no guarantee that
egalitarian policies would not make the rich worse off.
Moreover, one may object that distributive justice should not be related
only to opportunities and end states, but also to procedures. I have,
however, neglected questions like to what extent outcomes can be unjust
if the procedures that lead to these outcomes can be justified by voluntary
trading (Nozick 1974). Also the more radical versions of procedural
injustice focusing on the colonial past, imperialism and how for instance
land ownership was initially established, have been disregarded. Even
though there are important philosophical differences between radical end-
state theories and conservative procedural theories of justice, there may be
an important link between the two in practice. A sufficiently high degree
of inequality of outcomes in poor countries may easily induce extra-legal
appropriative activities that also violate procedural justice. Paradoxically,
however, those regimes (for instance in Africa) that speak most loudly
about radical reforms are sometimes the gravest sinners against the most
conservative principles of justice, namely equal opportunities and respect
for established rules and laws. These are violated by favouritism,
corrption, rule bending, expropriation and job assignment as a loyalty
device. Such practices are no doubt harmful to development as well.
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question. The notion of a general trade-off between democracy and
economic development is rejected, but it wil also be demonstrated why
economic development and welfare improvement wil not necessarily be
forthcoming from the new democracies.
The debate on democracy and development
Many scholars see an incompatibility between democracy and economic
growth for both economic and political reasons. The economic reasons
relate to the fact that growth requires an economic surplus available for
investment. Such surplus can only come out of the gross production of a
given society. A given surplus can be either invested or consumed. Hence,
there is only one way of increasing the investible surplus, namely by
reducing consumption. The argument is that a democratic regime wil not
be able to pursùe policies of curbing consumption (holding down real
wages), because the consurners are also voters who wil punish the
politicians next time they get the chance at the ballot box. Therefore, in a
democratic system, political leaders have to cater to the short-term demands
of the population. In the words of an Indian economist: "Under a system
in which lawmakers ... seek the approval of the electorate, the politician
cannot afford ... to follow any policies which wil not produce tangible
benefits for the electorate by the time the next election comes around."3
Accordingly, there is an incompatibility in the short and medium run
between economic growth (investment) and welfare (consumption): Y ou
cannot have your cake and eat it too. And the reservations against demo c-
racy have precisely to do with the tendency for democratic leaders to be
"persuaded" by the electorate to pro mote too much welfare and,
consequently, too little growth. Which in turn means that the whole basis
for welfare promotion in the long run is jeopardised.
The political reservations about democracy take the starting point that
economic development is best promoted when there is a high degree of
political stabilty and order.4 Democracy is counterproductive in this
regard, because it opens the already weak institutions of the developing
3 B.K. Nehru, "Western Democracy and the Third World", Third World Quarterly, voL.
1, no. 2 (1979), p. 57n. See also V. Rao, "Democracy and EconomIc Development",
Studies in Comparative International Development, voL. 19, no. 4 (1984-5): 67-82.
4 Samuel P. Huntington, PoliticalOrder in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968).
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Powell: "State building and economy bu ilding are logically prior to political
participation and material distribution, since power sharing and welfare
sharing are dependent on there being power and welfare to share". 8
The critics of the tradeoff-view challenge all of the arguments set forth
above. First, there is the economIc argument about democracy hurting
growth. While it is tre that a specific amount of economic surplus can be
either invested or consumed, but not both, the conc1usion that this means
a shar contradiction between growth and welfare is not as straightforward
as it seems. For example, public expenditure in such areas as health and
education constitutes investment in "human capital" which simultaneously
improves welfare for large groups in the population. Indeed, many econo-
mists advocate a strategy of development emphasising "Basic Human
Needs" that it is possible to have both growth and welfare simultaneously.9
If this is so, the argument in favour of authoritarianism because of
democracy's inability to hold back on welfare weakens severely. Indeed,
the choice may be, not between growth and welfare, but between two
different kinds of investment policy: one which supports welfare and one
which does not; and it can be argued that a democratic government is more
likely to promote the former and an authoritarian government the latter.lO
Second, the critics turn the argument that democracy cannot secure order
and stability on its head: authoritarianism can mean arbitrary rule and
undue interference in citizen's affairs. Only a democracy can provide the
predictable environment where economic development can prosper.
Moreover, political and economic pluralism reinforce each other. Without
basic civIl and politicalliberties, citizens wil not feel secure to consistently
8 Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental
Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), p. 363. See also Samuel P. Huntington, "The
Goals of Development", in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), Understand-
ing Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), p. 19, and Irene Gendzier,
Managing Political Change. Social Scientists and the Third World (Boulder: Westview,
1985), ch. 6.
9 See Hollis Chenery et aL., Redistribution With Growth (London: Oxford University Press,
1974), and Paul Streeten et aL., First Things First. Meeting Basic Human Needs in
Developing Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
10 See also Grace Goodell and John P. Powelson, "The Democratie Prerequisites of
Development", in Raymond Gastil (ed.), Freedom in the World: Political Rights and
Civil Liberties (New York: Freedom House, 1982): 167-76, and Atul Kohli, "Democracy
and Development", in John Lewis and Valeriana Kallab (eds.), Development Strategies
Reconsidered (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986): 153-82.
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political system does appear to be a luxury which hinders development". 14
A similar conc1usion is reached in Cohen' s study of economic growth in a
number of Latin American countries.15
Berg-Schlosser' s analysis of African regimes finds that authoritarian
systems have a "strong positive effect on the overall rate of GNP
growth",16 but he also emphasises that democratic (polyarchic) regimes
have done better than should be expected: Thus polyarchic systems fare
quite well both in terms of GNP growth and the improvement of the basic
quality of life. They also have the best record conceming normative
standards (protection of civil liberties and freedom from political
repression).17 Dwight King reaches a similar conc1usion in his study
covering six Asian countries: "If performance is evaluated in terms of
material equality and welfare rather than growth, and is examined
diachronically over the past decade and within differentiated population
groups (rurallandless, and near landless), democratic-type regimes
(Malaysia, Sri Lanka) have performed better than bureaucratic-authoritarian
ones (Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand)."18
G. Wiliam Dick has examined the growth record of 72 countries
between 1959 and 1968. He uses a classification with three different forms
of government: authoritarian, semi-competitive and competitive. He readily
admits that the data are not unambiguous. Even so, the conc1usion main-
tains that the "results certainly do not support, and tend to refute, the view
that authoritarian countries are universally capable of achieving faster
economic growth in the early stages of development than countries having
competitive political systems..."19.
No c1ear answer to the tradeoff question emerges from these studies, and
there is little help to be had from the invoking of additional analyses as a
14 Rodney M. Marsh, "Does Demoeraey Hinder Eeonomie Development in the Lateeomer
Developing Nations?", Comparative Social Research 2 (1979), p. 244.
15 Y ousseff Cohen, "The Impaet of Bureaueratie-Authoritarian rule on Eeonomie Growth",
Comparative Political Studies, voL. 18, no. 1 (1985): 123-36.
16 Dirk Berg-Sehlosser, "Afriean Politieal Systems: Typology and Performanee",
Comparative Political Studies, voL. 17, no. 1 (1984), p. 143.
17 Ibid., p. 12l.
18 Dwight Y. King, "Regime Type and Performanee. Authoritarian Rule, Semi-Capitalist
Development and Rural Inequality in Asia", Comparative Political Studies, voL. 13, no.
4 (1981), p. 477.
19 G. Wiliam Diek, "Authoritarian versus Nonauthoritarian Approaehes to EeonomIc
Development", Journal of Political Economy, voL. 82, no. 4 (1974), p. 823.
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Both of these pathways are tried out below. I look first at a pair of
cases, thenat different types of authoritarian and democratic systems.21
India versus China
India and China are both very large, populous, and predominantly agrarian
countries. They were at a rather low leve1 of social and economic develop-
ment in 1950, following India's independence in 1947 and the Chinese
revolution in 1949. At the same time, India is one of the most stable
political democracies in the developing world, while China is under
authoritarian socialist rule. It may be that India' s democracy is less than
perfect, and some democratic elements have been present in China, but the
overall difference is c1ear enough. We thus have a democratic and an
authoritarian country with stable regime forms for more than three decades,
and with a number of basic traits in common, inc1uding similar levels of
development in 1950. Therefore, they are good candidates for comparing
development outcomes of democratic and authoritarian regimes.
Economic development as defined here includes two elements, growth
and welfare. Let us first look at the growth results in table 1.
Growth statistics are seldom fully reliable, and there is also a problem
with comparability of China and India. Note that the levels of GNP are
roughly equal in the two countries in 1988 - 330 and 340 dollars respec-
tively. if the 1965-88 growth rates are also reliable, we must conclude that
for the figures to match, India's per capita income in 1965 should have
been twice that of China and that is contrary to all avaIlable evidence.22
On the other hand, real GDP level in terms of PPP dollars is a more valid
figure than per capita GNP, and when this is used, the difference in growth
rates becomes more trustworthy.
These data problems cannot be fully settled here. Without deciding on
the exact magnitudes, I see no reason to doubt that the overall growth rate
in China has been substantially higher than in India. On one important
dimension the difference is not dramatic, namely agricultural growth
between 1950 and 1980. Before saying more on this point, a few general
remarks on the growth figures are in order.
21 Some of these considerations draw on Sørensen, Democracy, Dictatorship and Develop-
ment.
22 See Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1989), p. 206n.
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more important. First and foremost, the regime rapidly undertook far-
reaching reforms in industry and agriculture; these reforms made an
economic surplus available for investment which had earlier accrued to
private landowners and capitalists. At the same time the reforms increased
productivity, especially in agriculture. Several analysts have pointed out that
the lack of such basic reforms are responsible for a large, unrealised growth
potential in Indian agriculture.24 It is a main thesis in Barington Moore's
contribution that big landowners and moneylenders in India appropriate a
large part of the agrarian surplus and spend it for unproductive purposes.25
A number of scholars have echoed that opinion in more recent analyses and
it is a fact that the taxation of agricultural income in India has been
extremely low, yielding only one per cent of total tax proceeds in 1980-
8 1.26 The strategy of the "Green Revolution" adopted in some areas from
the mid-sixties aimed at increasing production though the use of modem
inputs, like chemical fertilsers, pesticides, irrigation and new crop varieties.
The strategy has increased output where implemented, but it has not
radically improved the overall growth rate in agriculture or paved the way
for a substantially higher contribution from agriculture towards industrial
growth.
Yet there are some less attractive elements which must be included in the
Chinese growth record. The power of the authoritarian regime to organise
rapid economic growth also involves the power to commit horrible mistakes
and even persevere in such mistakes, as it happened during the so-called
"Great Leap Forward" from 1958, which was supposed to boost production
to an extent where China could be among the highly industrialised countries
in ten years time. The Leap was a faIlure in industry and a disaster in
agriculture; the production of food grain dropped in 1959 to the leve1 of
1953. Only in 1978 did per capita output of food grain reach the level of
1956.27 In industry, output first increased dramatically and then dropped
at a similar speed in 1961-2. Behind the rise in output was a complete lack
24 Francine Frankel, "Is Authoritarianism the Solution to India' s Econornc Development
Problems?", in Atul Kohli (ed.), The State and Development in the Third World
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 154-61.25 Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant
in the Making of the Modem World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 355.
26 Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development in India (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1984), p. 56. See also Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Delhi: Orient
Longman, 1982), p. 352n, and K. Subbarao, "State Policies and Regional Disparity in
Indian Agriculture", Development and Change, voL. 16, no. 4 (1985), p. 543.
27 A. Piazza, Food Consumption and Nutritional Status in the PRC (Boulder: Westview,
1986), p. 36.
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Development Program,UNDP, has in recent years published a Human
Development Report which identifies some of the best indicators. Drawing
primarilyon these data table 2 outlines the welfare achievements in China
and India.
Indicators
Life expectancy at birth (years) 1990
Adult literacy rate (%) 1985
Mean years of schooling (1980)
Under-5 mortality rate (per thousand)
Human development index rank 
l
Table 2
Welfare in China and India
China
70.1
68.2
4.8
47
0.614
India
59.1
44.1
2.2
154
0.308
l The HDI is composed of three indicators: life expectancy, education and income. For
each indicator, a worldwide maximum (1) and a minimum (O) is identified and the single
countr is then ranked according to its position. The combined average of the three
positions is the HDI; the doser it is to 1, the better the ranking; see UNDP, Human
Development Report 1991 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991): pp.
88-91.
Source: Figures from UNDP, Human Development Report 1991, p. 120. The Under-5
mortality rate is based on UNICEF data, quoted from Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, Hunger
and Public Action (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989): p. 204.
Even when we allow for some uncertainty in the data, there is no doubt
about the general tendency: China has achieved a substantially higher leve1
of welfare according to these indicators than has India. China' s rating in the
composite Human Development Index is twice that oflndia's. Note that the
figures in the table are averages. The situation for the poor is much worse.
The percentage of the population living in absolute poverty, that is, at a
bare minimum leve1 of subsistence or below, is as high as fort y in India
and this percentage has basically remained unchanged since independence.
With a population increase from 360 to more than 800 millon this means,
of course, that the actual number of very poor people has increased
dramatically. The corresponding percentage of absolutely poor in China is
twelve to fifteen.31
This goes squarely against the expectations in the theoretical
considerations above, according to which democratic regimes were expected
31 See Sørensen, Democracy, Dictatorship and Development.
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prices; public financial institutions have provided a cheap source of finance
and the leve! of taxation has never constituted a serious burden.
Second, there are the rich farmers. They have benefitted from price
support for farm products, a wide range of subsidised inputs (fertiliser,
power, water). Moreover, the threat of land reform has been held in check,
and there has been no significant taxation of agricultural income and
wealth. The third group is the bureaucracy, that is, the professionals and
white-collar workers in the public sector. The benefits to this group has
come from the substantial expansion of the public sector, partly in the form
of public enterprises, partly through indirect controis; the bureaucracy has
the power to grant licenses, subsidies and other favours sought by the
private sector.
In sum, from the viewpoint of "who benefits?" Indian govemments have
presided over this coalition constituting roughly the top twenty per cent of
the population. It is a dominant coalition in the sense that the government
policies are such as to further, in the long run, the interests of the
participants.35 The development policies of the state have never
significantly been outside of the orbit of what is acceptable to the dominant
coalition. The mass of poor people is too unorganised, divided and
politically weak to radically change this state of affairs.
Why, then, the much better welfare situation in China, in spite of an
authoritarian government pushing economic growth? On the one hand, the
reforms in agriculture not only pushed growth, but also welfare. According
to one estimate, the poorest fifth of the rural households almost doubled its
share of the overall income, from six to eleven per cent, as a consequence
of the agrarian reform.36 On the other hand, a number of measures were
taken which aimed directly at welfare improvement. Three areas stand out
in this respect, namely health, education and public distribution systems.
The average health situation was substantially improved by the system of
public health care erected in the 1950s and expanding its coverage to the
rural areas during the 1960s. This system also includes curative health
care.37 Ninety-three per cent of the relevant age-groups attended ground
school in 1983, and even if more than one-third of the pupils from the rural
areas drop out, the level of education has been considerably improved.
35 See also A. Rudra, "Political Economy of Indian Non-Development", Economic and
Political Weekly, voL. 20, no. 21, May 25 (1985), p. 916.
36 Riskin, China 's Political Economy, p. 235.
37 See Piazza, Food Consumption and Nutritional Status in the PRC, p. 176.
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Types of authorItarian systems
Comparing the cases of India and China helps shed a more nuanced light
on the theoretical debate on economic development outcomes of democratic
and authoritarian regimes. Yet it is c1ear that the theoretical debate can not
be settled on the basis of one pair of cases. The comparison says nothing
about the relationship between India-China and other examples of authori-
tarian and democratic regimes. Even if the India-China contras t does not
give very high marks to Indian democracy it is necessary to know more
about different types of authoritarian and democratic systems and how the
cases fit into this picture before drawing further conc1usions. I shall argue
in this section that China is indeed not very typical of the large group of
authoritarian systems. China belongs, together with a few other countries,
to a rather exc1usive group of authoritarian developmentalist regimes, which
has been capable of pushing both economic growth and welfare. When we
look at development outcomes, the large number of authoritarian systems
belong in two less attractive groups: they either push growth, but not
welfare, or even worse, they do neither. Regimes in this latter group do not
have the promotion of economic development as their main aim: their
ultimate goal is enrichment of the elite which controls the state.
Regime type Aspects of economic Country
development example
Growth Welfare
Authoritarian + + Taiwan
developmentalist regime China
Authoritarian +
-
Brazil under
growth regime military rule
Authoritarian state elite
- -
Zaire under
enrichment regime Mobuto
Figure 1
Types of authoritarian systems: Consequences for
economic development
These three main types of authoritarian systems are further introduced in
what follows.
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seventies. China was intemationally isolated for a long period and the ties
with the Soviet Union during the fifties did not provide much economic
assistance, compared to what Taiwan got from the United States.
Yet what must be stressed here is the basic similarity of China and
Taiwan as members of the category of authoritarian developmentalist
regimes. There are only a few other candidates for this type of authoritarian
regime. The two most obvious ones are the two Koreas.41 It is c1ear that
South Korea has many traits in common with Taiwan, while North Korea
is a socialist case which has taken centralisation of political and economic
control even further than has China. There are a few borderline cases which
share some of the features of authoritarian developmentalist regimes;
examples are Singapore on the capitalist side, and Cuba on the socialist
side.
Authoritarian growth regimes
The sec ond main type of authoritarian regime is the authoritarian growth
regime, which promotes economic growth, but not welfare. Brazil during
military rule, from 1964 until the present period of redemocratisation, is a
good example of this type of regime. As an authoritarian growth regime,
Brazil exhibits the following characteristics: economic growth objectives are
pursued with the aim ofbuilding a strong national economy (which, in turn,
can provide the basis for a strong military power). The long term interests
(but not necessarily the immediate interests) of the dominant social forces
are respected while the economic surplus to get growth underway is set to
come from the workers and peasants of the poor majority .
It is thus an explicitly elite-oriented model of development, res ting on an
alliance between local private capital, state enterprises and transnational
corporations. The elite orientation of the model applies to the supply side
(emphasis on consumer durab1es) as well as to the demand side (capital
intensive industrialisation with most benefits to a small layer of skilled and
white collar employees and workers). What this means is that the poor
majority of the population is not really involved in the growth process; the
most urgent needs for the poor are basic health, housing, education and
gainful employment.42 Redistributive reform measures, inc1uding agrarian
41 Jon Hallday, "The North Korean Enigrna", in Gordon White et aL. (eds.), Revolutionary
Socialist Development in the Third World (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983): 114-55; Clive
Harnlton. Capitalist Industrialization in Korea (Boulder: Westview, 1986).
42 Peter T. Knight, "Brazilian Socio-Econornic Developrnent: Issues for the Eighties",
World Development, voL. 9, no. 11-12 (1981).
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The surplus which comes into the hands of the leadership through its
control of the state is distributed among the elan or a coalition of clans
which in turn providepolitical support for the leader. It is not, of course,
an equal pattern of distribution; the lion's share of the benefits accrues to
the supreme leader and a small elite around him. There is no clear
distinction between politicians and civil servants; the latter are actively
involved in the efforts to gain personal advantage from their public posts.
Thus, despite official elaims to the contrary, the ruling elite takes no real
interest in economic development, be it in terms of growth or welfare. The
main aim is self-enrichment. This requires an act of balancing against
potential opponents and a measure of distribution of spoils which may have
side-effects in terms of promoting either welfare or growth, but this is not
the main aim. Zaire under Mobuto may be the clearest example of an
ASEE-regime.46 The inner circle of the Mobutu Clan consists of a few
hundred people, his "Fraternity". The lucrative positions in "state,
diplomatic corps, party, army, secret police and the Presidency"47 are
reserved for clan members. The latter directly elaim some twenty per cent
of the national budget; the income is complemented through smuggling
(diamonds and gold) and "private" sales of copper. Mobutu himself has a
personal share in all foreign undertakings operating in Zaire, and his family
controls sixty per cent of the domestic trade net. He has accumulated
enormous wealth as is recognised to be among the three richest men in the
world.
Hence, the defining characteristic of the ASEE-regime is simply that the
elite which controls the state is preoccupied with enriching itself. Other
examples from Africa which fit this description is the Central African
Republic under Jean Bedel Bokassa and U ganda under Idi Amin. There are
also examples of authoritarian regimes outside Africa which have much in
common with the ASEE type of regime: Haiti under Duvalier Senior and
Junior (Papa and Baby Doc); Nicaragua under Somoza, and Paraguay under
Alfredo Stroessner.
46 David Gou1d, "The adnnnistration of 
underdeve1opment" , in Guy Gran (ed.), Zaire: The
Political Economy of Underdevelopment (New York: Praeger, 1979): 87-107; Sa1ua
Nour, "Zaire", in Dieter Noh1en and Franz Nusche1er (eds.), Handbuch der Dritten Welt,
voL. 4 (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe): 468-522.
47 Nour, "Zaire", p. 512.
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Types of democratie systems
There is less material for a typology of democratic systems, simply because
there are very few relatively stable democracies in the developing world.
Not counting very small countries with a population of less than one
millon, only Costa Rica ( with a population of three million) has been a
stable democracy for as long as India. Venezuela and Colombia come close
to a similar stability. Yet there is a common denominator between these
stable cases and the majority of the current transitions towards democracy,
which is significant for their economic development outlooks. They are all
elite-dominated democracies.
Elite-dominated democracies
Indian democracy, in the vein of the current transitions towards democracy,
was achieved by an elite-dominated coalition with three main groups: the
urban professionals,who founded the Congress movement already in 1885;
the Indian business community in trade and industry, and the rural
landowning elite. The masses of poor peasants supported the elite
coalition's struggle for independence and democracy; they ralled behind
Gandhi as the great leading figure, instrumental in welding this allance
between elite groups and the poor masses. Yet the support of the poor
peasants did not really upset the rural elite. Gandhi' svision of the future
of the Indian vilages included no threat to their position; and it was the
rural elite, not the landless peasants, who controlled the Congress
organisation at the local leveL. 49
We saw above that the continued elite dominance in the Indian
democracy shaped and set the limits of what could be achieved in terms of
economic development. The process of economic development has mainly
served the interests of the elite groups in the dominant coalition. The
respect for elite interests has impeded the capacity of Indian democracy to
mobilise resources for economic growth and welfare improvement through
basic agrarian and other reforms.
Most of the current transitions towards democracy must also be
characterised as transitions from above, that is, elite-dominated transitions.
This may lead to "frozen democracies" unwiling to transgress the narow
limitations imposed on them by the elite factions who engineered the
transition to democracy in the first place. Against the background of the
Indian experience with some fort y years of elite-dominated democracy, such
49 See Sørensen, Democracy, Dictatorship and Development, ch. 2.
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achievements are more ordinary, especially during the crisis period in the
1980s (see table 3).
Table 3
Welfare and growth in Costa Rica
Life expectancy at birth (years) 1990
Adult literacy rate (%) 1985
Means years of schooling (1980)
Human development index rank!
Real GDP per capita (ppp$)2
Annual growth rate (GNP per capita, %) 1965-80
1980-88
74.9
91.8
5.6
0.876
4,320
3.3
0.2
i The HDI-measure is explained in table 3.2. 2 PPP (purchasing power parities). An attempt
to measure real GDP in terms of domestic purchasing powers of currencies, thereby
avoiding the distortions of offcial exchange rates.
Source: Figures from UNDP, Human Development Report 1991, pp. 119,164.
It should be noted that the average figures given here conceal a fairly
large group at the bottom of the ladder which has made much less progress.
While there are very few at the level of actual starvation, one estimate from
1977 put the share of the population living at subsistence leve1 at seventeen
per cent.52 Most of these people are rurallandless or urban population
from the city slums. The economic crisis of the 1980s has meant asetback
for the majority of the population. Already by 1982 real wages were back
at the level of L 970 and cutbacks in state expenditure has hit several social
programmes.
Even if this is the case, there is reason to ask why the elite-dominated
democracy of Costa Rica has fared relatively well in welfare terms. Several
elements go into explaining this. First, the nature of elite rule in Costa Rica
during the nineteenth and early twentieth century was different from most
other countries in Latin America. Costa Rica did not have a system with
Indians and slaves under the control of a rural elite; there was an
independent peasantry and the rural working class was free from feudal ties
binding them to rural patrons in a slave-like manner. Second, the dominant
stratum of coffee-barons supported liberal values of religious freedom,
52 C. Hall, Costa Rica. A Geographicallnterpretation in Historical Perspective (Boulder:
Westview, 1985), p. 270.
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better social and housing conditions. At the same time, measures should be
taken to make the economy more effective, geared to faster growth while
also increasing popular control. The policies were redistribution of land
through an agrarian reform, regaining of national controlover the mineral
sector through nationalisation, something which was also foreseen for the
largest enterprises in the private sector. 55
While successful in its first year in power, the Unidad Popular had to
face rapidly growing resistance from landowners, industrialists, and the
middle sectors. A process of radicalisation took place where an increasingly
united opposition faced a government which was divided internally as to
whether it should seek radical confrontation or moderate accommodation
with its political adversaries. It was this situation that in 1973 culminated
with the military coup lead by Augusto Pinochet. This underlines the
fragilty of mass-dominated democracies; they easily lead towards hostile
confrontation which may then result in a return to authoritarian rule.
The fate of the Unidad Popular and other mass-oriented democracies in
Latin America has led to rather pessimistic conclusions as regards the
future possibilties for such systems in the region. Set ina broader
perspective the picture may be a bit brighter. It should be possible for
mass-dominated democracies to proceed more cautiously along the road of
reform and avoid the kind of all-encompassing showdown that took place
in Chile. One example of this is the Left Front rule in West Bengal in India
from 1977.56 At the same time, democracies have transformative
capacities. In this sense it is possible to see the development of most West
European democracies since the 19th century as a process beginning with
elite-dominated systems and then gradually transforming towards more
mass-dominated systems. The latter, in turn, are responsible for the welfare
states built since the 1930s. The process of gradual transformation paved
the way for elite acceptance of social reforms and equity policies.
The reasoning above as regards types of democratic systems is rather
simple. It suggests that the economic development prospects, especially as
regards the likelihood of improvements for the underprivileged, depend on
55 The remarks on Chile are based on Jakob J. Simonsen and George Sørensen, Chile 1970-
73: Et eksempel på østeuropæisk udviklingsstrategi? (Aarhus: Institute of Political
Science, 1976).
56 See Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty in India. The Politics of Reform (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
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Furthermore, even in the case of the relatively few authoritarian develop-
mentalist systems which perform well in economic development, we still
need to demonstrate in more precise terms how and to which extent the
suspending of civil and political rights can be justified in order to promote
economic development. It may well be, for example, that socialist
authoritarianism in China provided a freedom of manoeuvre for the regime
which paved the way for radical redistribution of land to the benefit of the
rural masses. But this hardly justifies a blanket tradeoff between
development and all types of civil and political rights. As one scholar has
noted, such violations as "torture, disappearances, and arbitrary executions
can almost always be eliminated with no costs to development; rights to
nationality and to equality before the law would also seem to have very low
development costs; due process is likely to be a bit more costly, but the
burden seems bearable...In other words, tradeoffs of civIl and political
rights must be selective, flexible, and rather specific if they are to be
justified at all". 57 Therefore, even in those cases where the tradeoff seems
justified, it is necessary to argue in a more precise and differentiated
manner for the rights which need to be suspended in order to promote
development.
The theory of a general tradeoff between democracy and development
must be rejected. Yet it is also clear that this rejection do es not open the
door to a harmonic world where democracy and economic development
automatically go hand in hand in a virtuous circle of mutual reinforcement.
Behind the rejected tradeoff are other, equally serious dilemmas. First, there
seems to be a fairly large number of both authoritarian and democratic
systems which, for different reasons, do not perform well in terms of
economic development. The ASEE-regimes and theelite-oriented growth-
regimes on the authoritarian side, together with the elite-dominated "frozen"
democracies, seem to hold out few promises for a process of economic
development with hopes for the large mass of poor people.
This is related to a sec ond serious dilemma. As regards the main types
of democracies, there seems to be a tradeoff between stability on the one
hand and the capacity for promoting rapid economic development on the
other. The elite-dominated democracies by far hold the best prospects for
stabilty as the Latin American experience ilustrates; at the same time,
elite-dominance can of ten mean support for status quo and little
development progress. Mass-dominated democracies promise more rapid
economic advance through reforms attacking vested elite interests. At the
57 Jack Donelly, "Human Rights and Development. Complementary or Competing
Concerns?", World Polities, vol. 36, no. 2 (1984), p. 281n.
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Table 4
Democracy and human rights observance 1990
Percentages of states violating selected rights
Not free Free
Summary executions 11 2Disappearances 56 20Massacres 24 3Arbitrary arest 88 31
No fair & decent trial 86 23Torture 84 25
Source: Based on Berto Jongman, "Why Some States Kil and Torture While Others Do
Not", PIOOM Newsletter and Progress Report 3, no. 1 (1991): p. 9.
However, further scrutiny reveals problems at two points. First, the
relationship is not perfect. Many countries have the basic political freedoms
associated with democracy while they continue to violate other human
rights. Such violations of human rights are monitored by Amnesty
International. In recent years even the long standing and consolidated
democracy of Denmark has been mentioned in Amnesty' s report on human
rights violations (the case in question had to do with violating the right to
humane treatment under detention for some visitors from developing
countries). Therefore, if rights are defined in a very broad sense even the
most democratic countries might not fully provide all of them. This is
brought forward in the human freedom index constructed by United Nations
Development Programme.60 It lists no less than fort Y rights/freedoms, for
example social and economic equality for ethnic minorities, freedom for
independent newspapers and book publishing and freedom from capital
punishment. It then proceeds to count the extent to which these fort Y
different rights are respected. Based on a sample of eighty-eight countries
from 1985, it appears that no single country observes all freedoms. Sweden
and Denmark top the list with thirty-eight out of fort Y freedoms guaranteed
to their people. They are followed by Netherlands with thirty-seven and
Finland, New Zealand and Austria with thirty-six. Some democracies have
rather low scores. This goes for India (fourteen), Colombia (fourteen), Israel
60 UNDP (United Nations Deve10pment Programme), Human Development Report 1991
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 20.
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Conclusion
This paper opened with a question: is democracy really worth the trouble
- does it pave the way for improvements in other spheres of life than
those narrowly connected with political freedoms? A number of reasons
have been given for an affirmative answer. Not only is democracy a value
in itself but it helps promote other civil and political rights. Furthermore,
democracies may not invariably perform better than authoritarian systems
in terms of economic development, but the notion of a general tradeoff
between democracy and development was rejected. Most of the
authoritarian systems are not only oppressive; they are also poor performers
in terms of economic development.
At the same time, transitions towards democracy do not guarantee a
promised land of rapid economic development and a vastly improved
human rights situation. The elite-dominated "frozen" democracies seem to
hold out few promises for a process of economic development with hopes
for the large groups of poor. The transitions themselves can lead to
situations of instabilty and breakdown of authority involving higher human
rights violation than before. The promise of democracy is not that of
automatic improvement in other areas; it is the creation of a "window of
opportunity", a political framework where groups struggling for develop-
ment and human rights have better possibilities than before for organising
and expressing their demands. Democracy offers the opportunities; it does
not offer guarantees of success.
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The failure of the statist economy
The struggle for independence was essentially fought to gain control of the
colonial state as a source of power and a provider of goods and services.
It was considered necessar by the liberation movements not merely to gain
access to the state but actually to take over the state machinery which had
previously been used as a means of political repression and economic
exploitation. As a predominantly law and order apparatus the colonial state
had at its disposal an arsenal of repressive tools from legislation to the use
of physical violence by means of police, army and security forces.
The economic functions of the colonial state lay mainly in its monopoly
position in the pricing and marketing of agricultural produce, primarily for
export, by means of marketing boards (or crop authorities as they tend to
be called today). Although a certain proportion of the agricultural surplus
thus extracted was used to develop the physical infrastructure of the
colonies and to finance the colonial bureaucracy, little was provided in the
way of goods and services to the citizenry. The colonial state was not a
developmental state, but its economic functions had the potential of being
transformed into one. Since the development of an indigenous class of
entrepreneurs was virtually non-existent in most countries at independence,
the state acquired a more prominent role in the economic sphere than would
otherwise have been the case. l The state, therefore, came to be seen as the
principal economic agent, reinforced by ideological inclinations of the new
rulers towards variants of socialism which saw state intervention in the
economy as paramount. The centrality of the state as an economic agent
was furthermore underscored by the majority of external donors tending to
enter into state-to-state relations in aid programmes. For a long time donors
neglected non-state actors, be they private businesses or civic organisations.
With the benefit of hindsight the statist approach to economic development
turned out to yield disastrous results. Towards the end of the 1970s and the
beginning of the 1980s very many African economies were in severe crisis
from which they have yet to recover.
To be true, the economic crisis was not exclusively a result of il
conceived domestic economic policies or simply poor implementation of
home-grown policies which were reasonably well designed. An adverse
international context most certainly must be attributed a large part of the
blame. Extemal shocks like oil price hikes, volatie commodity markets and
generally deteriorating terms of trade contributed to the crisis conditions
Marin Doornbos, The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and Prospeet, in
Journal of Modem African Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 1990, pp. 179-198.
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narow political ends. The colonial instruments of state repression were
taken over largely intact by the new ruling class and used to consolidate its
power position.
Wide-ranging security legislation including provisions for preventive
detention without trial was retained as a rule and on ly marginally adapted
to the new circumstances. Security establishments were likewise retained
and in some cases modified and streamlined. New legal instruments were
also created to control parts of civil society, e.g. the labour movement.
Other mechanism of political control were also used such as cooptation
of leaders of oppositional forces, and the weaving of a web of patron-client
relationships based on ethnic or other affiliations. These informal
instruments have been the hallmark of African politics to date. They are
inherently undemocratic as no accountability is built in to them.
The erstwhile unit y of the broad anti-colonial coalition was broken up
and the seeds of dissent were sown, only to grow into widespread
opposition as the wielders of state power closed their ranks in an
increasingly autocratic system of governance in which the Head of State
and the ruling party made it their exclusive preserve to formulate and
implement policy without much participation by or consultation with those
concerned. Attempts were made to give the abolition of competitive politics
and the de jure introduction of a one-party state a semblance of
legitimacy.2
CivIl society: A definition and its critique
Definitions of the concept of civil society abound. They have evolved
historically and from different philosophical traditions. There is today no
agreed definition of the concept because the choice of definition caries
with it ideological and political connotations. No attempt wil be made here
to reconcile the various definitions; it would hardly be possible. But a
broad definition wil be offered to which the present author subscribes. The
paper wil later return to a critique of aspects of the notion of civil society
and problematise it.
2 See e.g. Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, "The One-Party State and Its Apologists: The
Democratie Alternative", in Nairobi Law Monthly, August 1991; Julius K. Nyerere,
Freedom and Unity, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967) and Freedom and
Socialism, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968); Kwame Nkrmah, Ghana: The
Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, (London: Panaf, 1957).
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wil always seek autonomy, distance and protection from the state; that is
its raison d'etre.
Although this distinction may have some merit, its usefulness may be
questioned. Even if certain civic organisations with a limited welfare
objective confine themselves to pursuing that objective, they tend to take
on an implicit political functions all the same. For what is politics if not a
struggle over the allocation of resources in society, regardless of whether
those resources are controlled by the state or any other entity. But in certain
circumstances civic organisations, belonging to what Stepan would subsume
under civIl society, are likely to take on overt political roles. To use a
recent example from Zambia. The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
(MMD) was initially a broad social coalition mobilising against the
incumbent government. Its very name as a movement attests to that. It
comprised such civic organisations as churches, trade unions, professional
associations. It was only later that it was transformed into a party set to
take over state power. After winning the elections in October 1991 a
number of its constituent parts are retreating to their former roles as civic
organisations although some individuals may have accepted political
positions. In fact most of the churches and other civic organisations have
now forrned a Caucus for National Unit y (CNU) which is under banning
threat for assuming a stance of criticism and vigilance vis-à-vis the
government it helped bring to power.
Likewise the anti-colonial coalitions which historically deposed colonial
regimes comprised a plethora of civic organisations, in most cases under the
leadership of organisations which in Stepan's sense would be par of
political society. It should also be recalled that civic organisations serve as
popular bases of political careers, but that fact does not change the
character of such civic organisations. It is highly doubtful whether the
distinction between political and civil society help understand such
processes?
CivIl society is often associated, perhaps naively, with freedom. By
contrast the state is often made out to be synonymous with totalitarianism,
monopoly, centralism and absolutism, whereas civil society involves
pluralism and decentralisation and participation by wide segments of the
population. Coercion is considered to belong to the state while freedom is
rooted in civil society. Human emancipation is seen to be found in the
autonomy of civIl society, its expansion and enrichment, its independence
of the state and its protection against the state through mechanisms of
formal democracy. Such a caricature picture does not correspond to reality.
The realm of civil society is marred by exploitation and oppression, sexism
and racism within civic organisations, at the workplace etc. Very oppressive
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nothing else to rely upon for its survival but the means of repression and
violence to which it previously claimed legitimate monopoly. Social
situations with a high level of violence is normally a good indication of a
low level of legitimacy on the part of the state.
It is crucial to bear in mind this dialectical relationship between state and
civil society. They form a contradictory and complementary unit y,
coexisting in a condition of creative tension. Civil society has at once a
legitimising function vis-à-vis the powers of the state and alimiting
function on the exercise of power.
Seizing the terrain of civIl society
The ideological and political mood of the world after the end of the cold
war has led to a widespread belief in the triumph of democracy across the
world. io It might prove to be wishful thinking or at least an overstatement.
But in this euphoric atmosphere of the march of democracy the notion of
civil society figures prominently. It is seen as a bulwark against state
repression and abuse; as a vehicle for ensuring societal pluralis m; as a
guarantor against the authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies which states
may develop. In other words, civIl society is seen as a countervailing power
vis-à-vis the state. .
In recent years a stream of literature on civIl society, democracy and
governance has been published. i l It has been supplemented by journal
articles.12 This reflects a new interest in this field of study by academics
lO See e.g. Dankwart A. Rustow, Democracy: A Global Revolution, in F oreign Affairs, voL.
69, no. 4, 1990, pp. 75-91.
l L Consult inter alia Patrick Chabal (ed.), Political Domination in Africa: Rejlections on
the Limits to Power, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Naomi Chazan,
Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhil and Donald Rothchild, Politics and Society in
Contemporary Africa, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988); Larr Diamond, Juan J. Linz and
Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa, VoL. Il,
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988); Abbas Pourgerami, Development and Democracy in the
Third World, (Boulder: Westview, 1991); Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.),
The Precarious Balance: State & Society in Africa, (Boulder: Westview, 1988); Göran
Hydén and Michael Bratton (eds.), Governance and Politics in Africa, (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1992).
12 Michael Bratton, Beyond the State: Civil Society 
and Associational Life in Africa, in
World Politics, voL. XLI, no. 3, April 1989, pp. 407-430; Patrick P. Mo1utsi and John
D. Holm, Developing Democracy when Civil Society is Weak; The Case of Botswana,
in African Affairs, voL. 89, no. 356, July 1990, pp. 323-340; Michael Bratton, The
Politics of Govemment-NGO Relations in Africa, in World Development, voL. 17, no.
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repressive state and possibly to secure political controlover that state for
both economic and political reasons.
The clash between these main strands can best be seen when policies or
conditionalities of structural adjustment of the economy are pursued
simultaneously with political conditionality of democratisation.13 The
implementation of a structural adjustment programme requires a strong
government, some would say an authoritarian government, because gre at
sacrifices are demanded of large segments of the population. However, the
introduction of democracy caries with it the principle of accountability. No
government in its right mind would scrupulously implement a tough
austerity programme, in vol ving dramatic cuts in public expenditure for
education and health as well as abolishing subsidies on basic foodstuff, and
hope to be reelected! No democratic government can insulate itself from the
pressures being felt from those carying the brunt of the burden.
Democratisation and civIl society
How does civil society relate to processes of democratisation in
contemporary Africa? To begi n with it is useful to look to the role of civic
in different phases of such processes. The anti-colonial coalition and its
achievement has already been referred to as "the first African revolution"
which may be considered an historical phase. Having gone through a period
of increasing authoritarianism since independence, there appears to be a
phenomenal upsurge of popular movements in what has been dubbed "the
sec ond African revolution". 14 This phase is the current one in which civil
society plays a major role in the transition to some form of democratic rule,
i.e. the formal system and mechanisms of democracy such as a multiple
parties in a competitive political campaigns for votes, a relatively free press
and constitutional guarantees in the form of a Bil of Rights. The
13 See Thandika Mkandawire, Adjustment, Political Conditionality and Democratisation in
Africa, paper presented at the 7th General Assembly of CODESRIA on "Democratisation
Proeesses in Africa: Problems and Perspectives", Dakar, 10-14 February 1992.
14 See e.g. Peter Anyang' Nyong'o (ed.), Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa,
(London: Zed Press, 1987); W.O. Oyugi and A. Gitonga (eds.), Democratie Theory and
Practice in Africa, (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1987); Haroub Othman, Immanuel K. Bavu and
Michael Okema (eds.), Tanzania: Democracy in Transition, (Dar es Salaam: Dar es
Salaam University Press; 1990); Issa G. Shivji (ed.), State and Constitutionalism: An
African Debate on Democracy, (Harare: SAPES Trust, 1991); Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd
Sachikonye (eds.), The One-Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate, (Harare:
SAPES Trust, 1991); and John Holm and Patrick Molutsi (eds.), Democracy in
Botswana, (Gaborone: Macmillan, 1989).
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What are the instruments of power of civil society in the face of the
state? As lon g as the incumbent regime se eks to maintain areasonably
democratic system of governance, its legal framework acts as arestraining
factor on excesses in the exercise of state power.
But much more important is the independent resource base which civic
organisations must possess in order to be able to withstand the patronage
of the state. These resource bases may be internal or external, or a
combination of both. It is noteworthy, for instance, that trade unions and
churches have generally been able to maintain an autonomous stand. Trade
unions derive revenues from membership dues collected regularly at the
place of work. Churches also conduct collections of various kinds and
receive contributions from members. Both are affiliated to international
networks which may assist financially.
The broader the social base of civic organisations, the stronger they tend
to be. In Africa churches have generally reached every nook and corner.
This fact has served as a protective device vis-à-vis the state. If coupled
with organisational strength, the effect of a broad social base wil be
reinforced. Trade unions have capitalised on organisation as a tool, and to
some extent on their social bases, despite the fact that the unionisable work
force in most African countries is small.
A third factor is ideology, be it religious or secular. The degree of
commtment to the organisation' s goals and the cohesion ideology provides,
is a critical factor.
Democracy is an exceedingly complex concept and indeed a very elastic
and elusive one. It is a big word and therefore prone to abuse. Hardly any
concept in social thought is today as universally acclaimed as democracy
- but it is defined so differently. Qualifying adjectives tend to be put in .
front of the term: Liberal, Christian, people' s, parliamentary, constitutional,
participatory, social and African. Democracy can easily be abused as a
cheap propaganda slogan. For instance, the notion of an African brand of
democracy has been used by African autocrats to fend off grassroots
demands for participation by claiming that democracy is un-African.
For democracy to have a real meaning for the vast majority of
populations in Africa, the concept wil have to be operationalised into
concrete action in their daily lives. There has been a tendency towards
neglecting the practice of democracy as reflected in the inadequate attention
being paid to civil society. When discussing preconditions for democracy
and the prerequisites for the continued survival of democratic governance,
a strong civil society can be seen as a critical factor in a workable
democratic system. Civil society constitutes the terrain in which democratic
struggles take place. The shape of that terrain is a major determinant of the
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6. Democracy in multi-ethnic societies:
The African case
Sharif Ha ri r, Centre for Development Studies, University of
Bergen
Introduction
In the following I shall try to explain the political decay so prevalent in
Africa today. In the process I shall also draw a rough picture of what went
wrong in the first place with the ideals of building a nation-state of a stable
democratic character, as this constituted both the development project and
the agenda for shedding the fetters of colonialism in most of Africa.
Explaining today's decay means positioning oneself in the "ethnographic
present" of the African post-colonial state, whereas trying to sketch what
went wrong means running back and forth into African history for both
elucidation and interpretation. As both of these tasks necessitate addressing,
at the same time, various levels of historical depths and social formations
of various scales, the end result can scarcely be expected to constitute an
ethnography of Africa at large; nor should this amount to a rewriting of its
history .
What I propose is a reinterpretation of some aspects of the available
facts. It is now obvious that both the democratic experimentation (whether
of a Westminster or the French variety) that happily followed independence
and the various totalItarian regimes (whether of the military or one-party
varieties) which were responsible for the demise of the initially democratic
periods, faIled to stabilise the African nation-states into the path of any
meaningful political or economic development. The phenomenal upsurge
of political Islam in certain parts of the con tinen t as well as the strong
renewal of faith in multi-party democracy in other parts of it also ne ed to
be examined in the light of the initial failure of democratic experimentation
as well as the faIlure of the totalitarian aftermath.
The backdrop is the cardinal reality that each African state
(notwithstanding its pretences to be a nation-state because of its sovereignty
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the last 150 years. Latterly, these histories had also produced another
dass, the "working dass" (Davidson 1992:205). (Emphasis added.)
Such a development might have been possible, had the pre-colonial African
states - i.e. the kingdoms and sultanates of the 17th and 18th centuries-
not been brought to sudden subjugation by colonial forces. This, however,
must remain purely speculative. African history after colonialism tended to
produce regional configurations of interest groups that took an apparently
ethnic organisational base. Most of the central political parties during the
early period of independence coincided with such groupings, either because
of the primacy of one ethnic group or out of tactical political
considerations. From here to politics of clientalism was not a major step -
especially as the initial trans-ethnic unit y that was created by the struggle
against a foreign power, yielded to an intern al struggle of a severely
factional character, with each faction attempting to maximise its share of
the spoils in the centre that had been vacated by the dep arting alien rule.
The extremely divisive and polarising nature of the implosion of political
conflct was reflected in the numerous armed confrontations which followed
independence, aresting not only the development of ameaningful civIl
society, but also all development in general in the new Africa.
The politics of clientalism which produced all these negative
developments in the field of politicallife in the newly independent African
states, was quite different from the politics of tribalism that had produced
the pre-colonial states of Africa such as Asante in Ghana, the Fur sultanate
in the Sudan, the Amhara dynast y in Ethiopia, the Rwanda kingdom of the
Tutsi, the Wadai kingdom in Chad, the Zulu kingdom in South Africa, the
Ankole kingdom in U ganda or those African kingdoms of Nigeria such as
Hausa and Y oruba. Clientalist politics meant that "politicians at regional
and national leve1 gained and reproduced the support of local leaders by
allocating to them state resources over which (these politicians) had
influence or control. Each attempted to maximize this support and his
access to resources in competition with the rival politicians" (Allen,
1989:24, quoted in Davidson, 1992:207).
In other words, the brief periods of liberal democratic experiments that
followed independence in most of the states of Africa were inherently
problematic. "Democracy" was completely transformed to represent only
the ceremonial occasions of vote casting and was never extended to cover
aspects of accountability or transparency of regimes. Transparency was
substituted by conspiracy by the very logic of clientalistic politics, which
converted vote to controlover state resources, and their concurrent
conversion again into the political re source of support. Even in fewer cases
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Africa, with the one overthrowing the other in a vicious cycle of political
instability.
The "masses", "tribesmen", "ethnic groups" - or the civil society -
whichever way one looks at it, having lost hope in any possibility of a
meaningful continuation of the social struggle underlying the nationalist
movement that had led to independence, starts a process of disengagement
from the ruling elite. This disengagement takes the form of various armed
confrontations among itself (across social borders such as the ethnic ones)
and acts of violence directed against the state itself. The state' s practice of
centralised repression (as Mazrui (1986) puts it), wil generate decentralised
violence on the receiving end. Both the unstable regimes (and their ruling
elites) and the "mas ses" are paralysed by this vicious cycle of political
unstabilty. The cycle of political in action is completed by the elite
inventing battles against external forces and internal tribalism - "only if
tribalism and neo-colonialism or imperialism would disappear, Africa wil
be fine"!
Subsisting on the original sin of colonialism
It is often claimed that the African malady of political instability, economic
dependence, underdevelopment and the consequent decay of institutions is
a structural outcome of the European original sin of colonialism,
imperialism and latter-day neo-colonialism. Thus African regimes explained
away their failures by attributing the sources of frustration to external
political enemies some of which (like colonialism) were long dead and
fossilsed. To the extent that extemal political enemy conceptions mystified
internal weakesses, not an ounce of self-criticism was applied. This
tendency of explaining away stark internal realities by various African
regimes was given scholarly depth by an academic tradition which based
itself on "dependency theory", "unequal exchange", and Europe's under-
development of Africa (see Walter Rodney (1972) among others) and which
defined as its mandate to obsolve the African "victim" from all responsibil-
it y in what was happening. While the underlying theories were plausible,
their operationalisation by the African goveming elites led to only one
result: African future and present became a hostage to the past. Their
argument can be summed up as follows: If the African situation of today
as reflected in political instability, poverty, mass misery, underdevelopment,
international indebtedness and decay of structures and institutions, was a
determined outcome of historical mishaps of externally constituted nature,
then the present situation is a determinate given. There seems to be very
liUle which can be done by Africans or African regimes to undo a pre-
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evolutionary process like that which brought about the states of Western
Europe. Even more so is the concept of "Nation-State". The cartography of
the African state came out of negotiations, compromises and agreements
between European powers - sometimes reached by fatigue - and not as
a result of any internally arising and gradually expanding core, which in the
end came to encompass a natural whole which could become a nation-state.
The African state was made abroad historically; today it stands, in many
cases, as a juridical expression of international law and for no better reason
than the fact that the international order is inherently reluctant to condone
the formation of further new states. However, what is takng place in the
Horn of Africa and Eastern Europe with the emergence of new states from
the older ones, may in fact be a pointer to future political developments in
Africa. The colonial borders no longer seem to cary sanctity as was
assumed before. In fact they never carried any sanctity with their African
populations in the areas where they overlap.
The nationalist movement that led to the departure of colonial powers
and independence in Africa was strictly political, as far as the elites were
concerned, and it did not include social transformation as an articulate part
of its programme. In most cases, the whole programme was the achieve-
ment of political independence. Issues of social justice were long forgotten
except in rhetoric. State-making being achieved by the colonial powers, the
elite which assumed power at independence took the existence of a nation
for granted by equating it to the state, and then settled on the easier task of
importation of technology, or what is known as "modemisation". This was
to have far-reaching consequences. If this elite ever reflected on the social
basis of the state it inherited, it did so very fleetingly and only long enough
to explainaway or "taboo" the most salient social bases of their states:
tribalism and ethnic affiliation, which were summarily dismissed and given
pejorative connotations. Tribalism and ethnic affiliation were, and are, a
part of the systematic context of the African state. Any off-hand dismissal
of them cannot be defensible.
The so-called modemisation process, with its bu ilt-in bias towards the
elites and the urban areas of their concentration, led to a lopsided develop-
ment, where various parts of the same state would later exhibit sharply
contrasting inequalities and disparities. This was very much reflected in the
rural/urban di vide, where relative affuence was predominant in urban areas
and mass poverty and impoverishment dominated the countryside. This in
turn meant a duality of economies for most of the states in the continent.
In the decades following political independence this development was to
have far-reaching repercussions, kindling rural and regional discontent,
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this process has allowed neither democracy nor dictatorship to take root.
Political instabilty has became an important context of the African state.
Thus system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy and effectiveness as
attributes of political systems are perennial problems in this context. The
prevalent extra-judicialism, extra-institutionalism and centralised repression
as means of regime survival can all be understood in this light.
The dominant and the dominated
The African elite which assumed the reins of power at independence
consisted mainly of a small, urban-based and educated class, themselves a
product of the colonial education system. Also among this elite were urban
traders and leaders of sectarian religious and traditional tribal groups.
Across their divides, this elite was temporarily unified, in most cases, by
the very political nationalism which informed the struggle against
colonialism. As soon as independence was achieved, however, this remark-
able unit y quickly dissipated. The constituency that carried the elites of the
newly independent African states to power, Le. the political nationalism of
anti-colonialism, was no longer a constituency: it disappeared when colonial
powers departed formally . Furthermore, there was a time when the various
segments of this elite were satellites orbiting around the central political
authority which was represented by and exclusively occupied by the
colonial authority. Each was kept in its orbit by the colonial central
political authority in the individual state. No cross-overs were allowed
except when the colonial authority decided to give one segment preferential
treatment: This then was the cornerstone of the policy of divide-and-rule.
All the segments of the African elite rushed to fil the vacuum created by
the departure of colonialism in the independent state. In the ensuing
struggle, central political power in the new state was captured by some
segments of this elite using the liberal democratic orientation of the post-
independence era but excluding in the process other segments where it was
deficient in terms of Westminster-st yle democracy. Most African states
have plural societies, in the sense of being divided by segmental cleavages
such as ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious, regional and cultural ones. Thus,
most organisational vehicles (Le. parties) used by the winning segments
were naturally organised along lines in which religious, linguistic and
cultural cleavages coincided with tribal or racial belonging. This coincident-
ality was much more visible among the personnei that constituted the
1eadership of these parties. This meant a sharp departure from the
consociational existence which had characterised the pre-independence era,
where separately constituted corporate collectivities were associated as
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For the central difficulty of "nation-building" in much of AfrIca and Asia
is the lack of any shared historical mythology and memory on which state
elites can set about "building" the nation. The nation is not, as we see,
built up only through the provision of "infrastructure" and "institutions",
as "nation-bu ilding" theories assumed; but from the central fund of culture
and symbolism provided by shared historIcal experiences (Smith,
1986:258).
While all this is a valid cnticism of nation-bu ilding theory and its
tendencies to "slight, if not totally ignore, problems associated with ethnic
diversity" (Connor, 1972:319), it unduly emphasises the difficulties related
to the lack of a central fund of culturally-determined shared historical
experiences. Likewise is the problem of absence of an ethnic core. In fact,
the real problem lies, in the very attempt on the part of the African elites
to read into the African context models drawn from experiences which had
taken place in a totally different context: European epistemology. In their
attempt to read Europe into Africa, the continent s power elite embarked
on what Ali Mazrui (1986) has called "turning Africa's back on previous
centuries", and set in motion a process of "de-Africanising" Africa. Instead
of allowing Africa' s multiplicity of cultural funds and the concomitant
ethnic diversity to act as an enriching source, one whose inter action might
have produced a unified cultural fund giving each state its unique identity
within a truly African con text, the post-independence African elite set about
debunking the African reality of tribal multiplicity as politically counter-
productive, by attributing its very presence to colonialism and its designs
in creating strctures which resist the yearning of that elite to bu ild a nation
out of this multitude. Nation-building was given extreme priority, but it
started in a lopsided way because it was based on the denial of the African
reality and the single-minded push towards eradicating those very identities
and groupings which constituted a legitimate base for socio-political action
among the African people. In the process, a lot of brutalisation took place
as this denial of worth by the central elite did not go down well with the
generality of the African societies.
This, of course, has another side. The epistemology which informed the
nation-building agenda of the elite was Western. As Smith (1986) remarks,
"However, the blue-print for building a nation bit by bit remained Western
where the goal was the 'National participant Society' of the democratic
Western states" (230).
The tendency to ignore problems associated with ethnic diversity that
permeated most of the leading nation-building theories referred to above,
was caried into the African scene by the African elite without any
modifications. This situation may be a natural outcome of what Mudimbe
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Eastern Europe, (the former bastion of one-party systems), this multiparty
democratic movement is also deeply rooted in the African realities of ethnic
diversity and cultural pluralism. Representation as a means of participation
has roots in its history. However, many questions arise in this connection:
How are we to reconcile the two contradictory facts: on the one hand,
multiparty democracy have repeatedly failed in African as contemporary
history shows, and on the other the present popular drive towards multi-
party democracy? Would it not be a repeat-show of a failed experience? Do
Africans need yet another experience of disappointment?
To start with I concur with Lijphart (1977) in stating unequivocally that
what failed in Africa was not democracy per se but a particular type of
democracy: The British-st yle, Westminster type of democracy, and for a
rather simple reason. With its emphasis on the supremacy of numbers rather
than categories, it was not a natural historical continuum, nor was it
culturally feasible. This type of democracy came to be practised only after
independence; as such it was an alien concept without any roots in the
former colonial societies. Hence it could not provide a natural historical
continuum. But more than its historical status, what defeated Westminister-
st yle democracy was its cultural non-feasibility. Westminster democracy
takes the "enfranchised individual" as its point of departure and as a
building block. By contrast, African societies take as their point of
departure their "groups of identification". Each of these two stances has
significantly different implications for the political game. The breakdown
of the democratically-oriented constitutions inherited by African states at
independence can be attributed to this slight over the nature of the building
blocks of African societies. In their pursuit of nation-building, Africa' s
elites saw only the goal of creating an homogeneous political society,
paying scant attention to the cultural feasibility of their project. It is time
to recognise this fundamental difference between the evolution of political
systems in the West and in Africa.
From the ethnographic record of Africa we see that many of the new
states have precolonial traditions based on what M.G. Smith (Kuper and
Smith, 1969) has termed "consociation", which he defines as "an
association of separately constituted corporate collectivities as equal and
internally autonomous partners in a common society". The basic assumption
to be tested by Smith was the hypothesis that domination by one group in
a segmentally plural polit y was inevitable. However, in reaching the above
conclusion of consociational existence of collectivities as equal and
internally autonomous partners in a common polit y, he also falsified the
hypothesis of inevitability of domination. Most of the kingdoms of pre-
colonial Africa, and especially those of the Sudanic belt and West Africa,
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(including the recent political Islamism) have not led to national cohesion.
On the contrary, they have stimulated segmental cohesion and inter-
segmental violence, as evidenced by various ethnic wars. On the inter-
segmental leve1, attempts to eradicate diversity by repressing it lead to
decentralised violence only equalled by the centralised repression practised
by the state. It is time to recognize explicitly the diversity of African
societies, and to use those very groups to build stable democracies. That is
the reason for the recent popular upsurge of the multi-party movement in
the continent. Recent developments in Ethiopia may constitute a pointer. To
end this paper on a note of caution, let me wam that political
consociationalism is no panacea unless it can be linked with other measures
mainly of a socio-economic nature, which I refrain from pursuing now.
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7. Afropessimism. A response from below?
Inge Amundsen, Institute of Social Science, University of Tromsø
The recent developments in black Africa, even the unmistakeable demise
of authoritarian rule in several African countries, has for some time been
analysed by development theorists predominantly in pessimistic terms,
leaving liUle hope for a better future for the African masses. In the exigent
search for other development paths and other development agents, some
French Africanists have, however, suggested a research approach called "le
politique par le bas", politics from below, or popular modes of political
action.l which is somewhat more optimistic on Africa's behalf.
Both the background for the widespread afropessimism, and the response
from below-approach wil be reconsidered in this article, in the light of the
recent democratisation process in Africa. The question is; is there any hope
for political and economic development in the demise of authoritarian rule
and in the downscaling of the state apparatus, or wil this simply lead to
political disintegration and further aggravate the economic crisis?
The afropessimistic setting
It seems as if development theory as such is in a state of fatigue, and
certainly the debate over the future of Africa is rather pessimistic. It is
pessimistic since Africa is especially hard hit both by the extemal and
intern al conditions unfavourable to development, and it is pessimistic
because other parts of the third world are doing better. Africa scores the
worst on almost every record, and seems to be trapped in a vicious circle.
According to Richard Sandbrook, in one of the most discouraging
pictures drawn on African politics,2 the only hope lies in some reasonably
authoritarian, development oriented management. He leaves few hints,
Different terms for this, and simi1ar ideas certain1y exist in other deve10pment writing.
2 Richard Sandbrook; The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation (Cambridge, 1985,
Cambridge University Press).
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The state in crisis
Internal factors, however, must also be taken into consideration to explain
Africa's economic downturn. Internal factors like bad management, political
instabilty, authoritarianism (despotism, patrimonialism) and disintegration,
occur to be the major obstacles to the potentialities of foreign investments,
loans and development projects, as these dep end upon a "sound" economic
climate.
Africa's bad management problems are widespread and epidemic, and
therefore destructive also to domestic economic life in general. The leve1
of corrption and incompetence is sometimes astonishing. African govem-
ments are weak, lacking the necessary techno-administrative and managerial
capacity to implement plans and programmes.
Too often, also the wilingness to give national development the highest
political priority is missing. Preoccupied with keeping themselves in power,
few African govemments are in fact primarily concemed with development
as a priority area.
When the shrinking surplus is spent on regime security, little is left for
welfare redistribution and legitimation purposes. African govemments'
expenditure on intern al security is considerable. In other words, the African
state is excessively authoritarian to compensate for the fact that it is inad-
equately authoritative.
Due to its lack of legitimacy and authority, the post-colonial state is in
a destitute situation in Africa. In some countries the state has for all
practical purposes even ceased to exist.
Zaire is the prototype of the non-existent state, together with civil strife
dissolved states like Ethiopia, Somalia, the Sudan, Chad, Angola, Uganda
and Liberia. In Zaire the central government has full controlover the
capital city and a few other urban areas only. The president is perpetually
absent from the political scene, and higher officiais, military and adminis-
trative personneI, are deserting the country.4
Social disturbances
In addition the political distress, the social problems multiply; a population
growth and an urbanisation rate far exceeding the economic growth and the
rate of new jobs created. More than one hundred million people in Africa
are unemployed or under-employed. Besides, those happy enough to have
4 See for an elaboration on Zaire in Jean-Claud Willame: L'automne dun déspotisme
(Paris, 1992, Éditions Karthala).
137
The economic and political crises are also making other problems
insurmountable. Islamic fundamentalism, not only in Algeria, but also in
the sub-Saharan countries, Senegal and Nigeria included, and other anti-
democratic movements are almost exclusively met by force. Other social
problems, like hunger, drought, epidemics (AIDS), and the increasing
number of refugees, cannot be settled without external assistance.
Three impediments to democracy
According to the "afropessimistic" view of the process towards democracy
in Africa, there is reason to fear that this movement may contain within
itself the seeds of its own undoing. Three of the most serious obstacles to
the transitions to democracy need a closer study.9
Disintegration
First of all, there is uncertainty as to the outcome of any political
liberalisation process. Liberalisation can occur without democratisation, as
a process initiated and controlled from above with prolonged domination
as its intention and outcome. Otherwise, the demi se of authoritarian rule
may be followed by disintegration and confusion, as we have seen for
instance in Uganda, Liberia, Chad, Congo, and Somalia.
The resurgence of religious and ethnic strife is as evident in Africa as in
the former communist countries of Eastem Europe when the absolutist
regime is gone. Cultural cleavages, of which almost every African country
is plentiful, are awakened, and old strife revitalised.
Most African countries contain more than one religion. Usually, Islam
and Christianity (each with several denominations) coexist with various
forms of animism. In most of West Africa, the political borders are north-
south, while the religious borders are east-west, leaving these countries with
substantial Muslim minorities in the northem regions. Additionally, many
Adjustment in Africa (Basingstoke, 1989, Macmillan), pp. 152-153.
9 I am grateful to professor René Lemarchand, University of Florida, for this classification,
which is taken from his seminar paper African Transitions to Democracy: An Interim
(and Mostly Pessimistic) Assessment, and discussions at the Centre for Development and
the Environment (SUM)/NUPI seminar on Democracy and Economic Development in
the Third World, Oslo, February 10, 1992.
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unique nor distinct to Africa; the non-violent means, however, have some
noteworthy characteristics.
Direct and indirect control of production and capital accumulation is
frequently employed by the African state class to broaden its social power
base, as extracted surplus is spent on prebends, co-optation, and clientelism.
By employing these different forms of bribery, the appetites of rivals and
opposition leaders are usually satisfied, and the opposition thus silenced
through non-violent procedures.
In Senegal during the presidency of former President Senghor, the
practice of co-optation was brought to perfection. Originally, different
ethnic groups and local communities were brought into control by offering
their chiefs and notables positions in the offcial hierarchy, as ministers,
administrators, prefects, govemors, etc. Later, this method of co-optation
was successfully applied to attract and pacify the leading figures of stil
other groups, such as students, clergy, labour unions, and other politically
active groups.
This strategy usually leaves the opposition subsequently splintered and
marginalised for some time. Most commonly employed is the "di vide and
rule" strategy, however, and this strategy will never run out of possible
internal divisions to manipulate.
Even political reforms permitting party pluralism seem to fit in to this
strategy. An unrestricted right to form parties can for instance breed ethnic
hatred because party leaders find latent ethnic divisions so easy to exploit.
Instances of insupportable and unjustifiable number of paries, like the total
of 84 registered paries in Cameroon and 257 in Zaire, make any concerted
opposition impossible and facilitate the domination by the formerly single
party establishment.
We have also seen attempts at authoritarian restoration after a period of
democratisation. In Togo late 1991 and in Congo early 1992, the army,
loyal to the president put aside by the national conference, was harassing
the authority of the transitional government. 13 Other countries, like Côte
d'Ivoire, Niger, and Cameroon have run into political stalemate situations
because of fervent regime resistance to any real change in the existing
power relation.
Autocratic regimes of Africa also have to defend themselves against
pressures from outside. Through the structural adjustment programmes
(SAPs) and other conditionalities the IMF, the World Bank and other
money lenders are demanding the building down of the state-apparatus into
13 See Jeune Afrique nos. 1614-1615 and 1621 for further details on Togo and Congo
respectively.
141
most part allocate resources to extemal interestsl6 or to the jidèles of the
privatising regime.
These individuals are more of ten than not former politicians and civil
servants, some are even preserving their position within the power structure,
only seeking additional opportunities outside the administrative apparatus
because of shrinking wages and halted careers in the public sphere, or
accepting these private positions as some kind of patronage. This makes
them less independent as capitalist entrepreneurs, and one must expect that
it wil at least take some time before these people no longer identify
themsel ves with the regime.
Liberalised economies also facilitate the expatriation of moneyearned in
political office or elsewhere. The problems of capital flght and tax evasion
increases with liberalisations, resulting in reduced investment, and reduced
national income and employment. 17
The poverty dimension
Thirdly, wil the economic crisis and adjustment, and the implied "rollng
back of the state", lead to a strengthening of "civil society" and thereby for
democratisation? Wil there be economic decentralisation and better
opportunities, both for informal sector entrepreneurs to arise and for
medium and large private/privatised enterprise to prosper? Wil class
configurations be altered in a favourable way, creating a balance of power,
which is a democratic necessity? Wil the new democratic regimes be able
to "deliver", or wil there be infinite overthrows of inevitably powerless and
unpopular democratic regimes?
Behind questions like these, lIe the prevalent belief that democracy wil
remain impossible as long as minimal standards of economic well-being are
not met. This implies that a certain standard of education, of information
and participation is needed to maintain a democracy, and that poor people
are too concerned with survival to participate as politically active citizens.
When politics is a mere strife over ebbing resources, wil the struggle
inevitably grow more intense and end up in violence? Is it possible that
democracy can be the result of a bitter fight over diminishing resources, or
16 Several major public enterprises in Africa has been bought by the French multinational
Bouygues, and made more cost-efficient through staff reductions and salary freezes. See
for example Laurent Marcailou: "Une (autre) réussite pour Bouygues" in Jeune Afrique
no. 1614, December 1991, pp.59-60.
17 Rune Skarstein: "Pengene og livet! Om Valutafondets kondisjonalitet" in Vardøger,
no.19, 1990, pp.80-81.
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This has nothing to do with revolutionary ideas or even populist sympa-
thies, however, neither with folklore nor traditionalism. This approach does
neither suggests any existence of a fundamental force or antagonism in
society. It rather reflects an unwilingness to reduce popular political action
to a residual, to an answer to pressures from above only.
According to Bayart, studies employing this approach might indeed be
better performed by historians, sociologists and ethnologists, than by
political scientists or economists. This is because popular modes of political
action is about the informal, the unexpected and fugitive. It is a domain
where sentiments, ambi valence, and other unmeasurable elements prevail.
Central themes of this focus are, for instance, religious beliefs and move-
ments (including the use/misuse of witchcraft, religious symbolism and
metaphors), the complex relationship between culture and politics (like the
cultural repertoires of politics), and the sociology of domination.20
Bayart says the local historical experiences have a greater impact on the
present political reality then do the international economic structures (i.e.
colonialism and neo-imperialism). Formal political institutions, usually
imposed on African societies from outside (from the colonial power), might
just not be the most important political structures and arenas, because
ancient forms of domination and authority survive.
Thus, the political systems of today' s Africa should be seen as a
continuation of ancient (pre-colonial) modes of domination and exploitation.
Even the harshest colonialism implied some sort of mutual, although
unequal, exchange and bargaining, giving some profit also to the existing
local elite, like education and positions in the new power structure for their
sons, for instance.
(..) contemporary political dynamics should be understood in the
light of their historical setting, (..) the ancient cleavages mould the
modem socIal relationships, and also the political system, in strict
terms.21
This implies the intermediary political levels should be taken into
consideration, along with the popular modes of political action. Obviously,
20 Bayart, op.cit., p.259.
21 Bayart, op.cit., p.55, in my translation. For further elaboration on this theme, see also
Bayart, op.cit., pp. 40-41, 44, and 54-55, and the chapter "L'historicité des sociétés
africaines" in his book L'État en Afrique (Paris 1989, Fayard), and his artic1e "L'État"
in C. Coulon & D.-C. Martin: Les Afriques politiques (Paris, 1991, Éditions la Décou-
verte).
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"State against society"
At the same time, the state-society struggle has been of central importance
in Bayart s studies, as well as in other studies of the African state.23 In
this approach, the image of the state struggling against society is crucial.
Here, the state is seen as a ruling and dominant class with a hegemonic
project (i.e. domination; social, cultural and institutional autonomy; and
accumulation).
Most of these regimes (...) resist the autonomous and pluralist organisation
of socIally subordinated groups, either by striving to integrate the different
socIal forces into unitary movements, or by more or less implicitly
amplifying a pseudo-competitive logic, usually by adopting intermediary
and mIxed forms of domination.24
Moreover, this analysis fits well in with the popularly understood distance
between the ruled and the rulers in Africa, the commonly felt and
frequently expressed difference between "us" and "them" , between the
ordinary people and the governing few. 25
Representative for this approach is the ide a of a state apparatus
dominated by an elite of political and bureaucratic "entrepreneurs", utilising
the state capabilties in their own interests. The state is seen as a rather
autonomous group, distinct from other segments of society, almost
exclusively in control of the means of production, the means of distribution,
the means of coercion, and certainly the means of consumption. This
politicallbureaucratic elite is subsequently perceived to be persistently in
search for hegemony and accumulation; usually articulated ideologically as
national construction and integration.
State power in Africa is seen as fundamentally tied up with the welfare
of the ruling elite, and the exclusive right to pilage and plunder. This is
23 See Bayart, Le politique par le bas, which is an insightful book on the "politics from
below", like his former book L 'Etat en Afrique. La politique du ventre (Paris, 1989, Ed.
Fayard) is on the African state, presenting and elaborating the "state against society"-
approach.
Other development writing do also present the "state against society" theme, see for
instance the two excellent artic1es: Larry Diamond: "Class Formation and the Swollen
African State" in The Journal of Modem African Studies, voL25, noA, 1987, pp.567-596,
and Richard L. Sklar: "The Nature of Class Domination in Africa", in The Journal of
Modem African Studies, voL17, noA, 1979, pp. 531-552.
24 Bayart; Politique par le bas, p.73, in my translation.
25 In Cameroon and in Côte d'Ivoire, for instance, the political elite is frequently referred
to as "les gens à décret" and "les en-haut des en-haut", respectively.
147
all over Africa the state has based its extraction on primitive accumulation
from over-exploited peasants.
Simultaneously, nationalisations and state control of the economy gave
additional extraction potentials by turning public property and public
services into personal fiefdoms of the administrators running them. Many
positions of power were turned into a position of enrichment and personal
advantages. The maximisation of the state economic role cannot be
separated from the individual accumulation permitted at allleveis, including
(definitely) at the top.
This state apparatus is frequently referred to as a neo-patrimonial state.
Neo-patrimonialism is defined as a confusion of public and private, as a
system where access to state power represents the major entry to riches. At
the same time, it is rather routinised, institutionalised and bureaucratised (or
technocratised), and less arbitrary than ordinary dictatorships.27
The neo-patrimonial state systems in Africa are, however, in crisis. The
economic downturn makes it difficult to preserve the system, and therefore
the neo-patrimonial state wil utilise any means possible in order to
maintain its hegemony and its extraction capacity. Thus, the state seems to
be struggling against society itself, to defend the vested interests of the
state elite.
Politics from below and development
The outcome of conjlict
The interaction between the elites and the masses is of essential interest in
most social science, however. Any search for democracy should consider
the state-society relation. Some researchers claim that any kind of
development, whether it be economic development in general or
democratisation in particular, should be recognised as the outcome of
conflict between competing interests. In Björn Hettne's words:
Development is not the fulfilment of a historically immanent logic, that
can be studied by development theory. It is something as simple as the
27 For a discussion on the neo-patrimonial state and its definitions and denominations, see
Médard: "L' État néo-patrimonial en Afrique noire" in Jean-François Médard (ed): États
dAfrique noire. Formations, mécanismes et crise (Paris, 1991, Karthala).
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the wil and capacity of such popular movements to "turn into politics", i.e.
to mobilse and unify the society in opposing and contending the hegemony
of the bureaucratised state, and thus to ensure the restructuring of the
political order. 
30
Popular movements in Africa have, of course, also some external ties.
International events have raised the spirit of popular struggles in Africa,
like the fall of the authoritarian regimes in eastem Europe, and certainly the
release of Nelson Mandela in South Africa. The democratic wave
throughout Africa inspires. Besides, important external political and
economic links exist, as well as direct interference from outside with
different political agents in each country. Support are given to both regimes
in place and opposition groups.
However, of even greater importance are changing internal conditions,
like new allances of forces, resourceful new leaders standing up, formation
of other political associations and parties, liberalisation, release of political
detainees, presidential succes si on and several other possible openings in a
closed system. Initiative, mobilsation and leadership wil have to emerge
from below in order to be authentic and successful.
Bayart has suggested that the distrusted ethnic based political parties are
not necessarily so bad, because they might be expressing local desires and
comprise a political tool for the masses.31 However, each instance of
popular movements, of collective wil to separate from the state and to
contest its predominance, should be considered, separatelyand cOiiectively.
The social grouping most inclined to affront the state seems to be the
young, male, underemployed, urban population. Insurrections emanating
from this group is increasingly reported from throughout Africa. They are
more likely to incite political change, however, than to administer political
remodellng.
The working class and the peasantry, traditionally considered to be the
revolutionary classes, are also litte likely to organise the struggle,
according to several observers, including Bayart;
The peasantry is weakened by its internal deavages and by the sometimes
dramatie deterioration in their standard of living, (n.). Although
combative, the working dass is not necessarily pursuing a counter-
hegemonic project, at any rate it stays numerably impotent.32
30 Bayart; op.cit., p.18-19.
31 Bayar, op.cit., p.20. See also his book L'État en Afrique, chapter I, on this.
32 B . 95' L .ayart, op.eit., p. ,In my trans ation.
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domination, generally by demanding obedience and fidelity and political
realities. In this respect, religious leaders might be an important
intermediary agent for the rulers, mediating the mode of rule and
legitimising the system of domination.
Other forms of religious beliefs and movements might be contemplating
and inward-oriented, rejecting political realities, thus encouraging political
passivity. Witchcraft and black magic are sometimes used to pacify,
confuse, and split, especially in the battle against political rivais. Wide-
spre ad prejudices and the fear of evIl spirits might den y certain politicians
popular support.
Interrnediaries are characteristically strengthening status quo. People of ten
prefer to support the established structures of domination, structures with
which theyare familiar and which they can master. The insecurities and
hazards of altered social settings are normally avoided. This can to a certain
extent explain the prevalence of clientelism.
Clientelism attaches the ruled to their rulers by ambivalent bonds of
domination, and makes the restructuring of society along civIl lines
problematic. The ties between the primary units of society, and certain key
institutions of the state, notably the presidency and the armed forces, make
the bargaining between state and society, on economic terms, a singulary
futile enterprise. Patron-client ties are hardly compatible with the autonomy,
corporateness and capacity for self-governance that one must expect from
the intermediary organisations.
Conclusion
There is some. hope for Africa, even if much research and theorising on
Africa have been biased towards an overvaluation of the state in the state-
society strggle, and consequently rather pessimistic. Blinded by this
pessimism, some africanists have been unable to foresee the man y demo-
cratic transformations in Africa, like most kremnologists were unable to
predict the fall of communism in the Soviet Union.
The best hope for Africa lies with the possible social and political
organisation from below, according to the "politics from below" approach.
One possibility, not touched upon here, is politics from below spatially, i.e.
decentralised government. Even more promising are, however, politics from
below, in the form of spontaneous as well as organised popular political
action, emanating from cultural, social or economic interests, as these might
develop into a counter-power strong enough to balance and democratise the
hegemonic state.
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8. Gender, law and democratisation:
Reproductive regulation and legal
pluralism in Zimbabwe
Anne Hellum, Institute of Women's Law, University of Oslo
Introduction
Today, western govemments, international donor aid agencies and
development researchers are emphasising the importance of accountable and
democratic govemments in their negotiations with and studies of developing
countries. The ideal of liberal democracy, with its emphasis upon
constitutionalIsm and law is becoming a main concern. A number of
African states, particularly those indebted to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) , are reconsidering their legal systems and administration of
justice. Women's concerns have been recognised in anti-discrimination
conventions, transforrned into human rights and are gradually becoming a
part of international and national democracy and development discourses.
This paper focuses on gender and law as a par of democratisation and
development processes, with special reference to the sItuation at national
and locallevels in Zimbabwe. In line with a number of studies of state and
law in Southem Africa, it explores how state and law mediate gender and
dass conflcts (Armstrong and Ncube 1987, Arstrong and Stewart 1990,
Stitcher and Parpart 1988, Parart and Staudt 1989). By linking a women's
law approach to gender and development theory, the paper discusses
different implications of state and law for women and men, as well as for
women within different social groups. i
Three main trends/paradigms in women and development research and practice have
been termed WID, W AD and GAD (Rathgeber 1988). In the following these are
summarised and linked to different frameworks concerning women and law.
Women in Development (W/D) emerged from Esther Boserup's "Women's Role in
Economic Development" (1970) and is closely linked to the dominant modernisation
paradigm of the 1950s. This approach emphasises egalitarianism. An aim is to develop
legal and economic strategies which wil remove discrimination of women in the
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legal situation is, like in man y other post-colonial African states,
characterised by a combination of de jure and de facto legal pluralism. De
jure legal pluralism refers to a situation where several legalorders are
formally recognised within the state legal order. De facto legal pluralism
refers to situations where some of the coexisting legalorders are not
recognised by the national legal order. The latter is often referred to as
legal pluralism in a descriptive or sociological sense. It is seen as
characterised by "...the presence in one social field of more than one legal
order" (Griffiths 1986: l).
In order to understand how democratisation through legal reform affects
gender relations in pluralistic legal systems it is here argued that interplay
between coexisting normative structures ought to be examined. In the
following the case of changing and coexisting modes of regulation of
human reproduction serves as ilustration. Attention is paid to whether and
how the post-colonial Zimbabwean state, through its increasingly gen der
neutral and unified national legal framework, provides continuity and
discontinuity with regard to male controlover female sexuality and
reproductivity. With particular reference to sexual and reproductive
interaction in situations of childlessness, the paper examines interplay
between coexisting statutory, customary and religious normative structures
on international, national and locallevels. It is argued that an understanding
of gendered sexual and reproductive interaction and conflct als o sheds light
on female and male positioning and participation in society' s modem
democratic institutions where statutes and policies are determined.
Communal and individualistie modes of regulation of human
reproduction
In the following, I wil focus on the integration and coexistence of what is
termed communal and individualistic modes of regulation of human
reproduction in Zimbabwe. These categories correspond to the terms
extended and nuclear family organisation. The extended family constituted
the backbone of the procapitalist mode of production, while the nuclear
family came into being through British colonisation and gradual
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and voluntarily consent" to their marriage. In Chawa v/Bwuta (SR 1928:
98) the High Court of Southem Rhodesia laid down that within customary
law women should have an individual right to divorce an impotent or sterile
husband. These developments facilitated the establishment of nuclear
households and undermined the rule of male elders over sons, daughters
and wives.4
Upon independence, the Zimbabwean government adopted a law reform
strategy based on an indi vidualistic mode of regulation of human
reproduction. A fragmented law reform programme in the area of personal
and family law overrled a number of gender inequalities embedded in the
communal customary regulation of reproduction. In Zimbabwean national
law, a husband and wife, regardless of whether they have contracted a valid
customary or civIl mariage, are seen as formally equal sexual and
reproductive partners. Paternal rule in terms of rule of fathers over sons and
daughters is formally abolished. A valid marriage can be concluded without
the consent of male elders or payment of lobolo (bride price). In terms of
national law, marriage is a legal relation between the individual husband
and wife, not between two extended families.
Consent aspolitical construetion and empirical focus
In order to explore how male controlover female sexuality and fertilty is
perpetuated and resisted in situations where statutory, customary and
religious normative strctures coexist, there is need of a theoretical
framework and an empirical focus which links the different organisational
and normative structures.
In the following, consent is seen as amediating mechanism between
coexisting communal and individualistic legal structures and gendered
human actors on different leveis. To this end I combine two frameworks:
western feminist critique of social contract theory and an actor-oriented
process analysis which in women's research has been terme d a feminist
4 Colonial legal history is a rich source of how gender conflcts helped to shape the
character of the colonial state. Historians have identified the first phase of colonialism
as receptive to African women (Chanock 1982, 1985, Parpart 1988, Lovett 1989,
Mittelbeler 1976). Through colonial legislation, women gained certain individual rights
and access to courts. It was later, when women began to use their advantages, that men
began to realise that women were threatening the indigenous male contra!. Marin
Chanock, analysing case law in Rhodesia/yasaland/alawi, argues that male elders
alled themselves with colonial adrnnistrators and rulers to reestablish contral over
women through the emerging state customary law.
159
liberal contract theorists of the 18th century: the slave contract and the
mariage contract. Through the fiction of con sent, women were included in
"the social contract" as free and equal, yet men' s sex -right over women was
upheld as a conjugal right embedded in the mariage contract. The paradox,
that women were seen as free to enter into contracts, yet on the other hand
became the object of the husband' s power through marital consent, is the
hidden agenda which Pateman terms "the sexual contract". Through the
construction of consent, she argues that patriarchy as paternal rule was
replaced by patriarchy as male sex right over women. As statutory law
gradually eliminated male superiority within mariage, Pateman argues that
male sex-right is exercised through other forms of contract. In
contemporary society women are consenting to subordination and
exploitation through other forms of contract such as the prostitution contract
and the surrogate contract.
In my view, Pateman's theoretical assumptions must be confronted and
modified on the basis of actual sexual and reproductive practices. Do
underlying patriarchal normative structures always "force" women into
sexual subordination and reproductive exploitation? lassume that sexuality
and fertility is an area where complete male controlover female is
impossible. In order to investigate meetings between men and women
through sexual and reproductive practices I wil use consent as an empirical
focus. In my view, the introduction of normative structures implying
individual agreement and consent als o provides a tool which enables
women to resist subordination and exploitation.
On the international level I wil briefly describe the ideals of freedom
and consent laid down in the UN Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women. On the leve1 of the national legal
system, I wil explore how the legal construction of consent serves as an
integrative mechanism between communal and individualistic modes of
regulation of human reproduction. On the local leve1, I wil examine the
integration of coexisting regulations through actual case studies, from
famly and local court leveL. Here, luse con sent as ameeting point between
male and female actors who through sexual and reproductive interaction
resp ond to coexisting legal and moral strctures.
Law material and the case studies ilustrate how the legal system and
women and men from different social groups respond to the situation of
marital childlessness. The situation of marital childlessness is chosen
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National legallevel
On the national legal leveL, Zimbabwe is moving from a communal towards
an individualistic mode of regulation of human reproduction. The legal
system in Zimbabwe is stil characterised by de jure legal pluralism. The
relationship between the different systems of law is regulated by choice of
law criteria laid down in theCustomary Law and Local Courts Act of
1990. Upon independence, a social mode of life criterion replaced the racial
choice of law criterion. As already mentioned, in the area of personal and
family law, customary law has undergone profound changes due to
legislative intervention. On the formal leve1 it has been argued that
Zimbabwe almost has a unified and equality based system of family and
personal law (Ncube 1989).
Statutory marriage regulations lay down the principle of individual
freedom and consent. A series of legal reforms in the area of family law
have levelled out gender inequalities within customary law. Mariage is
seen as contracted between individual parties, not between extended
familes headed by male elders. The African Marriages Act of 1951 and the
Legal Age of Majority Act of 1982 imply that a valid marriage can be
contracted without payment of lobolo (bride-price payment) and parental
consent. Parental rights and duties are, regardless of whether the marriage
has been contracted under customary or general law, determined on the
basis of the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act of 1989. "The best
interest of the child" is the decisive criterion. Whether lobolo has been paid
is legally irrelevant. The Matrimonial Causes Act, which applies to
mariages contracted under general and customary law alike, is based on the
principle of "irretrievable breakdown". Failure to fulfil conjugal obligations,
sterility , barenness and impotence are no longer considered formal grounds
for divorce under customary law. Through legislative and court
intervention, the individualistic mode ofregulation ofreproduction has been
implemented in the context of customary law. Formally, patriarchy in terms
of rule of elder men over sons, daughters and wives has be en abolished.
Legal space for the integration and combination of communal and
individualistic - customary and general- patriarchal and gender neutral
regulations of marriage and reproduction is, however, provided by the
concept of individual marital consent. Through some examples, I wil
ilustrate how consent may provide an inroad to male-sex right over
women, and thereby access to reproducti ve issue.
By consenting to the conclusion of a valid marriage under the African
Mariages Act of 1951, a so called "customary registered union", the bride
and groom consent to a potentially polygamous marriage. This has different
legal implications for the bride and the groom. The groom may take a
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partly paid before registration took place. This implies that three sets of
parties and three sets of regulations are integrated.
Firstly, registration implies that the mariage becomes a legally binding
relationship between the individual husband and wife. Formally this relation
is regulated by a mixture of statutory and customary law.
Secondly, payment of lobolo creates a contractual relationship, guided by
custom and moral, between twomale headed extended families.
Thirdly, payment of lobolo implies that a link between past, present and
future generations is established. Through symbolic payments and rituals,
the ancestral spirits are involved. In this respect, the relationship is
regulated by the procreative beliefs and values underlying the traditional
mariage contract and payment of lobolo. By equating the bride's sexual,
reproductive and productive capacities, lobolo payments give rise to
gendered fertility expectations, assumptions and considerations. Personhood
and status of women and men were, within traditional Shona world vie w ,
linked to fertility and procreation (Aschwanden 1982). A person was
someone who would one day become a mudzimu, a spirit of a dead parent
or grandparent. According to this world vie w men and women became male
and female ancestral spirits through procreation. Male superiority was
established through a monogenetic theory of procreation, which implied that
there was only one principle in procreation. According to Aschwanden, the
man was seen as the main procreator. Through contributing semen, he was
seen as sowing his seeds in the woman's uterus, which was the field. On
this basis it is stil argued that it is the male lineage and the male spirits
which are perpetuated through procreation.
How do childless women and men in different social groups integrate the
various forms of regulation through their sexual and reproducti ve
interactions? Three case studies, one from a rural, one from a densely
populated and one from an urban setting, wil ilustrate a complex, varied
and dynamic picture of interplay through direct and indirect gen der
struggles.
Polygamy, childlessness and consent in a rural setting
if a couple who have registered their lobolo marriage are childless, the
three above-mentioned sets of legal and moral rights and obligations may
be evoked by the various parties involved. According to the African
Marriages Act of 1951 and the Matrimonial Causes Act, the reproductive
capacity of the parties is irrelevant as far as conclusion and dissolution of
mariage is concerned. However, in practice, the wife, the husband and
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Male sterility
if a man cannot have children, the para-legals told me, his elder relatives
wil sometimes arange for an older or younger brother to stay with the
wife of the sterile husband when the husband is away. According to the
written customary law which was practised by the colonial courts, the
legality of such an arrangement depended on the consent of the husband.
According to Holleman's Customary Law the husband's consent was
necessary. In the absence of such consent, the wife's sexual act wil be
deemed to be adultery (Holleman 1952: 218). In Mondiwo v. Muwirimi
(SRN 1952) the Native Court of Appeal of Southem Rhodesia stated that
the procedure according to custom must be as follows:
According to Native Custom, however, the matter is first discussed
between husband and wife, and if agreement is reached the hus band then
contacts a member of his family and hands him a token to sig nif y
acceptance of the arrangement.
In local practice today such arangements are often kept secret for the
hus band:
I know a couple in this neighbourhood. They did not have some children.
Some of the elders talked with the younger brother and told him to go to
the wife. He went. Now they have 5 children. The husband does not
know. Neither does the wife of the younger brother. Even if it is kept a
secret for the husband people wiU see the younger brother coming from
the wife's hut. So they wil know.
In practice, women sometimes take lo vers outside the husband's family.
Such extra-marital affairs are closely guarded secrets. According to one of
the para-legals:
Yes, once the husband knows the wife has had another man, they may kiU
each other. There are very few who can accept anything like that. Men do
not accept that his wife sleeps with another man. Once he knows about
it he gets angry.
By taking a procreator outside the husband' s family and without any family
consultation, the wife also breaks a spiritually sanctioned moral rule. By
conceiving with a man outside the husband's family she brings in alien
spirits. One of the para-legals told me the following story:
I know a family. This couple stayed together. The woman did not
conceive. She went to her older sister. The sister' s husband made her
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Conjugal rights, childlessness and consent in a densely populated
area
In situations where the parties fail to find a practical solution to the
problem it is often assumed by the husband and his family that it is the
wife who is the causer of the childlessness. They usually demand that she
should leave the matrimonial home empty handed. However, not all
childless women consent to such arangements, but instead take the matter
to the community court. By takng marital conflcts to the community court,
many women are treated in a less biased way than is of ten the case at the
patrilneal family leveL. A number of cases show that childless wives,
through court action, sometimes twist the argument of conjugal rights to
their own advantage. In the court records from Seke Community Court,
which has jurisdiction in Seke Communal Lands and Chitungwiza High
Density Area, I noted several cases where childless wives sued their
husbands for conjugal rights. In some of these cases, the community court
agreed with the wife that the situation of childlessness could not suspend
the husbands conjugalduties, such as housing the wife and showing her
respect.
Concluding remarks
Consent has been seen as a media ting mechanism between external and
intern al legal relations. On the level of the national legal system, its
function as integrative mechanism between coexisting international/national
equal rights and customary male sexual and reproductive privileges has
been described. At the locallevel, case histories ilustrate how consent in
certain contexts promotes female resistance, and in others perpetuates male
sexual and reproductive control. Consent, in other words, provides a local
focus of direct and indirect gender struggles. It provides insight into
complex, varied and dynamic processes where men are unable to exercise
complete sexual and reproductive domination:
1. Women's choices and actions are not mechanically determined by
patriarchal normative strctures. A number of women do not consent
to arrangements dictated by lovers, husbands, extended families or
spiritual ancestors. Some women utilize court structures in order to
promote their own individual interests. In order to resist and regain
control some women manoeuvre on the outskirts of law, custom and
spiritually sanctioned moral beliefs.
169
References
Armstrong, A. and W. Ncube (eds.) (1987) Women and Law in Southern
Africa. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.
Armstrong, A. and J. Stewart (eds.) (1990) The Legal Situation of Women
in Southern Africa. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.
Aschwanden, H. (1982) Symbols of Life. An Analysis of the Consciousness
of the Karanga. Gweru: Mambo Press.
Bentzon, A. W. (1990) "State Law versus Local Law in the Postcolonial
State. Law Data on Structures and Actors in Development Research", in
S. Arfred and A.W. Bentzon (eds.): The Language of Development
Studies. Roskilde: New Social Science Monographs.
Bentzon, A.W. (1991) "Construction of Theory on the Basis of Empirical
Data in Women's Law Research", Working Papers in Women's Law No.
37, Oslo, Institute of Women's Law.
Berg, N. (1990) "Demokratisering i Mosambik. Grunnlovsforslag om
konstitusjonelt demokrati", Mennesker og rettigheter 2/90.
Bourdilon, M. (1987) The Shona Peoples, Gweru, Mambo Press.
Chanock, M. (1982) "Making Customary Law: Men, Women and Courts
in Colonial Northem Rhodesia" in Hay, M.J. and M. Wright (eds.)
African Women and the Law: Historical Perspectives, Boston University
Papers on Africa.
Colson, E. (1958) Marriage and Family among the Plateau Tonga of
Northem Rhodesia. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Dahl, T. S. (1987) Women's Law. An Introduction to Feminist
Jurisprudence. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
Giddens, A (1984) The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of
Structuration. Cambridge: Polit Y Press.
Ghai, Luckham and Snyder (1987) The Political Economy of Law, A Thîrd
World Reader. Dehli: Oxford University Press.
Griffiths, J. (1986) "What is Legal Pluralism", Journal of Legal Pluralism
24, 1-55.
Hellum, A. (1992) "Law's Form, Content and Context: The Case of
Changing and Coexisting Modes of Regulation of Human Reproduction
in Zimbabwe, Childless Women's Perspectives", under publication in S.
Adelman and S.A. Paliwala (eds.): Law, Crisis and Underdevelopment.
London: Hans Zell Publications.
Holleman, J.F. (1952) Shona Customary Law. Cape Town: Oxford
University Press.
171
Shivji, I.G. (ed.) (1991) An African Debate on Democracy. Harare:
Southem Africa Political Economy Series (Human Rights and
Constitutionalism Series, No. l).
Weinreich, A.K.H. (1982) African Marriages in Zimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo
Press.
Women and Law in Southem Africa (WLSA) (1992) Maintenance in
Zimbabwe. Harare: WLSA Research Project.
173
partly inspired by Guilermo O'Donnell's early analyses of bureaucratic
authoritarianism iri the most developed Latin American states. O'Donnell
emphasised the autonomy of these regimes towards civIl society. They did
not only repress underclasses, they also made decisions that violated the
interests of national industrial upper classes (O'Donnell 1979). Similarly,
Bruce Cumings has argued that there is a connection between a high degree
of state intervention, dictatorial rule and state autonomy towards local elites
in the "bureaucratic-authoritarian industrialisation regimes" of South Korea
and Taiwan (Cumings 1984, 1988).
The second par of Gerschenkron's thesis deals with the transition from
state led development to development led by private capitalists. A follow-
up of the "Gerschenkronian" approach would be to expect a regime
transition toparliamentary democracy in line with the rise of a new indus-
trial bourgeoisie independent of the state that challenges state capitalism
and authoritarian rule. In this paper I wil see how well this Gerschen-
kronian argument can account for the economic and political transforma-
tions of Taiwan since World War Il. The Taiwanese development is briefly
outlined in the periodisation below:
A periodisation of Taiwanese development
Period
1895-
1945
1945-
1949
1949-
c. 1960
Regime type, geo-
political relations
Japanese
colonialism,
bureaucratic
authoritarian
regime
Chinese
take-over;
predatory state
KuoITntang
evacuation to Taiwan.
Bureaucratic authori-
tarianism oriented
towards ITlitary
targets. Included into
US sphere of interest
in the Cold War
Agrarian
relations
Agrarian re-
forms: Private
property rela-
tions, moderni-
sation policy
by corporatist
networks
Colonial agrarian
structure remains
Agrarian reforms
resulting in egali-
tarian agrarian
relations, state led
modernisation policy
combined with
resource extraction
from agriculture
EconomIc policy,
position within IDO
Specialised production
and exports of rice and
sugar for Japan, some
local industry, Japanese
policy of economic self
sufficiency within the
empire
Loss of Japanese markets,
new markets on the
Chinese, mainland, no
coherent economic policy
Loss of traditional
export markets, depen-
dence on US aid,
policy of import
substitution, con-
siderable state owner-
ship and state inter-
vention
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had to ally with several of them that continued to control local
administration and even had some degree of military sovereignty within
their territories. Local elite groups within Kuomintang core areas were als o
able to avoid central control, for instance in matters of taxation, whether
this was the result of allances with local civil servants, corruption or
simply insufficient public supervision capacity (Eastman 1984: ch. l).
During the first post-war years Taiwan was run as a military conquest by
a corrupt Kuomintang administration from the mainland. Taiwanese elites
were politically excluded. The islanders reacted strongly against confisca-
tions, discrimination of islanders, corruption and arbitrary rule. A spontane-
ous rebellion began the 27th of February, 1947, and lasted for some time
during the month of March. In May 1947 Nationalist troops from the
mainland were used against the islanders. The terror that now began, was
in paricular directed against intellectuals and urban middle classes that
were regarded to be the leaders of the island opposition. According to a
recent estimate somewhere between 18,000 and 28,000 were killed during
these actions (Gold 1986: 50; Haggard 1990: 80; Far Eastern Economic
Review, March 19, 1992: 30-31).
In December 1948 Chiang Kai-shek's son Chiang Ching-kuo was sent to
Taiwan. His task was to stabilise the island politically to prep are for the
possible evacuation of the Kuomintang forces from the mainland. Martial
law was declared in 1949. Remaining Taiwanese opposition and suspected
refugees from the mainland were imprisoned or executed in large numbers.
An effective internal security apparatus was constructed and coordinated by
the Political Action Commttee led by Chiang (Gold 1986: 50-51, 54;
Haggard 1990: 80).
Most of the formal provisions for representative democracy were sus-
pended by the martial laws, that gave great extra-constitutional powers to
the President and postponed new national elections until the retaking of the
mainland. The mainlanders that had been elected before the martiallaws
continued to hold their seats. Kuomintang rule was based on the myth that
the Taipei government was the sole government of China. This myth also
implied the doubling of political institutions. In theory Taiwan was only a
province within the Republic of China. The Taiwanese Provincial
Government was therefore beneath and subordinated to the nationalleveL.
A limited democracy was permtted locally with direct ~lections at county,
township and vilage leveis, and since 1959, direct elections for the
provincial assembly.
Political power was to a large extent located within the Kuomintang
Party. The party was organised according to Leninist principles in pary
cells intended to preserve Kuomintang hegemony within schools, the
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National self reliance was an important part of Kuomintang's military
strategy and it was supported by a strategy of industrialisation by import
substitution. Other non-market interventions of the 1950s were agrarian
reforms with state led modernisation and forced resource transfer from
agriculture to industry. These policies benefited from the preceding
Japanese colonialism.
Colonial inheritance, agrarian bureaucracy and agrarian
modernisation
During the Japanese colonial period on Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, a highly
competent administration combined authoritarian rule with a policy of
agricultural modernisation and infrastructure constructions. Japanese author-
ities restructured Taiwanese agriculture to specialised production of sugar
and rice for the Japanese market. Agrarian reforms were implemented with
capitalist private property rights and the removal of the former absentee
landlord class whereas the former tenant landlords were made legal owners
of land, directly responsible for taxes. A new flat tax on land replaced the
former proportional tax on output. This served as an incentive for the new
owners to raise their tenants' surplus production. A "Green Revolution" was
implemented based on agrarian research with scientific improvement of
seeds, use of fertilizers and irrigation construction. The new techniques of
culti vation were spread by local agricultural associations lead by the
administration in close cooperation with greater landlords. In 1938 the
Japanese created the "Taiwan Farmers' Association" to control these local
agricultural associations. In this way a model of "indirect-mixed-with-
direct-rule" emerged. The resulting agrarian modemisations did not on ly
include relatively large farming units but also tenant agriculture (Amsden
1979: 344-347; Apthorpe 1989: 527; Myers & Ching 1964: 360-361).
The legacy of the Japanese colonial administration was to some degree
preserved after World War IL., since Japanese officials on Taiwan continued
to function during a transition period (Cumings 1984: 22; Cumings 1988:
259). The Japanese combination of authoritarianism and high state capacity
was extended by Kuomintang authorities that also implemented new
egalitarian reforms.
Agrarian reforms had always been on the Kuomintang agenda, but on the
mainland "land-to-the-tiler" never amounted to much more than
propaganda. On Taiwan on the other hand, the state elites were more
motivatedto implement agrarian reforms and there was a considerable U.S.
pressure on Taiwan's government to implement agrarian reforms. The
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The agrarian bureaucracy on Taiwan combined modernisation of
agriculture from above with a considerable resource transfer from
agriculture to the urban sector. This resource transfer was facilitated by
state monopolies on sales of fertilizers that was barered with rice, at terms
of trade highly unfavourable to agriculture. Various other means were also
us ed to extract a surplus from agriculture; land taxes, compulsory rice
purchases, loan repayments and repayments for land res old to tenants under
"land-to-the tiler". All such collections were made in kind, mainly in the
form of rice. They amounted to "hidden rice taxes" since government
purchases were made at considerable lower prices than market prices. The
rice collected by the government in this way was rationed to the military
and civil servants, sold on the free market for revenue and price
stabilsation purposes or exported (Amsden 1979: 356-358).
Government sales kept internal rice prices low. This contributed to
industrialisation based on cheap labour since rice was the most important
consumer good of the labour force until the late 1940s, whereas rice exports
provided much needed foreign exchanges. Still, exploitation of agriculture
did not lead to impoverishment of Taiwanese agriculture, the standard of
living in the countryside was steadily rising from the 1960s as a result of
increasing off-farm employment within the farmer families (Amsden 1979:
359-360). The rise in industrial employment came as a result of a new strat-
egy of labour intensive export oriented industrialisation in the 1960s. To
explain this strategy of industrialisation, the impact of the United States
should be taken into account.
The liberal influences of the United States on economic
policy and economIc bureaucracy
According to Richard Barett a short-lived alliance emerged within the U.S.
Foreign Department around 1950 between geopolitical interests of contain-
ment and roll-back and a reformist ideology associated with the legacy of
Roosevelt. The Rooseveltian ideolog y had survived in the foreign policy
bureaucracy long after its disappearance from domestic politics, since it was
able to justify foreign aid with geopolitical arguments of U.S. national
interests. The Foreign Department tried to fashion an aid program for
Taiwan without making any clear commtment to the Kuomintang regime.
This policy would allow the United States to continue to pursue
opportunities to detach China from the Soviet orbit, or failing that, to
develop a group of "liberal reformers" who could take power in Taiwan
(emphasis mine, KN) (Barrett 1988: 131).
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substitution was stimulated by multiple exchange rates, tariffs and import
restrictions. The policy was tolerated by the United States that allowed the
Taiwanese economy a "breathing space" throughout the L 950s. Private
capitalism emerged within light industry sectors, notably cotton textiles and
flour millng, as a result of the combined pressure of AID-officials and the
pro-private sector bureaucrats (Amsden 1979: 364-365; Gold 1986: 71-72).
The U.S. authorities contributed with experts, advice and funds in the
difficult processes of land transfers during the land reforms through the
"Joint Commssion on Rural Reconstruction" (JCRR). The land reforms
also included the issue of compensating the former landowners. Despite the
resistance of "statist" factions within Kuomintang, the landowners were
partly compensated with industrial bonds in nationalised Japanese
enterprises. In this way the JCRR aimed at creating a dass of islander
capitalists to counter the mainlander Kuomintang state elites (Simon 1988:
139-148).
By the middle of the decade the AID mission changed from supply of
key commodities to project support. The project support was mainly
oriented towards key infrastructureprovisions within power, transportation,
communications and provisions of R.&D. services. These activities of the
AID mission together with the short-lived economic hothouse climate of
import substitution helped to promote new capitalist groups that to a large
extent were islanders (Gold 1986: 71; Simon 1988: 148-149). Gradually
Taiwanese small capitalists gained importance and dominated Taiwanese
industry.
The new private capitalists did in no way challenge the politicalorder.
The most important systemic changes came rather from within the state, as
a new technocratic economic bureaucracy elite gradually replaced the
military Kuomintang elites from the late 1950s. This change of power
within administration was sparked off by The United States in the 1950s
through the joint Sino-American agency, the Council on U.S. Aid (CUSA),
that had been forme d on the mai nI and in 1948. CUSA was the key organ
of administering U.S. aid. It was composed of U.S. aid officials and
Taiwanese cabin et members and chaired by the premier minister. The
agency was financially independent and it was not connected with any
particular ministry. It was therefore well protected from interference from
other state agencies and party factions (Gold 1986: 69; Haggard 1990: 86).
As the Chinese members went back to other bureaucracy agencies, they
caried with them the ideology and methods leamed from CUSA. The
highly competent CUSA elites now challenged the old Kuomintang elites
and their anti-capitalist military goals. In this way, development oriented
bureaucratic values gradually gained force inside the Kuomintang bureau-
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with each other" (Amsden 1979: 365). This protection was done by
cartellsation organised by the state.
Export oriented capitalist economic transformation and
democracy
From the mid- L 960s a well prepared public relation campaign for
Taiwanese investments was launched to attract foreign capital. Taiwan now
received an inflow of foreign capital that was responding on the new
favourable investment climate. Foreign investments were mainly divided
between "Fordist" export industries such as consumer electronics and
plastics and old light industries such as textiles. Japanese and U.S.
producers relocated labour intensive and technologically simple production
to Taiwan to benefit from low wages and a relatively highly skilled labour
force. Overseas Chinese invested within old light industry such as textiles.
Taiwanese authorities stimulated this development further by the Kaohsiung
Export Provision Zone that provided infrastructure facilities and various
fiscal incentives (Gold 1986: 78-81).
Taiwanese private capital within old sectors such as textiles and new
ones such as electronics also reacted on the new export opportunities. Tex-
tiles exports boomed throughout the 1960s. Production was gradually turned
to synthetic textiles. The electronics industry on Taiwan was implanted by
foreign capital as a typical peripheral enclave assembly industry. A new
group of Taiwanese entrepreneurs, relatively independent of the state,
emerged from various types of cooperation with foreign capital (Gold 1986:
81-84). As Taiwan approached full employment in the late 1960s, industrial
wages started to rise. The average rise of real wage rates from L 964 to
1973 was 5.4 per cent a year. This was well below the gains in
productivity, but ris ing wages and increasing employment within labour
intensive industry and various other modem sec tor activities stil sustained
a rise in mass consumption with considerable linkages to home industries.
The export led growth of the L 960s took place within a docile political
atmosphere of nearly unchallenged authoritarian rule by Kuomintang. No
organised class mobilisation took place in the 1960s. The peasantry
remained effectively suppressed by the state. No working class opposition
to the state emerged, although a repressive labour regime was in force;
martial laws prohibited strikes and unions were manipulated by the state.
There were no widespread proletarian class consciousness among industrial
workers, who of ten did not picture themselves as lifetime industrial
workers. The male workers generally regarded industrial work as a spring-
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good working relations with a new generation of politicians with similar
backgrounds (Gold 1986: 102-106).
The dividing line between the mainlander state and Taiwanese civil
society has also become more blurred. Local elections served as a channel
to integrate mainlanders and islanders. But Kuomintang also faced ques-
tions of legitimation and popular demands - and periodically strong
opposition - as it worked to control the outcomes of these elections. The
elite tensions between islanders and mainlanders were somewhat relaxed as
Kuomintang elites alled with the islander capitalist class and islanders
began to fil the ranks within party and state (Gold 1986: 90,92). The new
Taiwanese Kuomintang elites took a relatively conciliatory stance towards
the opposition. A new generation of young highly educated Taiwanese has
been exposed to the liberal influences of American culture through mass
media and education; consumerism, individualism, human rights, electoral
policy, democracy and economic liberalism (Gold 1986: 113). The
expanding civic and economic associations connected with capitalist
economic transformation - some of them international - have also made
party monitoring and control a much more difficult tas k than before (Cheng
1989: 482). An organised Taiwanese civilsociety emerged that gradually
mobilsed for democratisation:
.... society began aggressively to press its interests against the state. The
tangwai through magazines, organisations, electoral campaigns, and
demonstrations, articulate aspirations of a large segment of the middle
c1ass and bourgeoisie ... New faces invigorate moribund tame bodies such
as the Legislative Yuan and provincial local assemblies, raising pointed
questions about the dividing line between party and state, the necessity for
martial law, prohibition for new political parties, mainlander hegemony,
corrption, incompetence, a criminal underworld, lack of social welfare
programs, and so on. ... Taiwanese abroad organize and exert external
pressure, of ten through foreign press releases embarrassing the
government. Y oung party members demand changes in the KMT' s
gerontocratic centralist structure. Businessmen through trade associations
and elected offcials, press for further liberalisation plus mercantilist
support in foreign markets. They also demand more freedom to do busi-
ness, inc1uding with the mainland. Returned experts desire an environment
similar to that in the West where they resided for years. The state is
increasingly becoming an model for social conflict on the Western
pluralist model (Gold 1986: 130).
The main force for political change in Taiwan was a new generation of
middle class-intellectuals that had grown up with the Taiwanese "economic
miracle". Tun-jen Cheng suggests that these groups had relatively close ties
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the establishment of a new political party, the Democratic Progressive
Party. After internal conflcts between hardliners and softiners the
leadership of the Kuomintang proclaimed the ending of the martial laws
and ended the prohibition of political associations. Then in 1987
Kuomintang allowed regular elections for three national representative
organs and a two-party system emerged (Cheng 1989: 488-490). Although
Kuomintang stil holds the upper hand within Taiwanese politics by means
of clientelism and advantages from its previous rule, the state on Taiwan
is no longer simply the Kuomintang state.
Conclusions: Taiwan and the Gerschenkron approach
I wil now retum to the issues raised at the beginning of this paper. How
well do es the Taiwan case fit the sequence of a state interventionist
development dictatorship, followed by private capitalist economic trans-
formation and economic and politicalliberalisation? It should be noted that
Gerschenkron's theory deals with intern al development in de facto
sovereign countries. But in the case of Taiwan various types of geopolitical
dependency - first Japanese colonial rule, later American hegemony -
have influenced political development and economic transformation con-
siderably.
The Japanese legacy of state control may be explained reasonably well
by the Gerschenkronian approach. As emphasised by Bruce Cumings, Japan
was a case of late economic transformation that transferred its autocratic
state interventionist development model to Taiwan. In line with the
Gerschenkronian predictions, the late-late developing Kuomintang state on
Taiwan increased state control further, as seen in agriculture.
A central issue in Gerschenkron's argument is the resource transfer by
political means from agriculture to industry. The Kuomintang state inherited
the Japanese tradition of state intervention within agriculture and used it to
further national economic transformation. The Japanese system of
cooperation between landlords and administration was transformed into a
fully fledged system of state control. State control was enhanced by land
reforms that first broke the control of the landlord dass of the agrarian sur-
plus. The agrarian surplus was transferred to the state by means of hidden
rice taxes. To a large extent this surplus was us ed by the state to further
industrialisation by subsidising wages and providing investment funds for
industry (Apthorpe 1988: 520; Grabowski 1988: 62-64).
As for industry, there were considerable state intervention and state
ownership during the 1950s. On the other hand the "take-off' during the
export led economic transformation of the L 960s was led by local and
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China concept and its mythological functions of justifying Martial Laws at
the nationallevel until the retaking of the mainland.
The Gerschenkronian framework may perhaps be modified so that it is
the civil society created by capitalist development, rather than the capitalists
themselves that press for democracy. But it would stil be difficult to fit
into this framework that private capitalist development and the associated
development of civil society on Taiwan were not simply the outcomes of
internal forces. Economic and political developments were heavily
influenced by the United States. The postwar Kuomintang state on Taiwan
did not only receive enormous amounts of military and economic aid from
the United States, but U.S. authorities also influenced agrarian reforms,
economic strategy, bureaucratisation and power struggles inside the state
administration. In general the U.S. influence worked in the direction of
liberal capitalist or petit bourgeoisie values. The economic policy and
economic bureaucracy of the 1950s and 1960s reflected a blend of the
Japanese legacy, the statism associated with Kuomintang on the mainland
and liberal or reformist U.S. influence. U.S. influence has perhaps been
decisive in tipping Taiwanese development in the direction of the private
capitalist Gerschenkronian phase, led by a bureaucratic elite commtted to
capitalist growth.
The United States has been less influential to forward Taiwanese political
liberalisation. But it should be noted that U.S. pressure led to the system
of local elections in Taiwan. Although Kuomintang control remained firm,
the lon g time effects of this "putting on a democratic face" was to train an
ariculated local civil society, including an increasingly well organised
political opposition. In additon, politicalliberalisation was to some extent
an indirect consequence of the ideological influence of U.S. hegemony.
Thus, it was not capitalist economic transformation in general that led to
democratisation on Taiwan. We need to be far more precise, and relate
Taiwanese democratisation to the direct and indirect influences of American
political and ideological hegemony on Taiwanese economic and political
transformation.
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As has been shown by Dani Rodrik, a weak state wil over-invest in the
wrong kinds of intervention, and under-in vest in the right kinds of
intervention, while a strong state acts in the opposite way. It should be
noted, however, that authoritarianism is neither necessary nor sufficient for
this relative insulation.
The existence of many heterogenous interest groups in a country may
inhibit the Stackelberg solution of a non-cooperative game, and the state
has to participate in a negotiation game. Under such circumstances, the
state does not have the same possibility to make pre-commtments as in the
Stackelberg game. This kind of negotiation game can easily result in a
prisoner' s dilemma situation.
The following examples wil ilustrate different types of state
intervention, correlated to the concept of relative state autonomy:
i) Infant industry protection. In East Asia this kind of intervention has
succeeded. The case of Taiwan shows how an autonomous state can
make pre-commtments to temporary support, and stick to this
commtment. When the industry became internationally competitive,
the government support was withdrawn.
ii) Soft budget constraint. if the regime emphasises the need for short run
political responsiveness rather than economic accountabilty, non-
autonomous states wil be unable to make credible pre~commitments.
iii) Signals of pre-commitment. Structural adjustment programmes can be
used by soft states, by "blaming the IMF" to secure a higher autonomy
of the state from pressure groups.
iv) Uniform tarifs. A soft state may establish a system of uniform tariffs,
which wil make it more difficult for special interest group to "break
the rule", than in a case without such a rule.
The quality of intervention, imperfect information and
externalities
Problems concerning imperfect information and externalities are often used
as arguments in favour of state interventions. Bardhan showed, however,
that we have to qualify this general argument, and that state interventions
do not necessarily solve the problems.
Imperfect information. Bardhan argued that lack of information or
information al externalities in the market place usually are correlated with
insufficient information also for the state. In such cases, both market and
state equilibria are Pareto-inefficient.
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alternative may be to devote more emphasis on ways of monitoring state
owned enterprises, rather than focusing on the ownership structure
(privatisation). More emphasis should then be devoted to creating "high
power incentives" internally within the company.
One positive result of this debate is that decentralisation has be en placed
on the agenda. Decentralisation may reduce problems related to informa-
tional inefficiency. On the other hand, a system based on strong decentral-
isation to local and regional self-govemment, may need external
intervention due to:
* internal distributional differences. How may local power groups and
unequal internal distributions be counterbalanced?
* co-variate risks in projects within a region
* territorial externalities and common property
* power in negotiation. Local government has less power in an inter-
national context.
* regional distribution. Who has the commitment to distribute between
regions?
In his dosing remark, Bardhan maintained that even if decentralisation may
require a "third party" intervention to help solve these problems, his above
analysis of the quality of state interventions wil imply that this "third
party" does not necessarily have to be the state!
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11. The state, interest groups and
structural adjustment in Zimbabwe1
Tor Skålnes, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen
In 1990, the Zimbabwean Government led by the proclaimed Marxist-
Leninist, President Robert Mugabe, embarked upon a World Bank-
sponsored Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). This
happened after a decade of independence characterised by the pursuit of
policies of economic nationalism which differed little in principle from
those followed for fifteen years by the "right-wing" regime of Ian Smith's
Rhodesian Front. These protectionist policies had long benefitted the white-
dominated sectors of manufacturing and commercial agriculture in
particular. This article searches for an explanation as to why the shift in
economic strategy occurred. Did the government perhaps give up hope of
riding through an economic crisis on its own, and yield to pressures from
the World Bank and the IMF? Had it perhaps been able to extricate itself
from the grip of protectionist domestic industrialists, farmers and others and
increase state autonomy? Or can a contractarian theory emphasising
changing societal pressures contribute to our understanding of policy-
making in Zimbabwe?
Recently, political science has been heavily influenced by a liberal
political economy which posits models of "free trade" and limited state
intervention as normative standards of "rationality" in economic policy. At
the same time, there is continued and widespread failure of govemments
throughout the world, and in the developing part of it especially, to abide
This article is alsopublished in The Journal of Development Studies, vol. 29, no. 3,
April 1993, and is reproduced here by perrnssion of Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, London.
Financial support for the research was obtained from the Norwegian Research Council
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form of "interest group politics" rather than having promoted state
autonomy. With respect to Zimbabwe, however, it is argued that the
particular organisational and institutional form that interest group politics
has taken facilitates discussion around national policy issues and may be
promotive of policy flexibilty and change. The particular positions adopted
by Zimbabwean interest groups on structural adjustment and trade
liberalisation are then discussed in some detail, since these positions do not
fully correspond to common expectations that agricultural and extractive
industries wil favour liberalisation, while domestically oriented producers
wil oppose it.
Interest groups and political economy
In the L 970s, harsh political repression of the "popular sectors", including
domestic businessmen and workers, was said to be a necessary condition
for a successful state strategy of "forced" industrialisation in Latin America.
An allance of the "bureaucratic-authoritarian" state, international capital
and large domestic firms was held to account for a mixed economic
strategy ofmacro-economic stabilisation, selective export promotion by way
of subsidies and increased import-substitution focusing on capital goods and
other industrial inputs ("deepening" of ISI) (Cardoso and Falletto, 1979;
O' Donnell, 1973; Evans, 1979). The posited link between "deepening" of
import-substitution - i.e., the "heterodox" aspect of the strategy - and
political authoritarianism was criticised by a number of authors, a
representative sample of which are found in Coller (1979). However,
several studies upheld the proclaimed causal link between political
authoritarianism andpolicies of macro-economic stabilisation (the
"orthodox" aspect), later also full-fledged structural adjustment (Skidmore,
1977; Diaz-Alejandro, 1981; Kaufman, 1985). The collapse of authoritarian
regimes in Latin America and the economic chaos that many of them left
behind led, however, to a reconsideration of these issues in the late 1980s.
Many authoritarian regimes, it was found, were hopelessly incapable of
putting sound economic policies into effect, while the new democratic
regimes often did little better. Some authors found that more refined
categories than those of "authoritarianism" and "democracy" were needed
(Haggard and Kaufman, 1989 a and b; Stallngs and Kaufman, 1989).
The failures of "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes in Latin America
undermined the thesis that a high degree of state autonomy facilitates
economic progress. At the same time, however, the notable success of
certain highly repressive East Asian regimes in achieving rapid economic
growth reinforced the popularity of state-autonomy arguments among
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and growth, in the context of an analysis, inter alia, of differential growth
rates in Western countries after the Second World War. According to
Olson, interest groups can be usefully seen as "distributional coalitions".
Such coalitions are formed with a view to enlarging their own share of a
country' s economic "pie" rather than promote greater and more efficient
production among their members. The costs of policies of protection and
of other restrictions up on competition can be distributed among all
members of society, while the benefits accrue on ly to the members of the
successful lobby group. However, the larger the group, the more are the
adverse consequences of lobbying for various measures of state intervention
felt by its own members. Such "encompassing" coalitions may therefore be
interested in adopting a more long-term attitude in which efficiency crIteria
are incorporated into the ca1culation of self-interest. Nevertheless, Olson felt
that other factors would tend to cancel out this beneficial consequence of
"encompassingness". His data on differential rates of growth among
Western countries indicated to him that the less organised the society, the
higher the growth rates. Rogowski (1983), however, challenged Olson's
empirical findings by pointing out that it was exactly in countries with
long-established, broad-based and centralised interest groups that growth
had been most rapid.
This debate indicates that whether or not interest groups wil act to
promote efficient economic policies may depend on the particular way in
which these groups are organised, and how they are linked into the policy-
making process. If the studies on patrimonialism and personal rule in Africa
are anything to go by, one might say that the form of political
authoritarianism that Africa has seen, has stimulated exactly the creation of
numerous small and localised "pressure groups" which are linked to the
state by means of patron-client ties. Such groups frequently demand limited,
particular favours such as subsidies, a particular tariff, a share of
government expenditure, and the like. Autonomous interest groups
organising whole sectors of the economy or social classes are relatively rare
in Africa, since most govemments made it their project immediately after
independence to regiment labour unions, farmers' cooperatives and other
organisations of civil society, frequently turning them into ineffective
adjuncts of an ilegitimate ruling pary.
Robert Bates's Markets and States in Tropical Africa (1981) can be read
as a discussion of how political authoritarianism stifles the organisation and
expression of potentially society-wide economic interests, in particular the
agricultural interest. African rulers have regularly banned opposition parties,
and created one-party electoral arangements whereby only localised,
narow interests are allowed representation. These interests are then
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within the Government, although many politicians and bureaucrats stil
seem less than reconciled to the new programme of structural adjustment.
In Zimbabwe, interest groups form alliances for the purpose of inducing
change in public policy. Although initiative for such change is shared with
the Government (or parts of it) as well as external actors such as the World
Bank, a contractarian explanation must form a significant part of our
understanding of economic reform in Zimbabwe. The societal coalition for
economic change in Zimbabwe includes not only mining, commerce and
commercial agriculture, as one would expect on the basis of theories of the
"urban bias" of protectionism, but also, and prominently, the manufacturing
sector. The coalition for the status quo includes not only civil servants and
workers threatened with a loss of jobs and an erosion of real wages, but
also small-scale farers. Some plausible reasons for this state of affairs are
outlned below.
Zimbabwe's economic policies 1980-92
Zimbabwe's history offers both examples of periods in which an open
economy strategy was successfully pursued (generally up until 1965) and
of intervals in which import-substituting industrialisation was carried out
with some salutary effect (from 1965 onwards, with paricularly high
growth in the 1967-1974 years). Zimbabwe today has a highly diversified
economy, and a relatively advanced (for Africa) manufacturing sector that
contributed 26.4 per cent of GDP in 1990, compared to agriculture's 12.9
per cent and mining's 8.2 per cent (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992a: 3).
After formal independence from Great Britain in 1980 and the end to white
settler rule, the Gross Domestic Product has grown erratically, but by a
possible average 3.4 per cent in the 1980-1992 period. Key problems have
been a persistently high budget deficit, averaging 10 per cent of GDP, the
channellng of a large share of respectable savings rates of around 20 per
cent of GDP into government debt, strict foreign exchange rationing which
has reduced private investment to leve is below those needed for
replacement, and consequent lack of new employment creation in the
formal sec tor .
Zimbabwe experienced a brief "boom" just after independence, spurred
by the lifting of international sanctions. Domestic demand expanded
rapidly, while export incentives were eliminated and the real exchange rate
allowed to appreciate by 20 per cent (Riddell, 1990a: 376). Consequently,
exports suffered, especially those of manufactured goods. In 198 L -82, the
world recession led to further shar declines in export eamings. The 1982-
84 drought exacerbated the crisis. Zimbabwe introduced an IMF-sponsored
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addition of competing imported finished products in the final years of the
programme. Tariff protection wil average 30 per cent for finished goods
and domestic price controls wil be gradually abolished.
This wil give the manufacturing sector an opportunity to increase output
from existing plant and machinery while refurbishing and retooling (by
means, initially, of the rationing of credit supplied by the African
Development Bank and the World Bank). Expanded export incentives wil
reorient sales towards the external market. Later, when capital goods are
put on OGIL, further machinery and equipment can be imported for the
expansion of the productive base. Domestic manufacturers wil be shielded
from competition on their output of finished goods until the last phase of
the programme. Trade liberalisation was originally to be phased over five
years (Government of Zimbabwe, 1991). The programme commenced in
October 1990 and was supposed to be completed by 1995, but it is now
clear that this was overoptimistic. The fact that liberalisation is already
behind schedule is probably due in large part to the slow implementation
of governmentexpenditure reduction, caused by slow planning and political
difficulties that arise when a large number of civIl servants are to be laid
off. An even more important reason is the drought. So far, it does not seem
that industrialists have developed "cold feet". Although competition wil
hurt some of them eventually, a certain degree of tariff protection wil
remain when the programme is completed. But their continued support is
probably contingent on real progress in the cutting of the budget deficit and
the furnishing of capital for new investment in manufacturing.
Import liberalisation seems to have put immediate pressure on the
balance of payments. The current account deficit was large in 1990 and
1991, and may approach 1 bilion in 1992 (Economist Intellgence Unit,
1992b: 3), overshooting targets two-and-a-half times (cf. Government of
Zimbabwe, 1991: 25, table 4) and threatening to derail the programme. A
debiltating drought has made it necessary to import much of this year' s
requirement for maize, wheat, sugar and other foods. Recently the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was brought in, contrary to the earlier
wish of the Government to rely solelyon the World Bank and bilateral
donors. In January 1992 the IMF agreed to supply an SDR 343.4 milion
(US$ 484 millon) Extended Facility over three years. In addition, other
donors have apparently agreed to raise their contributions from an initially
agreed upon US$ 700 millon to US$ L billon a year (Economist
Intellgence Unit, 1992b: 12).
Import liberalisation is dangerous when the budget deficit is large, as it
stil is in Zimbabwe. The excess demand in the economy may spur inflation
and lead to unsustainable levels of imports. Inflation has gone up from 13
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and preserve effective dominance of political office in Zimbabwe.
Authoritarian tendencies are evident in the manipulation of electoral
arrangements and undisguised intimidation of opposition politicians and
their supporters. Nevertheless, a potential remains for opposition parties to
challenge ZANU (PF) rule on a constitutional basis. However, the faIlure
so far of Zimbabwean parties to turn elections into effective contests over
alternative policy programmes has limited the impact of the electoral
channel as a means by which to translate popular demands into public
policy.
Limited contestation in the party political arena combines with the
retention and expansion of opportunities for autonomous interest groups to
form and to exercise extensive influence upon public policies through a
system of bureaucratic consultation. This particular manner of structuring
the political system puts the interests represented by the white-dominated
economic sectors of commercial agriculture, manufacturing, mining and
commerce at an advantage over numerically larger but economically,
educationally and organisationally more disadvantaged segments of the
population such as unskiled workers and poor peasants. Nevertheless,
maj ority rule, the retention of formal democracy, and ZANU (PF) hesitation
to impose strict authoritarian, corporatist controls on interest organisations
- initially in the name of racial "reconciliation" - has created space for
the exercise of some influence by labour unions and peasants' associations
as well. ZANU (PF) seems more preoccupied with preserving its monopoly
of formal political office than with stiflng the expression of societal
demands that challenge some aspect of govemmental policy without
presenting an outright challenge to the Government itself.
Interest groups representing important white-dominated economic
interests include the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), the
Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU), the Chamber of Mines and the
Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC). All of these
organisations hark back many decades before independence, and are firmly
rooted in a relatively advanced and differentiated economy. Each generally
enjoys significant access to the various ministries. Immediately after
independence organisations representing black peasants (the National
Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe - NFAZ) and workers (the Zimbabwe
Congress of Trade Unions - ZCTU) established themselves at a national
leveL. Notwithstanding ZANU (PF)'s intermittent attempts to direct the
intemal affairs of the black organisations, a partial autonomy has been
possible to achieve. Interest groups have access to the public's ear through
an independent weekly and monthly printed press. With the abandonment
of the drive for a one-party state, Government-owned dailes have also
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of the Zimbabwean state was at best of a temporary and limited nature and
does not well explain the inauguration of structural adjustment. The key
domestic force for liberalisation has been the manufacturing sector.
Manufacturing was the major beneficiary of the system of foreign
exchange allocations and import controls that was installed after 1965. In
the interest of defeating economic sanctions by the international
community, the ilegal white regime created hot-house conditions so that
industry could diversify and expand, and thus substitute the imports that
could not be expected to flow easily to the country or be paid for though
dwindling export earnings. Growth in the initial years was rapid. Although
the manufacturing sector had been fearful of the consequences of the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence, UDI paradoxically forced the
Government to introduce the import quotas that the Association of
Rhodesian Industries, the forerunner to the CZI, had be en lobbying for
since the early 1960s.
Although commercial agriculture suffered heavily from sanctions on
tobacco exports, UDI led to a large-scale programme of diversification in
white agriculture. Quotas were established on tobacco production and
incentive prices paid for a range of other products such as wheat,
soyabeans, cotton, etc. Prices were set through negotiation between the
Government and the Rhodesian National Farmers Union (the later CFU)
and sale was organised though parastatal marketing boards.
The system worked to the overall advantage of manufacturing and
commercial agriculture, in that increased production for the domestic
market more than made up for reduced exports. Simply extrapolating from
this fact one would expect manufacturing and commercial agriculture to be
wary of current changes and to resist large-scale liberalisation of the
economy. One would further expect such resistance to be especially
pronounced on the part of manufacturing, due to its heavy investment in
production for the home market. Agriculture, perhaps, would be better able
to regain its position on the world market for tobacco and thus become
more interested again in policies which would promote such exports (a
devalued currency, easier access to imports), although one might also
expect a resistance to types of liberalisation that would threaten the sector' s
production of import-substituting crops such as wheat, soyabeans,
sunflowers, etc.
Such an analysis would lead one to expect wide-spread resistance to
ESAP on the part of important productive sectors, bolstered by the
opposition of labour and civil servants. The World Bank, IMF and other
donors would then appear to be the main forces for change, collaborating
with parts of the Government in implementing reform. Such an analysis
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The manufacturing sector in Zimbabwe in the mid-1980s was wary of
liberalising imports of goods produced in the country but resented most
other controis, especially ever stricter price controls and indeed extended
price freezes, as well as restrictions upon the ability to retrench workers.
Furthermore, it saw increased taxes being us ed to finance a growing budget
deficit that supported recurrent expenditure rather than public investment
in infrastrcture. Foreign exchange continued to be strictly rationed, with
little hope for significant long-term expansion. Improved economic growth
in 1985-86 was offset by renewed recession in 1987. It gradually became
clear that export incentives were proving insufficient to break the foreign
exchange bottleneck. According to a former CZI economist interviewed by
this author in 199 l, around 1985 the CZI preferred export incentives but
resisted an expanded Open General Import Licence. What shifted
manufacturers' position away from maintaining the old system was the
unavailabilty of forex except on the black market. Furthermore, the leve1
of net investment in the economy reached an all-time low, equipment
became ever more obsolete and little new employment was being created.
In 1987-88, the CZI' s position on trade liberalisation underwent a
substantial change. The annual congresses of the CZI are well publicised
and well-visited affairs at which Government ministers meet with the
country' stop-ranking industrialists as well as with representatives of other
economic sectors in the country. The congresses in 1987 and 1988 were in
large part devoted to the issue of liberalisation. The Government had held
discussions for some time with the World Bank and the IMF on the
liberalisation issue, but there was strong feeling within the Government that
the appropriate strategy for Zimbabwe was one of deepening import-
substitution rather than opening the economy to competition. This strategy
had for instance been outlined in the First Five-Year National Development
Plan, 1986-90. At the CZI's annual congress in 1987, then Deputy Prime
Minister Simon Muzenda called in his opening statement for increased
import-substitution, arguing that foreign exchange problems were due to
exogenous factors, not to any shortcomings of public policy. Although
Minister of Finance Bernard Chidzero had foreseen some form of trade
liberalisation in his 1987 Budget Speech, it is fair to say that almost all
Government officials supported continued import-substitution at the time.
The CZI itself, however, while also emphasising continued import-
substitution, added a new element to its thinking when calling for a
"planned, selective and gradual approach (to trade liberalisation) in
conjunction with tariffs... Competing imports wil have to be carefully
handled to ensure gradual exposure, and relaxation of restrictive local
conditions (labour laws and forex to upgrade equipment) (is needed) to give
213
considerations as to prospects on the world market, competitiveness of local
industry against potential imports, availability of investment finance, and
a host of other things. In 1987-88, then, a large number of technocrats sided
with the "ideologues" in callng for continued and increased "self-reliance".
Even in the Ministry of Finance, there was great scepticism in L 987 and
later of trade liberalisation. The minister himself, Bernard Chidzero, has
always been held up as a prime example of a pure technocrat and the one
who steered the new economicphilosophy through the Cabinet, in allance
of course with the World Bank in particular. This may be an apt description
of his role. However, in 1987 it is hard to detect a pro-structural-adjustment
stance within the ministry as a whole. if Chidzero was in favour, he
appeared isolated at the time. Permanent Secretary Mushayakarara for
instance expressed the opinion that foreign investment might not be needed
since Zimbabwe had so much of it already, unless it were to fil gaps
created by the failure of local people to invest. Few such gaps were
perceived, as apparent in this astounding statement: "I can only imagine
possibly that if we decided to manufacture atomic bombs, maybe that s
where we might fail (to be self-reliant)" (Financial Gazette, 1987: 2). The
Deputy Secretar in the Ministry of Finance also stayed firmly within the
old framework when he said that the most important role assigned to the
manufacturing sector was making the things which Zimbabwe was now
importing (Ibid.). These views were strongly supported by the Minister of
Industry and Technology, Callistus Ndlovu, for instance at the congresses
of the Commercial Farmers' Union in 1987 and 1988. The intra-
govemmental division at the early stage of the debate was not between the
economic ministries and the others, but rather between Chidzero and
perhaps the Reserve Bank on the one hand and most of the rest of the
Government on the other.
The CZI and the private sector was well ahead of the Government in
adjusting its policy position in 1987-88. The World Bank utilised the new
momentum by pressing the case for reform. In May 1987 it had finalised
its report on the manufacturing sector, arguing that within every sub-sector
of the industry there were firms who stood a good chance of competing in
a more liberal environment (World Bank, 1987a). In November that year
the Bank published a review of the whole economy, outlining its case for
liberalisation (World Bank, 1987b). The case for a gradual programme that
the CZI had put forward was supported by the Bank when a team visited
the country in February 1988 and indicated that a useful time frame would
be five years (CZI Industrial Review, 1988: 48). The World Bank support
for gradualism was reiterated at the CZI annual congress in 1988 by the
Bank's representative in Harare, M.A. Bumey (Ibid.: 55). Some months
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streamlined investment controis, and the expansion of export incentives in
an intermediary period in order to increase foreign exchange earnings for
the financing of the programme.. In basic outline this is what the ESAP
programme launched in October 1990 came to entail.
There is thus little doubt that the CZI lobbied very effectively for a
programme of economic reform which would maximise the manufacturing
sector' s chances of competing against future imports and redirecting itself
to the export market. In doing so it had the support of other white-
dominated productive sectors which might be thought to disagree with the
strong emphasis on manufacturing' s needs to the detriment of their own
immediate requirements. The Commercial Farmers' Union had for instance
clashed with the manufacturing sector in 1986 when the CFU argued for
liberalisation of agricultural inputs (many of which are produced
domestically). Agriculture and mining were only marginally involved in
consultation prior to the implementation of ESAP. But both sectors
collaborated with the CZI on a joint approach to Government from 1988
on, and clearly perceived that the manufacturing sector would be the key
to success of pressures for reform, both because it is the most important
economic sector in the country in terms of contribution to the GDP and
because, strongly protected as it has been, it would have to be the focus of
attention if the restructuring exercise were to be successful. Zimbabwe's
ESAP is perhaps notable for its strong emphasis on manufacturing, and for
the way it has left issues of agricultural pricing and marketing to be
decided at a later point in time.
Given the fact that some manufacturing firms look relatively competitive
on the "world market", while others are clearly much less so and have
grown as a result of quota and tariff protection only, one might have
expected a much greater divergence of opinion on the issue of trade
liberalisation within the CZI than has actually been the case from the late
1980s on. What accounts for the turn-around of the sector as a whole?
During UDI, import substitution had worked to the advantage of the
manufacturing sector. But at the time, black interests could be ignored,
especially insofar as public expenditure was involved. Macro-economic
stabilty was ensured until the guerrila war stared to take its toll in the late
1970s. The budget was generally balanced, inflation was low, and the
currency stable. Savings were channelled into investment to a much greater
degree than in the L 980s, taxes were much lower, and price controls much
less strict. The need after 1980 to increase expenditure on education and
health for the blacks, as well as to extend credit, subsidies and
infrastructural support to small-scale farmers, put much pressure on the
system. The large budget deficits increased inflationary pressures, mopped
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civil service, and unfortuitous circumstances all seem to play a role in
delaying the implementation of the most basic of structural adjustment
reforms, namely that of public expenditure reductions.
Government and other interest groups
In a short article such as this, it is impossible to adequately analyse the
positions and political influence of all Zimbabwean interest groups.
However, a few points must be made since the pattem of support and
opposition to structural adjustment in Zimbabwe does not correspond fully
to the expectations that "urban" interests wil oppose liberalisation while
rural, agricultural interest wil favour it (Bates, 1981). Unfortunately,
limited space demands that many of our assertions must remain
unsupported by detailed analysis and data.
The Commercial Farmers' Union, by many seen as the most well-
organised and influential of white-dominated interest groups, has been faced
with a number of problems in the late 1980s. Originally supportive of a
system of officially-determined producer prices and state marketing
monopolies, the CFU had by the late 1980s clearly become exasperated
with a system of controls which failed to keep down input price rises while
limiting increases on regulated output prices (especially maize). Large-scale
farmers started to diversify out of the numerous controlled crops and into
non-regulated tobacco and horticultural products.
In 1989, the CFU started lobbying for the complete dismantling of the
present system of controls - a process parallei to that which had taken
place within the CZI, and stimulated as in the case of the manufacturing
sector by the changing political context within which the system of controls
operated. if the CFU had earlier been a beneficiary of controlled marketing
and administrative price-setting, it no longer saw this to be the case. During
UDI, the need for diversification of commercial farming meant that
incentive prices were set for a range of products. Subsidy of irigation and
inputs was extended, all within the con text of a virtual exclusion of black
farmers from the market. After 1980, black farmers became heavily
involved in marketing of maize and cotton in particular, and this tended to
increase the pressures on the system. Operating costs of the marketing
boards soared because of the larger number of depots that were required for
the handling of communal farmer produce. Also, storage costs rose
markedly because black farmers who lacked irrigation could achieve record
production in years of good rainfall but experienced disastrous harvests in
years of drought. To achieve price stability hence also became much more
difficult. In drought years the Government felt compelled to increase
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to counter the influence of ZAPU-, UANC-, and ZANU (Sithole)-affiiated
trade unions and to undermne their attempt to merge into an independent
national umbrella organisation, the United Trade Unions of Zimbabwe
(UTUZ) (Wood, 1987; Mitchell, 1987).
The ZCTU has from its inception been plagued by corrption and
nepotism, and its grass-roots following is seriously in doubt. Although from
1985 on more independent-sounding leaders have been elected to the top
positions, the ZCTU has continued to be weak in relation to both the
Government and the employers.
In 1985, the Labour Relations Act was gazetted. The Act consolidated
labour legislation on wages, employment conditions, bargaining
arrangements, etc. Although an improvement from the point of view of
workers as far as minimum wages, maximum hours, and health and safety
were concerned, cumbersome industrial conciliation procedures originally
introduced by white settler govemments remain in place, and the right to
strike is virtually abolished. The Labour Relations Act conferred upon the
Minister of Labour broad powers to interfere in the intern al management
of trade unions as well as the right to register and deregister unions
(Sachikonye, 1986).
In the first few years of independence, the Government seemed prepared
to grant workers some concessions, notably in the case of minimum wages,
but it is perhaps instructive that these gains came through legislation and
unilateral executive action rather than by allowing trade unions an
independent role in negotiating for improvements with employers. Real
wage gains in 1980-82 have been undermined by later developments;
especially since 1986, and in any case long before ESAP, wages have fallen
behind inflation (Herbst, 1990: 203-205). In 1986, a machinery for
negotiating wages was set up for the first time, on the basis of "tripartism"
between the employers, employees and Government. The Cabinet reserved
for itself the right to have the final word. The tripartite machinery served
to weaken the labour unions by exposing it to a formdable coalition of
Government and employers (Ibid.: 209).
Somewhat paradoxically in vie w of the strong opposition of the ZCTU
towards ES AP, strctural adjustment promises to increase the autonomy and
freedom of manoeuvre for unions. Collective bargaining between workers
and employers has now replaced Govemment-imposed wage settlements.
Employers are as wiling as the unions to work within the new framework.
The result of the 1991 collective wage negotiations was wage increases
generally around 20 per cent, within the context of an inflation rate which
at the time was officially below 20 per cent, but ris ing rapidly, probably to
above 30 per cent as of now. For workers, this might be considered an
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and the ZCTU is hardly consulted on the great issues of economic policy
in Zimbabwe.
Conclusion
What this analysis has attempted to show, is the considerable influence
exercised in Zimbabwe by certain societal groups upon govemmental
economic policy. Strctural adjustment and trade liberalisation began to be
implemented in a con text not of overriding external dependency nor of state
autonomy vis-à-vis significant interest groups. The manufacturing sector has
been . key to the design of the new policies, and commercial agriculture,
mining and commerce have played supporting roles. The manufacturing
sector has backed reform as a whole, and support is not limited to those
who are already competitive on the extemal markets. Interest groups in
Zimbabwe seem generally to be able to formulate coherent but flexible
overall policy positions despite internal differences. The case of Zimbabwe
ilustrates that broad-based, centralised interest groups sometimes favour
policies which may increase their members' productivity and efficiency as
opposed to policies that mainly achieve some redistribution of already
created wealth.
Commercial farmers have as yet been ineffective in broadening the thrust
of liberalisation to include sectoral policies in agriculture, due in part to the
opposition of small farmers. The case of Zimbabwe therefore ilustrates not
only that state autonomy is not always a necessary condition for
liberalisation, but also that key urban interests might under certain
circumstances favour such policies, and that key rural interests might
oppose it.
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This does not imply that it wil be impossible to do anything about
corrption in countries where there are reasons to suspect that the top
leadership is corrpt. Klitgaard (1988) reports from a fairly successful anti-
corrption campaign in the tax bureaucracy in the Philippines during the
reign of Marcos.
It is possible to establish situations where corruption may have beneficial
effects - a few examples are indicated in the analytical part of this paper
- and describe regimes which are completely corrpt; the basic policy
assumption in this paper is, nevertheless that corrption is normally
harmful, and that it is possible to influence and change it.
It is sometimes claimed that corruption does not make much sense in an
African sense - what is designated corruption is simply the fact that
bureaucrats and politicians are adhering to traditional gift-giving norms
when they conflct with modem bureaucratic rules. While this may well
happen for certain kinds of fairly harmless corrupt acts, I wil not accept
this as a starting point but assume that there are many acts that wil be
considered corrupt in most cultures and countries, including the African
ones.!
On average, African countries appear to have fairly high levels of
corruption. Nevertheless, the levels seem to vary as much here as what is
the case in the other continents, so many of the mechanisms that I outlne
in order to explain the variation of the corrption 1evels should also be
relevant within an African cultural context. Moreover, it is my impression
that corrption may not be more common in African countries than certain
other areas. What may be exceptional, is rather that corruption in Africa
may have more harmful consequences than elsewhere, perhaps due to lack
of competence in many parts of the bureaucracies. For example, when a
sector is governed by bureaucracy that is bordering on not being technically
competent for a certain set of tasks, it may be exceptionally harmful if
people are not promoted on the basis of merit but on the basis of bribes or
political pushing.
In the following I wil mainly discuss economic forms of corrption that
may take place in any parts of the world, including Africa. There are, of
course, many peculiarities with African corrption which could be
highlighted, but of which I am hardly an expert. Most experts mention,
however, the fact that most African bureaucrats and politicians are tied to
larger and tighter personal networks either of horizontal or patron-client
types that cut across their formal hierarchic relationships, than public
servants elsewhere. The existence of such strong ties may modify some of
i This paper was first presented at a conference in Arusha Tanzania.
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bureaucratic structure would simply execute the implied orders without any
wil of their own.
Second, these apparatuses were sometimes considered exogenous for the
simple, intellectually honest reason that the behaviour of public offcials
(and politicians) was not amenable to economic analysis. At the time
economists had not much systematic to say about any kind of economic
behaviour which was taking place inside organisations.
Third, while Myrdal (1968) and others had pointed to the importance of
corrption in the con text of developing countries, in general, development
research was heavily influenced by diplomatic considerations which tended
to make researchers avoid subjects that could appear embarassing for
new ly established states, a discussion of which might also hurt the recently
established economic aid programs that most development researchers
supported. It is a sign of intellectual progress that we are able to set the
phenomena of corrption on the agenda today and discuss it in a fairly cool
and detached way.
Corrption is one of the more important and clear forms of norm
breaking behaviour observed among politicians and public officials.
Explaining it may shed light on other, less obvious ways to break the codes
for appropriate behaviour within the public sector which is so important for
makng the decisions of politicians and public officials at 1east roughly
predictable and efficient, limiting arbitrary applications of power.
Some startingquestions
Corrption has been a persistent problem of hierarchic organisations
throughout history with manysided and sometimes important economic
consequences. It has been discussed and remedies have been tried in all the
ancient civilisations such as Egypt and Mesopotamia, India and China.
Many of the public institutions in Greece were deliberately constructed in
order to lessen the extent and impact of corruption.2 What is a more
striking fact about the situation today, however, is not that corruption takes
place in practically every country in the world, and should be considered
as a potential problem everywhere, but the wide variation in the degree to
which corrption is observed. So the starting questions are:
How to explain the fact that levels of corrption seem to vary strongly
across societies? Why may similar situations almost always give rise to a
2 Arecent historical discussion of the problem may be found in John T. Noonan (1984).
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if the engagement of Another is not essential, we may talk about economic
disloyalty, which is a wider category. Money is, of course, the most
marketable good. Letus briefly note what is not included in our definition:
Ilegal markets as such are not included, since at 1east one of the
participants of corrpt schemes owe their participation to their position in
hierarchies, which is not generally the case in ilegal markets. Prostitution,
drugdealing, etc. may generally take place without breaking any hierarchic
rule, indeed no hierarchy may be involved at all. So such markets are
generally outside our domain of discourse, but may sometimes be involved
as forms of payment for corrpt services, for example in order to seal the
secrecy of a transaction. The main reason for this exclusion is our focus on
hierarchy. if we had only been interested in the breaking of rules within
hierarchies, however, we had to deal with phenomenon like embezzlement,
pilfering, position-related stealing etc. Because of our interest in the
transactional strcture of corrption, which I believe gives much of the clue
to any economic explanation of the variation in corruption frequencies, such
phenomena are excluded. More importantly, purely political forms of
corruption are also defined away. For example, when a politician uses his
office against the rules in order to gain some political asset, it is not
corrption as defined here, neither is nepotism as such. One may disagree
with our way to restrict the scope of the analysis, but it is certainly
legitimate in a formal way. It wil prove to be less fruitful, however, if in
fact political and economic forms of corrption are too closely intertwined
in the empirical world. Hence, I wil claim that rather pure forms of
economic corruption exist and may exist without being mixed into all kinds
of complicated political games.
Some existing ways to explain variation in corruption rates
One way to set out for an explanation of this variation is to point to the
fact that countries do have different economic systems. Under one set of
institutions, economic rules may yield higher incidence of corrption than
others. For example, some experts of the Soviet Union claim that much of
the corrption in the traditional system there could be explained as a
consequence of the economic and political system. An extreme expression
of this point of view may be found in Konstantin Simis (1982).
Some claims of plausibility can be made for that point of view. Since a
larger fraction of the whole set of economic decisions in a socialist
economy is centrally directed, it is also almost on ly a matter of definition
that a larger fraction of the transactions taken place are conceivably corrpt.
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way to try to explain variation in the incidence of corrption in different
African countries. It wil not be pursued in the following, however, since
it wiliead into various purely political mechanisms and variables which
are outside the focus of the paper.
Level of economic development. The first systematic attempt to explain
variation in corrption levels, and then by introducing the level of
economic development, was made in political science by Huntington
(1968). The explanation was almost embarrassingly old-fashioned, a
nineteenth-century type of stage theory, also called the "modemisation"
hypothesis. It is based upon the stylised "fact that in the "traditional" stage
corrption is rare or meaningless, while it increases during the
modemisation process and culminates when that process is at it fastest pace.
Corrption then subsides and reaches a low and stable size at the modem
stage.
The major mechanism that makes this work is that somehow during
modernisation the level of political participation increases faster than
political institutionalisation. It is not clear, at least not for an economist,
what this means, but the explanation was a kind of quasi-functionalistic
one; corrption was explained through the political function it has in
containing the antagonistic forces released through modernisation, although
he accepted that corrption as such would have a large number of negative
direct effects. Huntington also sugge sted many minor, but less vague
mechanisms: new norms and new values held by newelites that defined old
practices as corrpt, new regulations and larger states that created new
opportunities, etc. The policy implication of this view is repugnant since it
tells us to wait and do nothing significant about corruption until the country
in question has become sufficiently developed.
Since many less developed countries apparently have more extensive
corruption than most industrialised countries, it may be tempting to look in
the same direction as Huntington. Few convincing explanations of why the
leve1 of economic development may be so important have so far been
supplied, however. And an eventual relationship cannot be a one-to-one
relationship. For example, many Italian observers tend to conclude that a
developed region like Piedmonte has more corrption, while some less
developed areas, like Sardinia and Basilicata, have less corrption than the
national average. As pointed out by Ben-Dor (1974), corruption is not a
phenomenon that automatically disappears when political organisations
become more complex and institutionalised.
Culture. Social anthropologists have, of course, frequently come across
corruption during field work and have also tried to explain it. To be very
brief, their major way of dealing with corrption is to regard it as mainly
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may give rise to inconsistent norm systems in man y contexts, not only in
rapidly changing societies.
Around most activities, job tasks, institutions, etc. in any given society,
the public holds expectations about how office holders should perform their
roles, how the institutions should work. Myth systems are created, but they
are too vague and idealistic to be practical as a guide for behaviour.
Operators have to do something else, and operational codes are developed
among them, which then guide their behaviour. Certain forms of deviance
between prescribed and actual behaviour may be condemned as corruption
according to the myth system. There is no obvious reason why the deviance
between the myth systems and operational codes has to be less in
industrialised countries than in transitions from "traditional" to "modem"
economies.
Economic explanations of corruption
When economists started to explore questions related to corruption, they
naturally started from a different angle since they have no traditions for
considering any piece of behaviour as "explained" when relating it to some
kind of rules or norms or supemorms. Instead, the standard micro-economic
way to explain behaviour, was applied also in this case.
Situational analyses
Most of the analytical work on corruption has described particular situations
- the constraints that agents had to take into account - with relatively
great care. Noting that politicians, higher-level and lower-level bureaucrats
operate under systematically different sets of constraints, Rose-Ackerman
(1978) started to develop different types of models for these groups. The
advantage of the situational approach is that it is relatively easy to construct
realistic and detailed models. The disadvantage is that there are so many
conceivable situations where corrpt transactions may take place, that
detaIled situational analyses are difficult to generalise. It has proved
impossible to constrct such typical situations for members of an hierarchy
as the ones of the representative consumer and profit maximising firm. That
research strategy copied standard micro-economics perhaps toa directly.
Moreover, the models set up a too easy task for themselves in the sense
that they often make it trivial that a corrupt transaction would be the
dominant strategy for the given situation.
Most economic models of this kind study situations where lower-level
bureaucrats administer a supply of a public good or penalty or a purchase
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of cases has to be dealt with separately, while the others have to wait.
Although the cases waiting may not be formally organised as a queue, in
many cases they are. Of course, there may exist pars of the administration
which have practically nothing to do, hence no cases waiting, no queue.
Pure hold-ups may then be necessary in order to elicit a bribe.
Status of agents. The status of the agents may be of importance both by
influencing their motivational structures and situational constraints. So far,
we have only considered the behaviour of lower-ranking bureaucrats that
only need to consider the impact of actions on their own situation. A
higher-ranking bureaucrat, on the other hand, is likely to consider the
effects of bribes not only on his own position, but that on his office as
well. Wil, for example, the acceptance of corrption in his office increase
or decrease its level of activity? Other characteristics that normally are
strongly correlated to the rank of the officials and which would
systematically influence their eventual corrupt behaviour, are job security,
the possibility of manipulating the control apparatus, and the exposure to
eventual media attention and peer pressure. They are mainly working
through the constraints of the situation.
Politicians' preferences, on the other hand, wil be influenced by their
job insecurity. They are likely to watch closely the effects of engaging in
corrpt activities on the probabilty of their political survival. As indicated
above, trade-offs between their survi val probability and the level of
corrptly generated income would normally exist.
Economic explanations of the variation in corruption frequency
When seeking to explain variation in frequency, economists have kept the
assumptions about rationality of the situational analyses of corruption.
Everybody are opportunistic in the sense that they can imagine themselves
performing corrpt acts and ca1culate whether these acts wil increase their
utility or not. To assume that they may imagine that, is already a strong
statement about behaviour. As indicated by Jon Elster (1989) it may be
inappropriate in this context to assume that norms have already lost so
much of their emotional grip when trying to explain the degree to which
they are observed. Nevertheless, we wil stick to this assumption in the
following.
The general idea. The basic new ide a which has been brought into play
when variation in corrption frequencies has been explained by economists
is simple and straightforward: The expected profitability of engaging in a
corrupt trans action compared to not engaging in it hinges upon the number
of other people who do it. In some way or other all the analytical models
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due to the fact that the capacity of public investigations and prosecution
may be strained.
Figure L
The utility of corrp and non-corrpt transactions
Utility
o
c
A
n
(
less corrption
)
more corruption
Another set of factors is dealing with transaction costs. Since corrpt
deals are ilegal, they have somehow to be hidden. If few people are
corrupt, they are difficult to find. A person who has discovered an
opportunity for a corrpt deal must then try to establish contact with several
people on the other side of the "market" before succeeding. Each
unsuccessful contact is risky and non-profitable. This "thin" market is likely
to remain unorganised when corrption is rare. No middleman activity and
no standardised contracts are likely to arise at these frequencies, which
implies that the search costs associated with the matching of two corrupt
individuals are likely to decrease rapidly as the fraction of the population
which is corrpt increases.
Why wil the Co curve eventually turn? Let us first note that as the
number of corrpt officials increases, and after the negative shifts in search
costs associated with organisational changes (middlemen, standard
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towards the stable high equilibrium level, the "dirty" point C; if it starts off
with a lower lev el than B it wil end up at the dean point, A. What does
this conception imply for the observable phenomena of corruption?
First of all, it is quite conceivable that one may observe widely different
levels of corrption with the same set of preferences, the same economic
system, etc. Secondly, small changes may have a large impact if the
economy starts out at points close to B. For example, the departure of a
colonial administration may make it slightly more profitable to eng age in
corrupt acts than before, and this may be sufficient to move the economy
towards very high corruption 1evels. Or more optimistically, a slightly better
control system may be sufficient to move the economy towards a dean
point.
Another optimistic implication is that if one by a short-lived, but strong
anti-corruption campaign is able to move the economy from C and beyond
B the economy wil drive through on its own momentum to A. The
campaign may then be lifted without any serious consequences. Another,
more worrisome, implication is that although the economy may be dose to
a clean point, one should stil take corrption seriously; if B is in fact close
to A, small shocks may then be sufficient to make the economy slide down
into a high corrption level trap.
Note that in the way the figure is drawn, lassume that corrption has
negative welfare consequences in the sense that everybody is better off in
A than in C although corruption may increase welfare in a restricted area
of corrption frequencies.
Although suggestive, a Schellng diagram is hardly precise. It does not
specify actual mechanisms through which its condusions may be reached.
The theory suggested above is compatible with several different economic
mechanisms. In addition, it is also evident that the diagram drawn may be
compatible with more purely sociological mechanisms. For example,
Schlicht (1981) explores the idea that reference groups may be important
in economic behaviour. In our case one may simply assume that the
probability of one official making the corrpt choice be dependent on what
he con siders the average behaviour of his reference group to be, in order
to generate the behaviour pattern visualised above. Inter alia, Schlicht s ide a
implies that small changes in the economic profitability of single acts of
corrption may cause large changes in observed behaviour through the
sociological reference group mechanism. The sociological mechanism may
multiply the economic effects of changes in economic variables.
Feedback mechanisms between observed behaviour, reputation and
intrinsic moral values wil also lead to similar kind of behaviour in our
context of corrption.
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not pocketed by the government, but by one of its officiais. In his 1990
aricle Lien modifies that conclusion somewhat by pointing out that more
personalised, more "traditional" forms of corruption may lead to inefficient
buying decisions.
Queuing models represent a more direct attack on the problems discussed
by Leff and MyrdaL. Although the queuing models, like the multiple
equilbria mo dels do not bring in the third-party effects either, they
nevertheless open up for the possibility that corrption may be inefficient
even for the agents directly involved.
An important focus of interest is the question whether the usual bribing
procedures would speed up or slow down queues. As indicated above,
while open queues are relatively rare in most countries, occurring at
airports, harbours, admission to hospitals etc., almost any administrative
process have some queue-like features. We wil in fact discover that some
of the models suggested, which appear utterly implausible as a description
of open, public queues make sen se in such closed administrative contexts.
On a common sense basis, it is not difficult to imagine situations where
one should expect bribery to increase the speed of a queue and other
situations where the opposite should apply. if a fixed price for each finished
case has been established as custom, for example for a driver's licence, the
bribes are likely to increase the speed, if the supply of new applicants is
large. On the other hand, if the queue is thin, and there are possibilities for
discriminating among the queue standers, the organiser would need time to
test each individual's wilingness to pay. He wil thereby increase the
average waiting time and thereby also the value of gaining priority in the
queue. In many cases a queue may only form if application time is
increased.
As one might suspect at the beginning, analytical specification of models
as such, is not sufficient to settle this matter, although the analytically best
specified models tend to favour the conclusion that an increase in speed is
more likely.
Public commission reports tend to draw the opposite conclusions. They
may even regard a slowing down of the speed of administrative processes
as an independent cause of corrption, since any slowing down implies that
the bribers and bribees get better time to bargain the corrupt deals and to
hide them, reducing the probability of detection (Malaysia, 1955 pp.13-14).
TheIr overall conclusion with respect to the efficiency is clearly stated in
the Indian commttee (Santhanam, 1964, p.lO) which concluded that "this
custom of speed money has become one of the most serious causes of delay
and inefficiency".
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Empirical investigations of corruption
While there exist, scattered all over the world, interesting joumalistic
investigations of particular cases of corrption, studies that are thorough
and really able to address the theoretical questions raised in the academic
literature, are almost non-existing. There are exceptions, however.
I have already mentioned one such study by Oldenburg (1987) which
ilustrates how important beliefs about the incidence of corruption may be
for the actual occurrence of the phenomenon. Discrepancy between beliefs
and observed rates is important for the dynamics of almost all the multiple
equilibria models.
Wade (1982, 1985, 1989) gives a lot of detail about a specific irrigation
administration which shows how the efficiency of that specific institution
is linked to the specific forms of corruption which permeate it. He also
shows how the behaviour of politicians, lower- and higher-level officials
may be interlinked, payment systems centralised, and trans action costs
reduced as corrption becomes institutionalised.
The Knapp Commission Report (1973) about police corruption in New
York also contains systematic observations about the size and regularity of
bribes in various sectors of the New York police, which can shed light on
the role of moral restraints and the risk of detection for the bribe sizes
claimed. For example, earnings and extent of corruption in the gambling
sector us ed to be much larger than in the narcotics division mainly because
policemen themselves considered narcotics to be a more harmful trade to
protect. Here it may be of interest to note that the Hong Kong police did
not feel that way about narcotics, and the narcotics protection used to be
the largest and most lucrative business of the Hong Kong police before the
crackdown on police corrption in that city (Klitgaard, 1988). Restaurants
in New York were fairly lucrative, while control of prostitutes yielded
almost nothing due to the complete lack of mutual trust between the
prostitutes and the policemen, and was a much smaller trade than one
should expect.
Graham and McKean (Economist, Nov. 19 1988) have made a study of
US import shares in corrpt countries before and after the passing of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, which forbid most corrpt payments
by U.S. citizens to foreign officials and politicians. That study has two
interesting aspects. Based upon information from U.S. embassies they could
make an assessment of corrption levels in different countries. Secondly,
their study has some impact on the question whether corruption may be
efficient or not since they showed that the U.S. did not lose its import
shares in the high-corrpt areas, and they had reason to believe that the law
at least to some extent had been implemented.
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Second, it may in certain situations become an alternative to
economically motivated corruption: I may either hand out a scholarship to
a student of my tribe or get a 100 dollar bribe.
In general, one should expect "positive" spilover effects, however. if
more engage in corruption for friendship, the trans action costs for economic
corrption wil also decline, the respect for the rules wil also be reduced,
etc. In addition, the more extensive networks may themselves be used in
order to facilitate economically motivated corruption. More decisions have
to be made on the basis of political games and it becomes difficult to
distinguish between corrupt acts made on the basis of political necessity or
economic opportunism. But, again, these personal networks do not have to
work that way. They could be used as mechanisms for destroying the public
servants' reputation when they engaged in corrpt acts. Alas, so far this has
not be en the dominant tendency in an African context, but that may
change?
Policy implications: How to fight corruption?
It may be difficult to read strong policy implications from the preceding
rather abstract analysis. Nevertheless, there is at least one clear implication:
the shock approach of anti-corrption campaigns may be successfuL. If the
government by any means is able to force down the frequency of corrupt
acts, corrption also becomes less profitable, and may stay at the low level
equilbrium. Is this a relevant implication in an African context? It may not,
for if the personal networks are strong enough and the govemmental
. apparatus is mainly regarded as an arena for gaining personal advantages,
the purely economic and individualistic mechanisms are not likely to be
strong enough to tie the situation at the low leveL.
There have also been many anti-corrption campaigns in countries like
Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya to make one scepticaL. Nevertheless, there have
been campaigns that show the relevance of the mechanisms outlined. For
example, the strong anti-corruption campaign which was undertaken in the
Zaria province of Nigeria in 1958-59, and referred to above, the fact that
the public's manifest attitude changed in the expected direction, and that
their hostility to corrpt officials became open, may be a supporting case.
Wiliams (1987, p. 124) mentions Murtala Muhammed's campaign in 1976
in Nigeria as successful in many ways, but he had insufficient political
support to turn the situation. Rawlings' campaigns in Ghana have also been
reported as partly successful by some observers.
However, the analysis is obviously toa abstract to give many clues to be
used in practical anti-corruption policies. Nevertheless, our basic starting
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decade later USAID/Senegal employed Nihan' s framework as the basis for
a similar study in Dakar, Senegal (Zarour, 1989; Lubell and Zarour, 1990).
The ILO's Jobs and Skills Program for Africa carried out several
in formal sector studies in the late 1970's and the early 1980's in the urban
are as of both anglophone and francophone countries like Burkina Faso, the
Gambia, Tanzania, Congo, Djibouti, Niger and Zambia. The results from
the studies are summarised in an ILO publication on the Informal Sector in
Africa (ILO, 1985).
Various studies have focused on the informal sector in Latin America and
the Caribbean. The ILO Urbanization and Employment Research Project
commssioned studies of the urban informal sector in three cities of Latin
America in the mid-1970's: Bogota (Columbia), Campinas (Brazil) and
Cordoba (Argentina). ILO's Program on Employment in Latin America and
the Caribbean (PREALC) has initiated extensive studies in this region of
the world. According to Lubell (1991) these studies were characterised by
a labour market approach, I.e., that PREALC viewed informality primarily
as a res ult of an excessavailability of labour for employment in the formal
sector and that informal sector activity is entered only as an alternative to
open unemployment. The PREALC series of surveys was conducted in the
1970's and included three major cities of Mexico (Mexico City,
Guadalajara and Monterrey), Asuncion (Paraguay), San Salvador (El
Salvador), Quito and Guayaquil (Ecuador), Kingston (Jamaica) and
Santiago (Chile). The results are summarised in PREALC (1978). Other
institutions and individuals have also conducted studies of the informal
sector in Latin America. Of particular importance is Hernando de Soto's
(1989) well-known book "The Other Path" (El Otro Sendero) that describes
the informal sector in Lima (Peru) in the 1980's.
Lubell (1991) states that the informal sec tor in Asia has recei ved less
attention than is the case for the other two continents of the developing
world. Stil, ILO has directed two research programs toward the informal
sector in Asian countries. Its Urbanization and Employment Research
Project Studies (Sethuraman, 1981a) included surveys in Jakarta
(Indonesia), Manila (Philippines) and Colombo (Sri Lanka) in the
mid-1970's. Under the Asian Regional Training and Employment
Programme, ILO organised a two-stage survey in Dhaka (Bangladesh) in
1979 (see Amin, 1987) as well as a sample survey of self-employed and
small proprietors in Bangkok (Thailand) in 1986 (see ILO/ARTEP, 1988).
Other Asian informal sector surveys include the 1986 study of four Indian
provincial cities conducted by the National Institute of Urban Affairs, New
Delhi and a 1987 survey of the informal sector in Delhi and five other
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However, the ILO Kenya Mission (ILO, 1972) defined informal sector by
certain characteristics: a) Ease of entry; b) Reliance on indigenous
resources; c) Family ownership of resources; d) Small scale of operation;
e) Labour-intensive and adapted technology; f) Skills acquired outside the
formal school system; and g) Unregulated and competitive markets.
According to Lubell (1991) subsequent research definitions have only been
variants of the Kenya reports list. In particular later studies have suggested
that listed characteristics should be qualified with the adverb "relatively".
It may for instance turn out that of ten entry is not particularly easy, or that
resource inputs may be of foreign origin etc.
Sethuraman (1981b) has stated that the multiplicity of criteria in the ILO
Kenya report causes ambiguity because each criterion can be used to create
a uni verse of its own. He therefore proposed a general definition of
informal sec tor as small-scale units engaged in the production and
distribution of goods and services whose primary objective is to generate
employment for the participants rather than to maximize profits. The ILO
studies on the informal sector in Latin America and the Caribbean used two
alternative definitions of informal sector activity; the first was based on
labour force status while the other us ed an income criterion. Mazumdar
(1976) viewed informality as a labour market phenomenon that could
explain differences in incomes at the lower end of the income distribution,
while several recent studies (see Lubell, 1991) have identified informality
with ilegality. Studies especially from Latin America define informal sector
as ilegal in the sense that informal activities do not comply with
regulations pertaining to fiscal, employment, health and other matters.
All scholars do not seem to accept the in formal/formal dichotomy.
Mingione (l 985) has for instance replaced the dichotomy with a "spectrum
of human activities contributing to reproduction". He distinguished seven
types of human (re)productive activities: formal, mixed formallinformal,
pure informal, ilegal activities, work not exchanged for income,
extraordinary work for self-consumption and "normal" domestic work.
Mingione's (1985) approach is interesting because it breaks away from the
informal/formal dichotomy, and according to Boer (1990) it could be a
useful guide to theory formation and empirical research in to the dynamics
of (in)formalisation processes.
Informal sector: Different viewpoints
The informal sector is controversial because there are many different
viewpoints from which one can observe this sector (ILO, 1991). The
negative view of the informal sector is perhaps the most traditional way of
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The other claims that economic growth is a precondition for sol ving
environmental problems.
Since one of the most visible extemal consequences of the present
western economic systems is environmental problems, it has been easy and
rational to blame the production systems for the observed diffculties. The
argument is that economic growth induces environmental destruction
because the main goal of production is profit and not the needs of people
or the tolerance of nature. The circulation of money in the system does not
correspond to the circulation of energy and natural resources, which creates
an exhausting consumption of energy and natural resources. Resource
utilisation is determned by profit potential, and because the mai n driving
force in the production system is profit and not needs or nature, environ-
mental concerns are bound to lose when they have to compete with
economic considerations. This is strengthened by the fact that
environmental consequences of production are regarded as external factors
for the production unit. The costs of pollution or resource exhaustion are
not included in the firm' s accounts, and environmental considerations are
thus considered as extra costs, which the firms do not want to cover (until
they are forced to do so). The logical conclusion is that the economic
system does not have the potential to incorporate environmental
considerations.
The quite opposite view arises from the same techno-economic
philosophical heritage. The argument is that economic profit and growth
provide the society with technologies and resources so that it is possible to
solve the environmental problems. The radical position here is that it is
necessary to incorporate environmental considerations in the production and
resource decision and utilisation process, rather than concentrating on
cleaning up the mess created during the production process. Perhaps some
of the explanation for the popularity of the Brundtland report is that it has
shown away where the politicians do not need to choose between
economic growth or environment. They can have both.
In assessing the history of industrialisation in the third world, it appears
that one of the main failures (or explanations for failures), is that the
industrial units have been producing without a sufficieIit profit margin to
allow reinvestment or improved performance. This is typically a problem
for aid supported industries, which often lean on subsidies instead of their
own performance. The absence of profitability as an indicator of success,
has lead to misdirected use of scarce resources which has gradually drained
the industrial sector for its own potential. At the same time, the availability
of resources for improving and upgrading already existing industries to be
environmentally sound, are scarce in most third world countries.
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the threat to the environment. The third criterion for sustainable industrial
development should therefore be:
3. Social Sustainabilty:
An industrial activity which generates income possibilities and
distribution of resources to a large number of people in the local
society.
Accepting this argument, there is stil a problem of implementing this
criterion because of the owner-structure, control and knowledge of
production methods, organisation and finance necessary to produce. One of
the main constraints for developing an industrial base which distributes
resources to the local population and takes environmental considerations
into account, is the distribution of knowledge. Without the basic knowledge
to run and maintain an industry, there wil be a constant need for infusion
of foreign knowledge and capital which in turn leaves the control of the
production to people and bodies with their own interests in short term
profitability. And at the same time, using expatriates to compensate for the
lack of local knowledge, also means that a great deal of the resources
available, wil be spent on satisfying the needs and demands of the
expatriates and the local elite. The distribution process wil thus not take
place.
Therefore, our final statement is that in order to have sustainable
industrial development, the production technologies and also the potentials
for production improvements, should be controlled locally. One of the core
factors to achieve this, implies that the knowledge of the technologies and
the capabilties to improve the processes and the products, are locally
available and controlled. Therefore the fourth criterion for sustainable
industrial development should be:
4. Technological Sustainabilty:
An industrial development appropriate to the local level and
availabilty of knowledge and technologies.
Together the four criteria form a concept for sustainable industrial
development. We wil now make an attempt to evaluate the informal
sector' s role for sustainable industrial development in third world countries
with regard to these four criteria.
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sector products comes from within the informal sector itself. However,
although the informal sector plays an important role in satisfying the needs
of the urban poor, the extremely low purchasing power of these people is
an inadequate base for growth. A large proportion of in formal sector output
is consumed by people who derive their income from the formal sector of
the economy, but according to ILO (1991) this is not enough. If the
demand for informal sector output is to grow significantly, it is necessary
to strengthen market linkages with the rest of the economy. Subcontracting
by formal sec tor enterprises to informal enterprises may be one solution. In
fact, this type of subcontracting is already a major source of demand for
informal sector products in some Latin America and Asian developing
countries. In other countries, particularlyin Africa, this kind of
subcontracting is much less prevalent (Lubell, 1991).
Informal sector enterprises of ten compete against each other on the local
market, resulting in tough price competition and declining profitability. In
some countries, like, e.g., the Philippines informal sector businesses are
able to produce for export (Heide, 1991). However, most of these sales are
handled by monopsonistic intermediaries who to a great extent deterrne
the prices. Teszler (1990) argues that assistance in quality improvement and
cooperative marketing as well as improved market information are key
elements in improving the market situation for informal sec tor enterprises.
Other key elements of economic sustainability are finance and credit.
There seems to be consensus in that the difficulties informal sector
producers face in obtaining credit constitute one of the main barriers to
their growth. Most informal sector businesses have little or no collateral to
offer and as aresult they are forced to borrowing from money-lenders on
highly unfavourable terms. Since many informal enterprises run on a near
to subsistence leveL, the equity base is rather slim as is the potential for
capital accumulation through savings.
There are numerous examples of credit systems for informal sector
entities, created by NGOs, governments or donor organisations. However,
ILO (1991) argues that while such schemes have proved to be useful in
tapping and channellng resources from outside to the informal sector, they
also run the risk of becoming to dependent on external financing and
assistance. According to ILO (1991) the problem of inadequate credit wil
not be solved unless the informal enterprises have access to modem
financial institutions. Cooperative-types banks and savings schemes or
similar arangements should have an important role in this respect, since
they can act as intermediaries between the informal sec tor entities and the
formal banking system. However, while such schemes usually require
assistance from the government or a donor organisation, it is important that
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with which exhaustible resources are utilised should be optimised, subject
to substitutabilty among resources and technological progress. (2) The
renewable resources should be utilised at rates less than or equal to the
natural or managed rate at which they can be continuously regenerated. (3)
Wastes should be emitted at rates less than or equal to the natural or
managed rates at which they can be continuously generated.
It can be argued that the informal sec tor is an appropriate mechanism for
sustainable extraction of resources. The extraction rate of non-renewable
resources such as oil, gas and coal in the informal sector is certainly less
than is the case for formal sector companies. In fact, the scale advantages
found in the exploration and exploitation of these resources usually exclude
any informal sector participation. When it comes to extraction of
renewables, the situation is more complex. Most researchers agree that
informal sector entrepreneurs generally are mas ters in "making much out
of little" . The budget restriction that most of these entrepreneurs face,
ensures an efficient allocation of input resources.
However, there are at least two exceptions to this rule. The first is related
to the fact that most informal sector entrepreneurs rely on a local market
for their inputs. If the inputs are extracted in the local region and few
alternative sources exist, overexploitation of the local resource base may
occur, as a result of, e.g., a sudden increase in demand for finished
products. The other exception is related to external costs. If inputs are free,
the entrepreneurs wil face no cost in overexploiting the resource base. In
the Philppines for examp1es, informal sec tor brick producers tend to cut
down and burn the local trees at a much higher rate than the forests can
regenerate (Heide, 1991). The informal sector is almost by definition
non-controllable. if few economic motives exist for sustainable resource
extraction, it is difficult for the authorities to pre vent the informal sector
entrepreneurs from overexploiting the resource base.
In the refinement phase, there are at least two aspects that can threaten
the environmental sustainability of the informal sector; non-controllability
and limited resources. The problem of non-controllability stems both from
the large number of entrepreneurs and the informality of the sector itself.
It seems evident that at least in principle it is easier for an environmental
control agency to monitor a small number of large scale production plants
than is the case with numerous informal sector enterprises. The fact that the
informal enterprises rarelyare registered makes monitoring as well
sanctioning more of a problem compared to dealing with the formal sec tor.
However, there are some advantages as well. It is likely that the small
scale of the production and the simple technologies employed in the
informal sector, can be characterised as being less environmentally harmful
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sector should contribute in reducing the differences between rich and poor
in these countries.
It has been argued that the informal sector is socially unsustainable in the
absolute sense. Biggs (1991) argues that historical evidence from most
developed and developing countries indicates that the very small enterprises
are largely displaced by small and medium factories as industrialisation
proceeds. Over time the developing society wil experience what Biggs
(1991) calls the efficient structural transformation process. In other words
the formalisation process seems to be closely interlinked with industrial
development. Indeed significant characteristics of the developed welfare
state with almost full employment, are a high degree of formalisation of
activities and regulations that discriminate against the informal sector (Boer,
1990).
The social sustainability of the informal sector can also be questioned in
the relative sense. In a long term perspective informal sector activities may
in fact increase rather than diminish inequalities in living conditions.
Informal sector employment may offer temporary gains for those who work
there, but as we have discussed earlier, much of the profit potential is often
extracted by middle-men. Similarly, in cases where informal sector
enterprises act as subcontractors for formal sector corporations, chances are
that the larger firm draws off the profit. The fact that the majority of
informal sector enterprises operate beyond the law, implies that the workers
receive little or no legal protection. Poor working conditions and abusive
forms of exploitation are not uncommon in the informal sec tor. Within this
sector, two groups stand out as being particularly vulnerable: women and
children (ILO, 1991). Data from a number of countries show that half or
more of total women's employment is in the informal sec tor. Moreover,
within the informal sector, they tend to be concentrated in the most
insecure and lowest paid forms of employment. The plight of children in
the informal sector is perhaps the most tragic aspect of the problem.
Although child labour is prohibited in most countries, millions of them are
working, of ten in the most deplorable and hazardous conditions in the
informal sec tor. ILO (1991) states:
Whatever form it takes, child labour is an extreme manifestation of
poverty, since the poorest families have to rely on their children's labour
in order to survive; but it also results in a perpetuation of poverty, since
it prevents children from acquiring the education and skils that would
equip them for better employment and better paid jobs, in their adult life
(p. 8).
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learning process they acquire skills in "modem" technologies and
organisations. However, from the mid 1970's, which is the long lasting
stagnation period of the formal industrial sector in Africa, a growing part
of the industrial training and skills-acquisition takes place in the informal
sector. The indigenous apprenticeship-systems in Africa now provide a
majority of the urban workforce with vocational training (Lubell, 1991).
This training is based on traditional systems, where new workers are trained
by their masters. The informal sector thereby contributes in a significant
way to the local learning process and provides new workers with some
basic skills. These skills are to a large extent based on traditional
technologies and knowledge. We would argue that informal sector today is
one of the most important arenas for maintaining traditional skils and
technological knowledge.
At the same time, there are also some elements of "modem" technologies
in the sector as such, which justify that the informal sector to some extent
provides a necessary linkage between traditional technologies and modem
improvements. At the same time, the in formal sector suffers from poor
performance because of inadequate equipment and insufficient levels of
technological and managerial skils. One of the characteristics the informal
sec tor is the low capital per worker ratio, and a correlating low quality on
products and productivity. The informal sector remains on a fairly
unproductive level where people can survive, but hardly develop. And the
development of knowledge and skills beyond the elementary leve1 is
marginaL. Lubell (1991) states that there is some evidence which indicates
that the rates of innovations and development are positively correlated with
the level of education among the artisans. The low leve1 of education may
thus partly explain, as we have discussed earlier, why entrepreneurs in the
informal sector tend to copy and reproduce imported products, rather than
improving them.
Several types of technological and managerial skills are needed in the
informal sector. Most of all, there is a need for training in bookkeeping,
marketing and organisational development among the informal sector
entrepreneurs. There is also a need for adaptation of non-traditional
technologies and innovations to improve the level of performance.
Schumacher (1973) launched his famous term "intermediate technology" as
a strategy for upgrading the traditional technologies and know-how in the
informal sector for fillng the observed gap between traditional and
"modem" technologies. The strategy of the "appropriate technology"
movement is to bu ild on the locallevel of know-ho w and technologies, and
thereby integrate more productive technologies into the traditional
knowledge base. The main problem encountered in this strategy, is how to
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there. Technological sustainability in the in formal sector is to a large extent
restricted to maintenance of existing knowledge and traditional technology,
rather than a dynamic basis for technological development. The role of the
in formal sector as the carrier of traditional knowledge, could represent an
important starting point for acquiring industrial skills. However, the main
challenge in this respect, wil be to create systems where it is possible to
combine the traditional knowledge base with modem industrial know-how.
From our arguments it should be c1ear that we do not consider the
informal sector to be sustainable in a long term view. We wil thus argue
that maintaining a large informal sector should be no goal for any country.
The lon g term aim should be to convert informal sec tor activities to formal
sector enterprises. How then can this transformation be accomplished,
without creating disastrous side-effects?
In our opinion, there are three necessary conditions that need to be
fulfiled:
1. Strengthening of formal sector
2. Elimination of entry bariers in formal sector.
3. Support for informal sector entrepreneurs
There are c1ear indications that the formal sector needs to be strengthened
in many developing countries. In several African countries, for instance,
salaries in the formal sector are too low to maintain a decent living
standard for its employees. This implies that formal sector employees have
to engage in informal sector activities for eaming extra income. Corruption,
extra jobs and outside inc om e are known practices among e.g. civil servants
in a number of African countries. A formal sec tor which is unable to
sustain its own employees can hardly be expected to attract entrepreneurs
and workers from the informal sec tor.
Secondly, emphasis should be put on establishing predictable patterns of
enterprise development. The aim should be to create equal rights for all to
establish, develop and expand their businesses, in full confidence that the
state bureaucracy wil support their activities as long as the they act in
accordance with offcial laws and regulations.
The elimination of entry barriers in the formal sector is another
important task. Perhaps the most important determinant for successful
growth of micro-enterprises is the general business environment. The
regulatory framework and administrative practices in a great number of
developing countries seriously hamper the transition of enterprises from
informal to formal sec tor.
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economics in an Islamic state. The minister of finance should play much
the same röle as the traditional muhtasib in matters of economic policy, his
main objective beingto secure the general adherence to religious rules and
norms in the economy.
Islamic economists themselves c1aim to represent something new in the
field of economic thinking - an alternative to existing ideologies. Their
papers typically open with a declaration that Islam is neither capitalism nor
communism. Not communism because Islam stresses the right to private
ownership and the spiritual dimension. And not capitalism because this
system is associated with a laissez-jaire where solidarity and ethical values
are ousted in the competition.
I shall in this paper present the role of the state according to Islamic
economics. A neoc1assical analysis of the role of the state would typically
take market failure as point of departure. In Islamic economics it is more
natural to focus on ethics. I shall therefore introduce the concept of norm
failure as central to our understanding of the Islamic state. It wil be a
presentation of principle rather than practice. But before I go on with the
Islamic ideas, let me say some words on ethics in the western economic
tradition.
Ethics in the western economic tradition
Economics in the western tradition is not foreign to moral issues. Indeed,
at the universities economics used to be a branch of ethics. And although
most of us probably associate Adam Smith with the "invisible hand", the
Professor of Moral Philosophy and the founder of modem economics was
himself no believer in pure self-interest. He stressed the virtue of sympathy
and a set of generally accepted norms for the efficiency of the market: The
hand works better in a market of self..interested but honest people.
In developing the science of economics towards technical perfection, its
ethical dimension came more and more in the background. Neoc1assical
economics largely ignores other sentiments than self-interest, focusing on
prices as the only guide to human behaviour. It is up to the Walrasian
auctioneer rather than an Islamic muhtasib to c1ear the markets! Amartya
Sen in his "On Ethics and Economics" argues that "the nature of modem
economics has been substantially impoverished by the distance that has
grown between economics and ethics".
Of course, the neoc1assical school recognizes that prices can be wrong.
Since Adam Smith, economists have spent a lot of time investigating into
when the invisible hand is unable to guide the economy towards an
efficient outcome. The result of this research is the theory of market failure.
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but rather that of a mediator and a moral guide. According to Islamic
economics of today, this should be the approach for dealing with norm
failure in modem economies too:
For establishing economic justice, Islam does not rely on law alone. Great
importance is attached for this purpose to reforming the inner man
through faith, prayers, education and moral training, to changing his
preferences and ways of thinking and inculcating in him a strong moral
sense that keeps him just. 3
Religious education is seen as the most important economic policy of an
Islamic state. Extensive use of force wil not be necessary, it is argued,
because through education economic man wil be converted into Islamic
man.
Islamic man
Islamic man is altruistic and honest, has a modest lifestyle, charges a
reasonable price in trade, do es not involve himself in gambling and
speculation and avoids a1cohol and pork. These attitudes, it is stressed, lead
to both spiritual and material progress for alL. Monopolists wil understand
that charging a high price is unjust and refrain from taking advantage of
market power, polluting firms wil take into account the well-being of
society and reduce emmsions of toxic waste, the rich wil adhere to the
injunctions concerning a modest lifestyle and sympathy for the deprived
and share of their wealth. Conflcts wil be sol ved in "the spirit of
cooperation and collaboration, the eagerness to avoid all injurious effects,
...the common interest of furthering the general good, ...and the altruistic
tendency to help and sacrifice one's own interest".4 In short, adherence to
the Islamic principles would achieve rapid economic growth and a fair
distribution of income at the same time.
The role of the state
In such an Islamic equilibrium, there is not much room for government
intervention. The equilibrium is upheld by norms, enforced by the
individual conscience. This is not to say that Islamic scholars have an
3 Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi in Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi (1981).
4 Siddiqi in Timur Kuran (1983).
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The majority of Islamic scholars, however, argue that Islamic institutions
such as interest free banking and religious taxation should be introduced,
and that people's attitudes wil change together with the institutions.
Concluding remarks
The main contribution of the Islamic literature to our understanding of
economic development is its emphasis on the role play ed by norms in
ensuring social cooperation. Religion can no doubt reduce transaction costs
and contribute to overcome free rider problems by inducing a sense of
solidarity and encouraging honesty and cooperation in economic matters.
But religious institutions are conservative bodies not prone to change. Since
institutional change is an important determinant of economic development,
there is a risk that religious institutions, by upholding status quo, wil
become a bottleneck to economic growth and prosperity.
Omar Asghar Khan, commenting on the Islamisation policies of the
former Pakistani military regime, c1aims that Islam in his country was being
used by a government devoid of popular mandate, as a means of preserving
status quo. "Aware of the attachment of the mas ses to Islam, the ruling
c1asses hope to secure a future for themselves by establishing an
authoritarian and exploitative system, which they can claim to be Islamic."
In this presentation I have focused on the theoretical aspects of the Islamic
state. As for the Islamic state in practice, well, thats a completely different
story.
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